

# DATA EVAL COURSE

Colour, Print (suitable for print) (CP, Colour, Print)

Compiled 2. May 2014



**a) Table of Contents, in Checksheet order:**

1.	65-02-07	KEEPING SCIENTOLOGY WORKING.....	1
2.	70-06-17	TECHNICAL DEGRADES.....	9
3.	_____	THE LOGICS .....	11
4.	70-04-11	THIRD DYNAMIC TECH.....	15
5.	70-04-26	THE ANATOMY OF THOUGHT .....	19
6.	70-05-11	LOGIC.....	27
7.	70-05-12	BREAKTHROUGHS .....	31
8.	70-05-15	DATA AND SITUATION ANALYZING.....	33
9.	70-05-15	INFORMATION COLLECTION .....	37
10.	70-05-17	DATA SYSTEMS .....	41
11.	70-05-18	FAMILIARITY .....	45
12.	70-05-19	SANITY .....	49
13.	75-03-12	THE IDEAL ORG .....	55
14.	70-05-23	ERRORS.....	57
15.	70-06-23	THE MISSING SCENE .....	61
16.	70-06-30	THE SITUATION.....	67
17.	70-07-05	HOW TO FIND AND ESTABLISH AN IDEAL SCENE .....	71
18.	70-07-06	IRRATIONALITY .....	79
19.	70-07-07	WORKING AND MANAGING .....	89
20.	70-08-08	WRONG TARGET .....	93
21.	70-09-19	INVESTIGATORY PROCEDURE .....	95
22.	70-09-19	NARROWING THE TARGET.....	99
23.	70-09-19	SUMMARY OF OUTPOINTS.....	103
24.	70-10-13	THE REAL WHY .....	107
25.	70-11-26	MORE OUTPOINTS .....	109
26.	71-03-15	DATA SERIES AUDITING .....	111
27.	72-01-31	THE WHY IS GOD.....	113
28.	72-02-17	PROPER FORMAT AND CORRECT ACTION .....	115
29.	72-02-29	HANDLING POLICY, PLANS, PROGRAMS PROJECTS AND ORDERS DEFINED .....	125
30.	72-03-19	LEARNING TO USE DATA ANALYSIS .....	131
31.	72-06-12	LENGTH OF TIME TO EVALUATE .....	139
32.	73-05-25	SUPPLEMENTARY EVALUATIONS .....	143
33.	73-09-19	CHECKING EVALS.....	147
34.	73-09-30	OUTPOINTS, MORE .....	151
35.	73-09-30	SITUATION FINDING .....	153
36.	73-11-25	FINAL TARGETS.....	157
37.	73-12-14	TARGET TROUBLES TARGETS JUNIOR TO POLICY .....	161
38.	74-07-03	EVALUATION, CRITICISM OF .....	165
39.	74-07-18	SITUATION CORRECTION.....	169

40. 74-07-19 EVAL CORRECTION.....171  
41. 74-08-11 ENVISIONING THE IDEAL SCENE.....173  
42. 74-08-12 WHYS OPEN THE DOOR .....175  
43. 74-10-03 PLUSPOINT LIST .....177  
44. 74-10-28 WHO-WHERE FINDING .....179  
45. 75-03-12 THE IDEAL ORG .....181

## **b) Table of Contents, in chronological order:**

1.	_____	THE LOGICS .....	11
2.	65-02-07	KEEPING SCIENTOLOGY WORKING.....	1
3.	70-04-11	THIRD DYNAMIC TECH.....	15
4.	70-04-26	THE ANATOMY OF THOUGHT .....	19
5.	70-05-11	LOGIC.....	27
6.	70-05-12	BREAKTHROUGHS .....	31
7.	70-05-15	DATA AND SITUATION ANALYZING.....	33
8.	70-05-15	INFORMATION COLLECTION.....	37
9.	70-05-17	DATA SYSTEMS .....	41
10.	70-05-18	FAMILIARITY .....	45
11.	70-05-19	SANITY .....	49
12.	70-05-23	ERRORS.....	57
13.	70-06-17	TECHNICAL DEGRADES.....	9
14.	70-06-23	THE MISSING SCENE .....	61
15.	70-06-30	THE SITUATION.....	67
16.	70-07-05	HOW TO FIND AND ESTABLISH AN IDEAL SCENE .....	71
17.	70-07-06	IRRATIONALITY .....	79
18.	70-07-07	WORKING AND MANAGING .....	89
19.	70-08-08	WRONG TARGET .....	93
20.	70-09-19	INVESTIGATORY PROCEDURE .....	95
21.	70-09-19	NARROWING THE TARGET.....	99
22.	70-09-19	SUMMARY OF OUTPOINTS.....	103
23.	70-10-13	THE REAL WHY .....	107
24.	70-11-26	MORE OUTPOINTS .....	109
25.	71-03-15	DATA SERIES AUDITING .....	111
26.	72-01-31	THE WHY IS GOD.....	113
27.	72-02-17	PROPER FORMAT AND CORRECT ACTION .....	115
28.	72-02-29	HANDLING POLICY, PLANS, PROGRAMS PROJECTS AND ORDERS DEFINED .....	125
29.	72-03-19	LEARNING TO USE DATA ANALYSIS .....	131
30.	72-06-12	LENGTH OF TIME TO EVALUATE .....	139
31.	73-05-25	SUPPLEMENTARY EVALUATIONS .....	143
32.	73-09-19	CHECKING EVALS.....	147
33.	73-09-30	OUTPOINTS, MORE .....	151
34.	73-09-30	SITUATION FINDING .....	153
35.	73-11-25	FINAL TARGETS.....	157
36.	73-12-14	TARGET TROUBLES TARGETS JUNIOR TO POLICY.....	161
37.	74-07-03	EVALUATION, CRITICISM OF .....	165
38.	74-07-18	SITUATION CORRECTION.....	169
39.	74-07-19	EVAL CORRECTION.....	171

40.	74-08-11	ENVISIONING THE IDEAL SCENE.....	173
41.	74-08-12	WHYS OPEN THE DOOR.....	175
42.	74-10-03	PLUSPOINT LIST.....	177
43.	74-10-28	WHO-WHERE FINDING.....	179
44.	75-03-12	THE IDEAL ORG.....	181
45.	75-03-12	THE IDEAL ORG.....	55

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1.	70-05-12	BREAKTHROUGHS .....	31
2.	73-09-19	CHECKING EVALS.....	147
3.	70-05-15	DATA AND SITUATION ANALYZING.....	33
4.	71-03-15	DATA SERIES AUDITING .....	111
5.	70-05-17	DATA SYSTEMS .....	41
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16.	70-07-06	IRRATIONALITY .....	79
17.	65-02-07	KEEPING SCIENTOLOGY WORKING.....	1
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24.	74-10-03	PLUSPOINT LIST .....	177
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26.	70-05-19	SANITY .....	49
27.	74-07-18	SITUATION CORRECTION.....	169
28.	73-09-30	SITUATION FINDING .....	153
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44.	70-07-07	WORKING AND MANAGING.....	89
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HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex  
HCO POLICY LETTER OF 7 FEBRUARY 1965  
Reissued 15 June 1970

Remimeo  
Sthil Students  
Assn/Org Sec Hat  
Case Sup Hat  
Ds of P Hat  
Ds of T Hat  
Staff Member Hat  
Franchise  
(issued May 1965)

Note. Neglect of this Pol Ltr has caused great hardship on staffs, has cost countless millions and made it necessary in 1970 to engage in an all out International effort to restore basic Scientology over the world. Within 5 years after the issue of this PL with me off the lines, violation had almost destroyed orgs. "Quickie grades" entered in and denied gain to tens of thousands of cases. Therefore actions which neglect or violate this Policy Letter are **High Crimes** resulting in Comm Evs on **administrators** and **executives**. It is not "entirely a tech matter" as its neglect destroys orgs and caused a two-year slump. **It is the business of every staff member** to enforce it.

*ALL LEVELS*

**KEEPING SCIENTOLOGY WORKING**

HCO Sec or Communicator Hat Check on all  
personnel and new personnel as taken on.

We have some time since passed the point of achieving uniformly workable technology.

The only thing now is getting the technology applied.

If you can't get the technology applied then you can't deliver what's promised. It's as simple as that. If you can get the technology applied, you can deliver what's promised.

The only thing you can be upbraided for by students or pcs is "no results". Trouble spots occur only where there are "no results". Attacks from governments or monopolies occur only where there are "no results" or "bad results".

Therefore the road before Scientology is clear and its ultimate success is assured if the technology is applied.

So it is the task of the Assn or Org Sec, the HCO Sec, the Case Supervisor, the D of P, the D of T and all staff members to get the correct technology applied.

Getting the correct technology applied consists of:

- One: Having the correct technology.
- Two: Knowing the technology.
- Three: Knowing it is correct.
- Four: Teaching correctly the correct technology.
- Five: Applying the technology.
- Six: Seeing that the technology is correctly applied.
- Seven: Hammering out of existence incorrect technology.
- Eight: Knocking out incorrect applications.
- Nine: Closing the door on any possibility of incorrect technology.
- Ten: Closing the door on incorrect application.

One above has been done.

Two has been achieved by many.

Three is achieved by the individual applying the correct technology in a proper manner and observing that it works that way.

Four is being done daily successfully in most parts of the world.

Five is consistently accomplished daily.

Six is achieved by instructors and supervisors consistently.

Seven is done by a few but is a weak point.

Eight is not worked on hard enough.

Nine is impeded by the "reasonable" attitude of the not quite bright.

Ten is seldom done with enough ferocity.

Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten are the only places Scientology can bog down in any area.

The reasons for this are not hard to find. (a) A weak certainty that it works in Three above can lead to weakness in Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten. (b) Further, the not-too-bright have a bad point on the button Self-Importance. (c) The lower the IQ, the more the individual is shut off from the fruits of observation. (d) The service faces of people make them defend themselves against anything they confront, good or bad, and seek to make it wrong. (e) The bank seeks to knock out the good and perpetuate the bad.

Thus, we as Scientologists and as an organization must be very alert to Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten.

In all the years I have been engaged in research I have kept my comm lines wide open for research data. I once had the idea that a group could evolve truth. A third of a century has thoroughly disabused me of that idea. Willing as I was to accept suggestions and data, only a handful of suggestions (less than twenty) had long-run value and none were major or basic; and when I did accept major or basic suggestions and used them, we went astray and I repented and eventually had to "eat crow".

On the other hand there have been thousands and thousands of suggestions and writings which, if accepted and acted upon, would have resulted in the complete destruction of all our work as well as the sanity of pcs. So I know what a group of people will do and how insane they will go in accepting unworkable "technology". By actual record the percentages are about twenty to 100,000 that a group of human beings will dream up bad technology to destroy good technology. As we could have gotten along without suggestions, then, we had better steel ourselves to continue to do so now that we have made it. This point will, of course, be attacked as "unpopular", "egotistical" and "undemocratic". It very well may be. But it is also a survival point. And I don't see that popular measures, self-abnegation and democracy have done anything for Man but push him further into the mud. Currently, popularity endorses degraded novels, self-abnegation has filled the South East Asian jungles with stone idols and corpses, and democracy has given us inflation and income tax.

Our technology has not been discovered by a group. True, if the group had not supported me in many ways I could not have discovered it either. But it remains that if in its formative stages it was not discovered by a group, then group efforts, one can safely assume, will not add to it or successfully alter it in the future. I can only say this now that it is done. There remains, of course, group tabulation or co-ordination of what has been done, which will be valuable – only so long as it does not seek to alter basic principles and successful applications.

The contributions that were worthwhile in this period of forming the technology were help in the form of friendship, of defence, of organization, of dissemination, of application, of advices on results and of finance. These were great contributions and were, and are, appreciated. Many thousands contributed in this way and made us what we are. Discovery contribution was not however part of the broad picture.

We will not speculate here on why this was so or how I came to rise above the bank. We are dealing only in facts and the above is a fact – the group left to its own devices would not have evolved Scientology but with wild dramatization of the bank called "new ideas" would have wiped it out. Supporting this is the fact that Man has never before evolved workable mental technology and emphasizing it is the vicious technology he did evolve – psychiatry, psychology, surgery, shock treatment, whips, duress, punishment, etc, ad infinitum.

So realize that we have climbed out of the mud by whatever good luck and good sense, and refuse to sink back into it again. See that Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten above are ruthlessly followed and we will never be stopped. Relax them, get reasonable about it and we will perish.

So far, while keeping myself in complete communication with all suggestions, I have not failed on Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten in areas I could supervise closely. But it's not good enough for just myself and a few others to work at this.

Whenever this control as per Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten has been relaxed the whole organizational area has failed. Witness Elizabeth, N.J., Wichita, the early organizations and groups. They crashed only because I no longer did Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten. Then, when they were all messed up, you saw the obvious "reasons" for failure. But ahead of that they ceased to deliver and that involved them in other reasons.

The common denominator of a group is the reactive bank. Thetans without banks have different responses. They only have their banks in common. They agree then only on bank principles. Person to person the bank is identical. So constructive ideas are individual and seldom get broad agreement in a human group. An individual must rise above an avid craving for agreement from a humanoid group to get anything decent done. The bank-agreement has been what has made Earth a Hell – and if you were looking for Hell and found Earth, it would certainly serve. War, famine, agony and disease has been the lot of Man. Right now the great governments of Earth have developed the means of frying every Man, Woman and Child on the planet. That is Bank. That is the result of Collective Thought Agreement. The decent, pleasant things on this planet come from individual actions and ideas that have somehow gotten by the Group Idea. For that matter, look how we ourselves are attacked by "public opinion" media. Yet there is no more ethical group on this planet than ourselves.

Thus each one of us can rise above the domination of the bank and then, as a group of freed beings, achieve freedom and reason. It is only the aberrated group, the mob, that is destructive.

When you don't do Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten actively, you are working for the Bank dominated mob. For it will surely, surely (a) introduce incorrect technology and swear by it, (b) apply technology as incorrectly as possible, (c) open the door to any destructive idea, and (d) encourage incorrect application. It's the Bank that says the group is all and the individual nothing. It's the Bank that says we must fail.

So just don't play that game. Do Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten and you will knock out of your road all the future thorns.

Here's an actual example in which a senior executive had to interfere because of a pc spin: A Case Supervisor told Instructor A to have Auditor B run Process X on Preclear C. Auditor B afterwards told Instructor A that "It didn't work." Instructor A was weak on Three above and didn't really believe in Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten. So Instructor A told the Case Supervisor "Process X didn't work on Preclear C." Now this strikes directly at each of One to Six above in Preclear C, Auditor B, Instructor A and the Case Supervisor. It opens the door to the introduction of "new technology" and to failure.

What happened here? Instructor A didn't jump down Auditor B's throat, that's all that happened. This is what he should have done: grabbed the auditor's report and looked it over. When a higher executive on this case did so she found what the Case Supervisor and the rest missed: that Process X increased Preclear C's TA to 25 TA divisions for the session but that near session end Auditor B Qed and Aed with a cognition and abandoned Process X while it

still gave high TA and went off running one of Auditor B's own manufacture, which nearly spun Preclear C. Auditor B's IQ on examination turned out to be about 75. Instructor A was found to have huge ideas of how you must never invalidate anyone, even a lunatic. The Case Supervisor was found to be "too busy with admin to have any time for actual cases".

All right, there's an all too typical example. The Instructor should have done Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten. This would have begun this way. Auditor B: "That Process X didn't work." Instructor A: "What exactly did you do wrong?" Instant attack. "Where's your auditor's report for the session? Good. Look here, you were getting a lot of TA when you stopped Process X. What did you do?" Then the Pc wouldn't have come close to a spin and all four of these would have retained certainty.

In a year, I had four instances in one small group where the correct process recommended was reported not to have worked. But on review found that each one (a) had increased the TA, (b) had been abandoned, and (c) had been falsely reported as unworkable. Also, despite this abuse, in each of these four cases the recommended, correct process cracked the case. Yet they were reported as not having worked!

Similar examples exist in instruction and these are all the more deadly as every time instruction in correct technology is flubbed, then the resulting error, uncorrected in the auditor, is perpetuated on every pc that auditor audits thereafter. So Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten are even more important in a course than in supervision of cases.

Here's an example: A rave recommendation is given a graduating student "because he gets more TA on pcs than any other student on the course!" Figures of 435 TA divisions a session are reported. "Of course his model session is poor but it's just a knack he has" is also included in the recommendation. A careful review is undertaken because nobody at Levels 0 to IV is going to get that much TA on pcs. It is found that this student was never taught to read an E-Meter TA dial! And no instructor observed his handling of a meter and it was not discovered that he "overcompensated" nervously, swinging the TA 2 or 3 divisions beyond where it needed to go to place the needle at "set". So everyone was about to throw away standard processes and model session because this one student "got such remarkable TA". They only read the reports and listened to the brags and never looked at this student. The pcs in actual fact were making slightly less than average gain, impeded by a rough model session and misworded processes. Thus, what was making the pcs win (actual Scientology) was hidden under a lot of departures and errors.

I recall one student who was squirreling on an Academy course and running a lot of off-beat whole track on other students after course hours. The Academy students were in a state of electrification on all these new experiences and weren't quickly brought under control and the student himself never was given the works on Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten so they stuck. Subsequently, this student prevented another squirrel from being straightened out and his wife died of cancer resulting from physical abuse. A hard, tough Instructor at that moment could have salvaged two squirrels and saved the life of a girl. But no, students had a right to do whatever they pleased.

Squirreling (going off into weird practices or altering Scientology) only comes about from non-comprehension. Usually the non-comprehension is not of Scientology but some earlier contact with an off-beat humanoid practice which in its turn was not understood.

When people can't get results from what they think is standard practice, they can be counted upon to squirrel to some degree. The most trouble in the past two years came from orgs where an executive in each could not assimilate straight Scientology. Under instruction in Scientology they were unable to define terms or demonstrate examples of principles. And the orgs where they were got into plenty of trouble. And worse, it could not be straightened out easily because neither one of these people could or would duplicate instructions. Hence, a debacle resulted in two places, directly traced to failures of instruction earlier. So proper instruction is vital. The D of T and his Instructors and all Scientology Instructors must be merciless in getting Four, Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten into effective action. That one student, dumb and impossible though he may seem and of no use to anyone, may yet some day be the cause of untold upset because nobody was interested enough to make sure Scientology got home to him.

With what we know now, there is no student we enroll who cannot be properly trained. As an Instructor, one should be very alert to slow progress and should turn the sluggards inside out personally. No system will do it, only you or me with our sleeves rolled up can crack the back of bad studenting and we can only do it on an individual student, never on a whole class only. He's slow = something is awful wrong. Take fast action to correct it. Don't wait until next week. By then he's got other messes stuck to him. If you can't graduate them with their good sense appealed to and wisdom shining, graduate them in such a state of shock they'll have nightmares if they contemplate squirreling. Then experience will gradually bring about Three in them and they'll know better than to chase butterflies when they should be auditing.

When somebody enrolls, consider he or she has joined up for the duration of the universe – never permit an "open-minded" approach. If they're going to quit let them quit fast. If they enrolled, they're aboard, and if they're aboard, they're here on the same terms as the rest of us – win or die in the attempt. Never let them be half-minded about being Scientologists. The finest organizations in history have been tough, dedicated organizations. Not one namby-pamby bunch of panty-waist dilettantes have ever made anything. It's a tough universe. The social veneer makes it seem mild. But only the tigers survive – and even they have a hard time. We'll survive because we are tough and are dedicated. When we do instruct somebody properly he becomes more and more tiger. When we instruct half-mindedly and are afraid to offend, scared to enforce, we don't make students into good Scientologists and that lets everybody down. When Mrs. Pattycake comes to us to be taught, turn that wandering doubt in her eye into a fixed, dedicated glare and she'll win and we'll all win. Humour her and we all die a little. The proper instruction attitude is, "You're here so you're a Scientologist. Now we're going to make you into an expert auditor no matter what happens. We'd rather have you dead than incapable."

Fit that into the economics of the situation and lack of adequate time and you see the cross we have to bear.

But we won't have to bear it forever. The bigger we get the more economics and time we will have to do our job. And the only things which can prevent us from getting that big fast are areas in from One to Ten. Keep those in mind and we'll be able to grow. Fast. And as we grow our shackles will be less and less. Failing to keep One to Ten, will make us grow less.

So the ogre which might eat us up is not the government or the High Priests. It's our possible failure to retain and practise our technology.

An Instructor or Supervisor or Executive must challenge with ferocity instances of "unworkability". They must uncover what did happen, what was run and what was done or not done.

If you have One and Two, you can only acquire Three for all by making sure of all the rest.

We're not playing some minor game in Scientology. It isn't cute or something to do for lack of something better.

The whole agonized future of this planet, every Man, Woman and Child on it, and your own destiny for the next endless trillions of years depend on what you do here and now with and in Scientology.

This is a deadly serious activity. And if we miss getting out of the trap now, we may never again have another chance.

Remember, this is our first chance to do so in all the endless trillions of years of the past. Don't muff it now because it seems unpleasant or unsocial to do Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten.

Do them and we'll win.

L. RON HUBBARD

Founder

LRH:jw.rr.nt.ka.mes.rd





HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex  
HCO POLICY LETTER OF 17 JUNE 1970R  
Revised 9 April 1977

(Revision in this type style)

Remimeo  
Applies to all SHs and  
Academies  
HGCs  
Franchises

**URGENT AND IMPORTANT**

**TECHNICAL DEGRADES**

(This PL and HCO PL Feb 7, 1965 must be made part of every study pack as the first items and must be listed on checksheets.)

Any checksheet in use or in stock which carries on it any degrading statement must be destroyed and issued without qualifying statements.

Example: Level 0 to IV Checksheets SH carry "A. Background Material – This section is included as an historical background, but has much interest and value to the student. Most of the processes are no longer used, having been replaced by more modern technology. The student is only required to read this material and ensure he leaves no misunderstood." This heading covers such vital things as TRs, Op Pro by Dup! The statement is a falsehood.

These checksheets were not approved by myself, all the material of the academy and SH courses **is** in use.

Such actions as this gave us "Quickie Grades", ARC broke the field and downgraded the academy and SH courses.

A condition of **Treason** or cancellation of certificates or dismissal and a full investigation of the background of any person found guilty, will be activated in the case of anyone committing the following **High Crimes**.

1. Abbreviating an official course in Dianetics and Scientology so as to lose the full theory, processes and effectiveness of the subjects.
2. Adding comments to checksheets or instructions labeling any material "background" or "not used now" or "old" or any similar action which will result in the student not knowing, using, and applying the data in which he is being trained.
3. Employing after 1 Sept 1970 any checksheet for any course not authorized by myself and the SO Organizing Bureau Flag.
4. Failing to strike from any checksheet remaining in use meanwhile any such comments as "historical", "background", "not used", "old", etc. or **verbally stating it to students**.

5. Permitting a pc to attest to more than one grade at a time on the pc's own determinism without hint or evaluation.
6. Running only one process for a lower grade between 0 to IV, where the grade EP has not been attained.
7. Failing to use all processes for a level where the EP has not been attained.
8. Boasting as to speed of delivery in a session, such as "I put in grade zero in three minutes." etc.
9. Shortening time of application of auditing for financial or laborsaving considerations.
10. Acting in any way calculated to lose the technology of Dianetics and Scientology to use or impede its use or shorten its materials or its application.

**Reason:** The effort to get students through courses and get pcs processed in orgs was considered best handled by reducing materials or deleting processes from grades. The pressure exerted to speed up student completions and auditing completions was mistakenly answered by just not delivering.

The correct way to speed up a student's progress is by using two way comm and applying the study materials to students.

The best way to really handle pcs is to ensure they make each level fully before going on to the next and repairing them when they do not.

The puzzle of the decline of the entire Scientology network in the late 60s is entirely answered by the actions taken to shorten time in study and in processing by deleting materials and actions.

Reinstituting full use and delivery of Dianetics and Scientology is the answer to any recovery.

The product of an org is well taught students and thoroughly audited pcs. When the product vanishes, so does the org. The orgs must survive for the sake of this planet.

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## THE LOGICS

- LOGIC 1. KNOWLEDGE IS A WHOLE GROUP OR SUB-DIVISION OF A GROUP OF DATA OR SPECULATIONS OR CONCLUSIONS ON DATA OR METHODS OF GAINING DATA.
- LOGIC 2. A BODY OF KNOWLEDGE IS A BODY OF DATA, ALIGNED OR UNALIGNED, OR METHODS OF GAINING DATA.
- LOGIC 3. ANY KNOWLEDGE WHICH CAN BE SENSED, MEASURED OR EXPERIENCED BY ANY ENTITY IS CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING THAT ENTITY.
- COROLLARY THAT KNOWLEDGE WHICH CANNOT BE SENSED, MEASURED OR EXPERIENCED BY ANY ENTITY OR TYPE OF ENTITY CANNOT INFLUENCE THAT ENTITY OR TYPE OF ENTITY.
- LOGIC 4. A DATUM IS A FACSIMILE OF STATES OF BEING, STATES OF NOT BEING, ACTIONS OR INACTIONS, CONCLUSIONS, OR SUPPOSITIONS IN THE PHYSICAL OR ANY OTHER UNIVERSE.
- LOGIC 5. A DEFINITION OF TERMS IS NECESSARY TO THE ALIGNMENT, STATEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF SUPPOSITIONS, OBSERVATIONS, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS AND THEIR COMMUNICATION.
- DEFINITION DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION: ONE WHICH CLASSIFIES BY CHARACTERISTICS, BY DESCRIBING EXISTING STATES OF BEING.
- DEFINITION DIFFERENTIATIVE DEFINITION: ONE WHICH COMPARES UNLIKENESS TO EXISTING STATES OF BEING OR NOT BEING.
- DEFINITION ASSOCIATIVE DEFINITION: ONE WHICH DECLARES LIKENESS TO EXISTING STATES OF BEING OR NOT BEING.
- DEFINITION ACTION DEFINITION: ONE WHICH DELINEATES CAUSE AND POTENTIAL CHANGE OF STATE OF BEING BY CAUSE OF EXISTENCE, INEXISTENCE, ACTION, INACTION, PURPOSE OR LACK OF PURPOSE.
- LOGIC 6. ABSOLUTES ARE UNOBTAINABLE.
- LOGIC 7. GRADIENT SCALES ARE NECESSARY TO THE EVALUATION OF PROBLEMS AND THEIR DATA.

This is the tool of infinity-valued logic: Absolutes are unobtainable. Terms such as good and bad, alive and dead, right and wrong are used only in conjunction with gradient scales. On the scale of right and wrong, everything above zero or center would be more and more right, approaching an infinite rightness, and everything below center would be more and more wrong, approaching infinite wrongness. All things assisting the survival of the survivor are considered to be right for the survivor. All things inhibiting survival from the viewpoint of the survivor can be considered wrong for the survivor. The more a thing assists survival, the more it can be con-

sidered right for the survivor; the more a thing or action inhibits survival, the more it is wrong from the viewpoint of the intended survivor.

- COROLLARY ANY DATUM HAS ONLY RELATIVE TRUTH.
- COROLLARY TRUTH IS RELATIVE TO ENVIRONMENTS, EXPERIENCE AND TRUTH.
- LOGIC 8. A DATUM CAN BE EVALUATED ONLY BY A DATUM OF COMPARABLE MAGNITUDE.
- LOGIC 9. A DATUM IS AS VALUABLE AS IT HAS BEEN EVALUATED.
- LOGIC 10. THE VALUE OF A DATUM IS ESTABLISHED BY THE AMOUNT OF ALIGNMENT (RELATIONSHIP) IT IMPARTS TO OTHER DATA.
- LOGIC 11. THE VALUE OF A DATUM OR FIELD OF DATA CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY ITS DEGREE OF ASSISTANCE IN SURVIVAL OR ITS INHIBITION TO SURVIVAL.
- LOGIC 12. THE VALUE OF A DATUM OR A FIELD OF DATA IS MODIFIED BY THE VIEWPOINT OF THE OBSERVER.
- LOGIC 13. PROBLEMS ARE RESOLVED BY COMPARTMENTING THEM INTO AREAS OF SIMILAR MAGNITUDE AND DATA, COMPARING THEM TO DATA ALREADY KNOWN OR PARTIALLY KNOWN, AND RESOLVING EACH AREA. DATA WHICH CANNOT BE KNOWN IMMEDIATELY MAY BE RESOLVED BY ADDRESSING WHAT IS KNOWN AND USING ITS SOLUTION TO RESOLVE THE REMAINDER.
- LOGIC 14. FACTORS INTRODUCED INTO A PROBLEM OR SOLUTION WHICH DO NOT DERIVE FROM NATURAL LAW BUT ONLY AUTHORITARIAN COMMAND ABERRATE THAT PROBLEM OR SOLUTION.
- LOGIC 15. THE INTRODUCTION OF AN ARBITRARY INTO A PROBLEM OR SOLUTION INVITES THE FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF ARBITRARIES INTO PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS.
- LOGIC 16. AN ABSTRACT POSTULATE MUST BE COMPARED TO THE UNIVERSE TO WHICH IT APPLIES AND BROUGHT INTO THE CATEGORY OF THINGS WHICH CAN BE SENSED, MEASURED OR EXPERIENCED IN THAT UNIVERSE BEFORE SUCH POSTULATE CAN BE CONSIDERED WORKABLE.
- LOGIC 17. THOSE FIELDS WHICH MOST DEPEND UPON AUTHORITATIVE OPINION FOR THEIR DATA LEAST CONTAIN KNOWN NATURAL LAW.
- LOGIC 18. A POSTULATE IS AS VALUABLE AS IT IS WORKABLE.
- LOGIC 19. THE WORKABILITY OF A POSTULATE IS ESTABLISHED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT EXPLAINS EXISTING PHENOMENA ALREADY KNOWN, BY THE DEGREE THAT IT PREDICTS NEW PHENOMENA WHICH WHEN LOOKED FOR WILL BE FOUND TO EXIST, AND BY THE DEGREE THAT IT DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT PHENOMENA WHICH DO NOT EXIST IN FACT BE CALLED INTO EXISTENCE FOR ITS EXPLANATION.
- LOGIC 20. A SCIENCE MAY BE CONSIDERED TO BE A LARGE BODY OF ALIGNED DATA WHICH HAS SIMILARITY IN APPLICATION AND WHICH HAS BEEN DEDUCED OR

INDUCED FROM BASIC POSTULATES.

- LOGIC 21. MATHEMATICS ARE METHODS OF POSTULATING OR RESOLVING REAL OR ABSTRACT DATA IN ANY UNIVERSE AND INTEGRATING BY SYMBOLIZATION OF DATA, POSTULATES AND RESOLUTIONS.
- LOGIC 22. THE HUMAN MIND<sup>1</sup> IS AN OBSERVER, POSTULATOR, CREATOR AND STORAGE PLACE OF KNOWLEDGE.
- LOGIC 23. THE HUMAN MIND IS A SERVO MECHANISM TO ANY MATHEMATICS EVOLVED OR EMPLOYED BY THE HUMAN MIND.
- POSTULATE THE HUMAN MIND AND INVENTIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND ARE CAPABLE OF RESOLVING ANY AND ALL PROBLEMS WHICH CAN BE SENSED, MEASURED OR EXPERIENCED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.
- COROLLARY THE HUMAN MIND IS CAPABLE OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN MIND.
- THE BORDERLINE OF SOLUTION OF THIS SCIENCE LIES BETWEEN *WHY* LIFE IS SURVIVING AND *HOW* LIFE IS SURVIVING. IT IS POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE HOW LIFE IS SURVIVING WITHOUT RESOLVING *WHY* LIFE IS SURVIVING.
- LOGIC 24. THE RESOLUTION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND HUMAN STUDIES (SUCH AS ECONOMICS, POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, MEDICINE, CRIMINOLOGY, ETC.) DEPENDS PRIMARILY UPON THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

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<sup>1</sup> The human mind by definition includes the awareness unit of the living organism, the observer, the computer of data, the spirit, the memory storage, the life force and the individual motivator of the living organisms. It is used as distinct from the brain, which can be considered to be motivated by the mind.

*NOTE:* The primary step in resolving the broad activities of man could be considered to be the resolving of the activities of the mind itself. Hence, the Logics carry to this point and then proceed as axioms concerning the human mind, such axioms being substantiated as relative truths by much newly discovered phenomena. The ensuing axioms, from Logic 24, apply no less to the various 'ologies' than they do to de-aberrating or improving the operation of the mind. It should not be thought that the following axioms are devoted to the construction of anything as limited as a therapy, which is only incidental to the resolution of human aberration and such things as psychomatic illnesses. These axioms are capable of such solutions, as has been demonstrated, but such a narrow application would indicate a very narrow scope of view.



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### THIRD DYNAMIC TECH

The material contained in **HCO Bulletins** applies to the **First Dynamic** – self, the individual.

The data, material and procedures contained in **Policy Letters** apply to the **Third Dynamic** – the dynamic of groups.

In applying HCO Bs as in auditing a preclear, you see that following a certain procedure results in the remedy of a certain personal situation.

In applying HCO Policy Letters, you see that by following or continuing certain Third Dynamic procedures you remedy, handle or continue certain situations which relate to groups.

In both cases, **Survival** is the keynote of the end result.

HCO B auditing tech increases the survival of the individual as an individual.

HCO Pol Ltr Third Dynamic Tech increases the survival of the group.

Man has always had a certain amount of know-how in both individual and group matters of survival but he has never had any high level of result.

It is easy to see auditing improve the individual when it is exactly and expertly applied.

Similarly one can see Third Dynamic Tech improve the group and its survival potential.

Just as there is "squirrel" auditing (alter-ised and unworkable) so there can be "squirrel" Third Dynamic Tech.

An executive who has no familiarity with HCO Pol Ltrs can make an awful lot of mistakes.

It is an easy pretense that First Dynamic Tech existed. But no one got any better when Man knew no more than the mumbo-jumbo he had before 1950. Since then real results occur. But they only occur when the actual tech of Dianetics and Scientology is correctly applied.

The same situation existed in the field of the Third Dynamic. The pretense was that "business" tech was successful, to name one. But 17 out of 19 businesses fail every year and the whole of the business world is under threat from the ideology of Communism. Strikes,

legislation, banking and other catastrophes daily remain unhandled by "business tech". So there's only pretense that "business tech" applies to groups successfully. It is at best a dying technology.

The failure is that previous Third Dynamic Tech did not seek out and learn the basic laws on which it must have existed.

You have seen the First Dynamic Tech of auditing develop over the decades to a highly precise and very workable body of knowledge. The current search began in about 1931. By 1970 it was in full practice over the world.

The need of organizations to serve the First Dynamic Tech beginning in 1949 forced further and further into view the absence of Third Dynamic Tech and its vital need.

With much hard experience the data now contained in HCO Policy Letters was won. In 1965 I began an active search for the basic laws of the Third Dynamo What has been found since then has been recorded on tapes or published in HCO Pol Ltrs.

If auditing took 38 years to bring to a highly polished state, then the 20 years of experience of which only 5 were devoted to an active effort to locate the basic laws can be seen to be an incomplete study.

But incomplete or not, the data and drills contained in HCO Policy Letters are a great advance over what Man had.

For instance, in 1950-51, using the crude organizational tech Man then had, the-first board of directors of Dianetics Foundations failed utterly. Any and all off-on-the-wrong-foot moves which became later woes to us were laid in at that time by some of the finest legal, accounting and PR experts one could retain.

Twenty years later our organizations, travelling on our developed Third Dynamic Tech (and even now poorly known by staffs) have enabled us to survive in the teeth of old vested interests and not only that to expand as well.

Tins is due to the practical know-how we have dredged up and used and which you find in HCO Policy Letters.

Naturally, we have not had time to develop Third Dynamic Drills for every situation. We have not had time even to train all our staffs.

But the basic knowledge is there, recorded on tape and on HCO Pol Ltrs and when known, understood and used it gives us survival, expansion and prosperity. When it isn't known or understood or used, only then do we sag.

If a study of our Third Dynamic Tech is approached from the viewpoint that it is for use and when known, understood and used that it will deliver an expected result, then one has a proper framework for the study of it.

If one thinks it is a series of orders, or just some random ideas, then one will not have the use of it.



The short span of men's lives inhibits the full development of any one subject in one lifetime. Thus there is a lot of room for further expansion of our Third Dynamic Tech. But the basic laws can be found in it and many exact drills are contained in it and it has great value in any zone of application.

What we now know and use of our Third Dynamic Tech is all that has forwarded our survival so far.

Thus its wider understanding and use in our own organizations is the key to prosperity and expansion.

An "old experienced Sen executive" (who has a lot of this know-how) can go into a collapsing org and boom it. The data he is using is all in these policy letters. He knows it is there for use and he uses it in action.

The elements he uses are in HCO Policy Letters.

The data encompasses Third Dynamic Tech. It is applied very much like one applies the First Dynamic Tech to the individual.

In its present state of development, like early auditing material. Third Dynamic Tech is used to think with and only the bright mind will achieve its full potential in action.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 26 APRIL 1970R  
Revised 15 March 1975

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*Data Series 1R*

**THE ANATOMY OF THOUGHT**

There are many types of thought. Unless one knows these types he can make serious errors on administrative lines.

In the unpublished work "Excalibur" (most of which has been released in HCOBs, PLs and books) there was an important fundamental truth. This was

**Sanity is the ability to recognize differences, similarities and identities.**

This is also intelligence.

Two or more facts or things that are totally unlike are **different**. They are not the same fact or same object.

Two or more facts or things that have something in common with one another are **similar**.

Two or more facts or things that have all their characteristics in common with one another are **identical**.

**SEMANTICS**

In a subject developed by Korzybski a great deal of stress is given to the niceties of words. In brief a word is NOT the thing. And an object exactly like another object is different because it occupies a different space and thus "can't be the same object."

As Alfred Korzybski studied under psychiatry and amongst the insane (his mentor was William Alanson White at Saint Elizabeth's insane asylum in Wash., D.C.) one can regard him mainly as the father of confusion.

This work, "general semantics," a corruption of semantics, (meaning really "significance" or the "meaning of words") has just enough truth in it to invite interest and just enough curves to injure one's ability to think or communicate. Korzybski did not know the formula of human communication and university professors teaching semantics mainly ended up assuring students (and proving it) that no one can communicate with anyone because nobody really knows what anybody else means.

As this "modern" (it was known to the Greeks, was a specialty of Sophists and *was also used by Socrates*) penetration into culture affects all education in the West today, it is no wonder that current communication is badly strained. Schools no longer teach basic logic. Due to earlier miseducation in language and no real education in logic much broken-down "think" can occur in high places.

A system of thinking derived from a study of psychotics is not a good yardstick to employ in solving problems. Yet the "thinking" of heads of states is based on illogical and irrational rules. Populations, fortunately less "well-educated," are assaulted by the irrational (kooky) "thinking" of governments. This "thinking" is faulty mainly because it is based on the faulty logic shoved off on school children. "You must study geometry because that is the way you think" is an idiocy that has been current for the past two or three decades in schools.

I have nothing against Korzybski. But the general impact of "General Semantics" has been to give us stupefied schoolboys who, growing up without any training in logic except general semantics are giving us problems. Increasingly we are dealing with people who have never been taught to think and whose native ability to do so has been hampered by a false "education."

### **ADMINISTRATIVE TROUBLE**

At once this gives an administrator trouble. Outside and inside his sphere of influence he is dealing with people who not only can't think but have been taught carefully to reach irrational conclusions.

One can make a great deal of headway and experience a lot of relief by realizing the way things are and not getting exasperated and outraged by the absurdities that he sees being used as "solutions." He is dealing with people who in school were not only not taught to think but were often taught the impossibility of thinking or communicating.

This has a very vast influence on an administrator. Things that are perfectly obvious to him get so muddled when passed for decision to others that an administrator tends to go into apathy or despair.

For instance it is completely logical to him that some activity must either cut its expenses or make more money before it goes broke. So he passes this on as an order demanding that the activity balance up its income-outgo ratio. He gets back a "solution" that they "get a huge sum each week from their reserves" so they will be "solvent." The administrator feels rattled and even betrayed. What reserves? Do they have reserves? So he demands to know, has this activity been salting away reserves he knew nothing about? And he receives a solemn reply – no they don't have any reserves but they consider the administrator should just send them money!

The idiocy involved here is that the "logic" of the persons in that activity is not up to realizing that you cannot take more out of something than is in it.

And the activity mentioned is not alone. Today the "assets" of a company are said by "competent economists" to be its property – good will – cash added to its debts! In short, if you have ten pennies and owe £1000 then your assets are £1000-0-10!

Yes, you say, but that's crazy! And you're right.

For an example of modern "think" the Ford Foundation is believed to have financially supported the arming of revolutionary groups so they will be dependent upon the capitalistic system and won't overthrow it even though the revolutionary group could not exist without Ford Foundation support!

A war is fought and continued for years to defend the property rights of landlords against peasants although the landlords are mostly dead.

Electronic computers are exported under government license and paid for by the exporter and shipped to an enemy who could not bomb the exporter without them in order to prevent the enemy from bombing the exporter.

Yes, one says. That's treason. Not necessarily. It is the inability to think! It is the result of suppressing the native ability by false systems of "logic."

### PROPER DEFINITIONS

People who annoy one with such weird "solutions" do not know certain *differences*.

Thoughts are infinitely divisible into *classes* of thought.

In other words, in thought there are certain wide *differences* which are very different indeed.

A **Fact** is something that can be proven to exist by visible evidence.

An **Opinion** is something which may or may not be based on any *facts*.

Yet a sloppy mind sees no *difference* between a **Fact** and somebody's opinion.

In courts a psychiatrist (who is an **authority**) says "Joe Doakes is crazy." Joe Doakes is promptly put away for ten years, tortured or killed. Yet this statement is just an **Opinion** uttered by somebody whose sanity is more than suspect and what's more is taken from a field "psychiatry" which has no basis in fact since it cannot cure or even detect insanity.

A vast number of people see no difference at all in **Facts** and **Opinions** and gaily accept both or either as having equal validity.

An administrator continually gets opinions on his lines which are masquerading as facts.

If opinion instead of facts is used in solving problems then one comes up with insane solutions.

Here is an example: By *opinion* it is assumed there are 3000 pounds of potatoes available in a crop. An order is therefore written and payment (\$300 at 10 ct a pound) is made for

the crop. One sack of potatoes is delivered containing 100 pounds. That sack was the *fact*. Loss is 2900 pounds of potatoes.

An administrator runs into this continually. He sends somebody to find an electric potato peeler "just like the one we had." He gets back a paring knife because it is the *same*.

The administrator orders a *similar* type of shirt and gets overcoats.

The administrator feels he is dealing with malice, sharp practice, laziness, etc., etc. He can lose all faith in honesty and truthfulness.

The **actual reason** he is getting such breakdowns is

**Sanity is the ability to recognize differences, similarities and identities.**

The people with whom he is dealing *can't think* to such a degree that they give him insane situations. Such people are not crazy. Their thinking is suppressed and distorted by modern "education." "You can't really communicate to anybody because the same word means different things to everyone who uses it." In other words, all identities are different.

A **basic law** is usually confused by students with an **incidental fact**. This is conceiving a similarity when one, the law, is so far senior to the fact that one could throw the fact away and be no poorer.

When a student or an employee cannot **use** a subject he studies or cannot seem to understand a situation his disability is that basics are conceived by him to be merely similar to incidental remarks.

The law, "Objects fall when dropped," is just the same to him as the casual example "a cat jumped off a chair and landed on the floor." Out of this he fixedly keeps in mind two "things he read" – objects fall when dropped, a cat jumped off a chair and landed on the floor. He may see these as having identical value whereas they are similar in subject but widely different in **value**.

You give this person a brief write-up of company policy. "Customers must be satisfied with our service," begins the write-up. Of course that's a *law* because it has been found to be catastrophic to violate it. On down the page is written, "A card is sent to advise the customer about the order." The employee says he understands all this and goes off apparently happy to carry out his duties. A few weeks later Smith and Co. write and say they will do no more business with you. You hastily try to find out **why**. If you're lucky enough to track it down, you find the shipping clerk sent them a card saying, "Your order was received and we don't intend to fill it."

You have the clerk in. You lay down the facts. He looks at you glumly and says he's sorry. He goes back and pulls another blooper. You threaten to fire him. He's now cost the company \$54,000. He is contrite.

All he understands is that life is confusing and that for some mysterious reason you are mad at him, probably because you are naturally grouchy.

What he *doesn't* know is what the administrator seldom taps. It isn't that he doesn't know "company policy." It's that he doesn't know the difference between a law and a comment!

A law of course is something with which one thinks. It is a thing to which one aligns other junior facts and actions. A law lets one **predict** that if **all objects fall** when not supported, then of course cats, books and plates can be predicted in behavior if one lets go of them. As the employee hasn't a clue that there is any difference amongst laws, facts, opinions, orders or suggestions he of course cannot think as he doesn't have anything to which he can align other data or with which to predict consequences.

He doesn't even know that company policy is, "Too many goofs equals fired." So when he does get sacked he thinks "somebody got mad at him."

If you think this applies only to the "stupid employee," know that a whole government service can go this way. Two such services only promoted officers to high rank if they sank their own ships or got their men killed! Social acceptability was the only datum used for promotion and it followed that men too socially involved (or too drunk) of course lost battles.

An organization, therefore, can itself be daffy if it has a concept that laws and facts and opinions are all the same thing and so has no operating policies or laws.

Whole bodies of knowledge can go this route. The laws are submerged into incidental facts. The incidental facts are held onto and the laws never pointed up as having the special value of aligning other data or actions.

An administrator can call a conference on a new building, accidentally collect people who can't differentiate amongst laws, facts, opinions or suggestions – treating them of equal value – and find himself not with a new building but a staggering financial loss.

As the world drifts along with its generations less and less taught and more and more suppressed in thinking, it will of course experience more and more catastrophes in economics, politics and culture and so go boom. As all this influences anyone in any organization it is an important point.

## PERSONNEL

In despair an administrator enters the field of choosing personnel by experience with them. He embraces a very cruel modern system that fires at once anybody who flubs.

Actually he is trying to defend himself against some hidden menace he has never defined but which haunts him day by day.

The majority of people with whom he deals-and especially governments-cannot conceive of

1. Differences,
2. Similarities,
3. Identities.

As a result they usually can't tell a **Fact** from an **Opinion** (because all differences are probably identities and all identities are different and all similarities are imaginary).

### A=A=A

We have a broad dissertation on this in *Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health* as it affects insane behavior. Everything is everything else. Mr. X looks at a horse knows it's a house knows it's a school teacher. So when he sees a horse he is respectful.

When anyone in an org is sanely trying to get things done he sometimes feels like he is spinning from the replies and responses he gets to orders or requests. That's because observation was faulty or think was faulty at the other end of the comm line. As he tries to get things done he begins to realize (usually falsely) that he is regarded as odd for getting impatient.

### THE WAYS OUT

There are several ways out of this mess.

- a. One is to issue orders that demand close observation and execution. Issuance of clear orders provides no faintest opportunity of error, assumption or default.
- b. Another is to demand that an order is fully understood before it is executed.
- c. A third is to be sure one totally understands any order one receives before one goes off to do it or order it done.
- d. One is to deal *only* in **orders** and leave nothing to interpretation.
- e. Another is to pretest personnel on one's lines for ability to observe and conceive differences, similarities and identities.
- f. The effective way is to get the personnel processed.
- g. A useful way is to educate people with drills until they can think.
- h. Another way is to defend one's areas by excluding insofar as possible adjacent areas where crippled think is rampant.
- i. A harsh way is to plow under zones whose irrationality is destructive (such as psychiatry).

### THOUGHT CONFUSIONS

Wherever you have thought confusions (where **Fact** = **Opinion**, where Suggestion = Orders, where an observation is taken as a direction, etc., etc., etc.) an administrator is at serious risk.

Misunderstoods pile up on these short circuits. Out of misunderstands come hostilities. Out of these come overwork or destruction.



The need for all discipline can be traced back to the inability to think. Even when appearing clever, criminals are idiots; they have not ever thought the thought through. One can conclude that anyone on management lines, high or low, is drastically affected by irrational think.

Individuals to whom differences are identities and identities are differences can muddle up an operation to a point where disaster is inevitable.

These are the third dynamic facts with which an organization lives daily.

The fault can be very subtle so as to nearly escape close search or it can be so very broad so that it is obvious and ridiculous. But on all admin lines, the point that fails has not achieved the basic law

**Sanity is the ability to recognize differences, similarities and identities.**

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 11 MAY 1970

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*Data Series 2*

**LOGIC**

The subject of logic has been under discussion for at least three thousand years without any clean breakthrough of real use to those who work with data.

LOGIC means the subject of reasoning. Some in ages past have sought to label it a science. But that can be discarded as pretense and pompousness.

If there were such a "science" men would be able to think. And they can't.

The term itself is utterly forbidding. If you were to read a text on logic you would go quite mad trying to figure it out, much less learn how to think.

Yet logic or the ability to reason is vital to an organizer or administrator. If he cannot think clearly he will not be able to reach the conclusions vital to make correct decisions.

Many agencies, governments, societies, groups, capitalize upon this lack of logic and have for a very long time. For the bulk of the last 2,000 years the main western educator – the Church – worked on the theory that Man should be kept ignorant. A population that is unable to think or reason can be manipulated easily by falsehoods and wretched causes.

Thus logic has not been a supported subject, rather the opposite.

Even western schools today seek to convince students they should study geometry as "that is the way they think." And of course it isn't.

The administrator, the manager, the artisan and the clerk each have a considerable use for logic. If they cannot reason they make costly and time-consuming errors and can send the entire organization into chaos and oblivion.

Their stuff in trade are data and situations. Unless they can observe and think their way through, they can reach wrong conclusions and take incorrect actions.

Modern Man thinks mathematics can serve him for logic and most of his situations go utterly adrift because of this touching and misplaced confidence. The complexity of human problems and the vast number of factors involved make mathematics utterly inadequate.

Computers are at best only servomechanisms (crutches) to the mind. Yet the chromium-plated civilization today has a childish faith in them. It depends on who asks the questions and who reads the computer's answers whether they are of any use or not. And even then their answers are often madhouse silly.

Computers can't *think* because the rules of live logic aren't fully known to Man and computer builders. One false datum fed into a computer gives one a completely wrong answer.

If people on management and work lines do not know logic the organization can go adrift and require a fabulous amount of genius to hold it together and keep it running.

Whole civilizations vanish because of lack of logic in its rulers, leaders and people.

So this is a very important subject.

### UNLOCKING LOGIC

I have found a way now to unlock this subject. This is a breakthrough which is no small win. If by it a formidable and almost impossible subject can be reduced to simplicity then correct answers to situations can be far more frequent and an organization or a civilization far more effective.

The breakthrough is a simple one.

**By establishing the ways in which things become illogical one can then establish what is logic.**

In other words, if one has a grasp of what makes things illogical or irrational (or crazy, if you please) it is then possible to conceive of what makes things logical.

### ILLOGIC

There are 5 primary ways for a relay of information or a situation to become illogical.

1. Omit a fact.
2. Change sequence of events.
3. Drop out time.
4. Add a falsehood.
5. Alter importance.

These are the basic things which cause one to have an incorrect idea of a situation.

Example: "He went to see a communist and left at 3:00 A.M." The omitted facts are that he went with 30 other people and that it was a party. By omitting the fact one alters the importance. This omission makes it look like "he" is closely connected to communism! When he isn't.

Example: "The ship left the dock and was loaded." Plainly made crazy by altering sequence of events.

Example: "The whole country is torn by riots" which would discourage visiting it in 1970 if one didn't know the report date of 1919.

Example: "He kept skunks for pets" which as an added falsehood makes a man look odd if not crazy.

Example: "It was an order" when in fact it was only a suggestion, which of course shifts the importance.

There are hundreds of ways these 5 mishandlings of data can then give one a completely false picture.

When basing actions or orders on data which contains one of the above, one then makes a mistake.

### **Reason depends on data.**

**When data is faulty (as above) the answer will be wrong and looked upon as unreasonable.**

There are a vast number of combinations of these 5 data. More than one (or all 5) may be present in the same report.

Observation and its communication may contain one of these 5.

If so, then any effort to handle the situation will be ineffective in correcting or handling it.

## **USE**

If any body of data is given the above 5 tests, it is often exposed as an invitation to acting illogically.

To achieve a logical answer one must have logical data.

Any body of data which contains one or more of the above faults can lead one into illogical conclusions.

The basis of an unreasonable or unworkable order is a conclusion which is made illogical by possessing one or more of the above faults.

## **LOGIC**

Therefore logic must have several conditions:

1. All relevant facts must be known.
2. Events must be in actual sequence.
3. Time must be properly noted.
4. The data must be factual, which is to say true or valid.
5. Relative importances amongst the data must be recognized by comparing the facts with what one is seeking to accomplish or solve.

**NOT KNOW**

One can always know something about anything.

It is a wise man who, confronted with conflicting data, realizes that he knows at least one thing-that he doesn't know.

Grasping that, he can then take action to find out.

If he evaluates the data he does find out against the five things above, he can clarify the situation. Then he can reach a logical conclusion.

**DRILLS**

It is necessary to work out your own examples of the 5 violations of logic.

By doing so, you will have gained skill in sorting out the data of a situation.

When you can sort out data and become skilled in it, you will become very difficult to fool and you will have taken the first vital step in grasping a correct estimate of any situation.

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### *Data Series 3*

## **BREAKTHROUGHS**

There are two breakthroughs, actually, that have been made here in the age-old philosophic subject of logic.

The first is **finding a datum of comparable magnitude to the subject.**

A single datum or subject has to have a datum or subject with which to compare it before it can be fully understood.

By studying and isolating the principles that make a situation illogical one can then see what is necessary to be logical. This gives us a subject that could be called "Illogicality Testing" or "Irrationality Location" but which would be better described as **data analysis**. For it subjects data and therefore **situations** to tests which establish any falsity or truth.

The other breakthrough consists of the discovery that no rules of logic can be valid unless one also includes the *data* being used. The nearest the ancients came to this was testing the premise or basis of an argument.

Trying to study logic without also having the answers to *data is* like describing everything about an engine without mentioning what fuel it runs on; or making a sentence like "He argued about" or "She disliked" without completing it.

Logic concerns obtaining answers. And answers depend on *data*. Unless you can test and establish the truth and value of the data being used, one cannot attain right answers no matter what Aristotle may have said or what IBM may have built.

The road to logic begins with ways and means of determining the value of the data to be employed in it.

Without that step no one can arrive at logic.

Two things that are equal to each other and to which a third is equal are all equal to one another. If A equals B and B equals C, then C equals A. Great. This is often disputed as a theorem of logic and has been ever since Aristotle said so. There is even a modern cult of non-Aristotelian logic.

The facts are that the ancient theorem is totally dependent on the **data** used in it. Only if the **data** is correct does the theorem work.

Lacking emphasis on the *data* being used, this theorem can be proven true or false at will. The philosophers point out the fallacy without ever giving emphasis to data evaluation.

## DATA ANALYSIS

Unless you can prove or disprove the data you use in any logic system, the system itself will be faulty.

This is true of the IBM computer. It is true of CIA intelligence conclusions. It is true of Plato, Kant, Hume and your own personal computer as well.

**Data Analysis** is necessary to **any** logic system and always will be.

Ships run on oil, electric motors on electricity and logic runs on data.

If the data being stuffed into a computer is incorrect, no matter how well a computer is planned or built or proofed up against faults you can get a Bay of Pigs.

In mathematics no formula will give an answer better than the data being used in it.

**Valid answers may only be attained in using valid data.**

Thus, if the subject of data analysis is neglected or imperfect or unknown or unsuspected as a step, then wild answers to situations and howling catastrophes can occur.

If data analysis becomes itself a codified subject, regardless of what formula is going to be used, then right answers can only then be attained.

## THE MIND AS A COMPUTER

The mind is a remarkable computer.

It is demonstrable that a mind which has the wrong answers removed from it becomes brighter, IQ soars.

Therefore for our purposes we will consider the mind capable of being logical.

As processing improves the mind's ability to reach right answers, then we can assume for our purposes that if a person can straighten out his data he can be logical and will be logical and can attain right answers to situations.

The fallacy of the mind is that it can operate on wrong data.

Thus if we specialize in the subject of **Data Analysis** we can assume that a person can attain right answers.

As an administrator (and anyone else) has to reach conclusions in order to act and has to act correctly to ensure his own or his group's continued survival, it is vital that he be able to observe and conclude with minimal error.

Thus we will not be stressing **how** to think but how to analyze that with which one thinks-which is **data**.

This gives us the importance and use of data analysis.

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*Data Series 4*

**DATA AND SITUATION ANALYZING**

The two general steps one has to take to "find out what is really going on" are

1. Analyze the data,
2. Using the data thus analyzed, to analyze the situation.

The way to analyze data is to compare it to the 5 primary points and see if any of those appear in the data.

The way to analyze the situation is to put in its smaller areas each of the data analyzed as above.

Doing this gives you the locations of greatest error or disorganization and also gives you areas of greatest effectiveness.

Example: There is trouble in the Refreshment Unit. There are 3 people in the unit. Doing a data analysis on the whole area gives us a number of outpoints. Then we assign these to A, B and C who work in the unit and find B had the most outpoints. This indicates that the trouble in the Refreshment Unit is with B. B can be handled in various ways such as his hat, his attendance, etc. Note we analyzed the data of the main area and assigned it to the bits in the area, then we had an analyzed situation and we could handle.

Example: We analyze all the data we have about the Bingo Car Plant. We assign the data thus analyzed as out (outpoints) to each function of the Bingo Car Plant. We thus pinpoint what function is the worst off. We then handle that function in various ways, principally by organizing it and grooving in its executives and personnel.

There are several variations.

**We obtain an analysis of the situation by analyzing all the data we have and assigning the outpoint data to the areas or parts. The area having the most outpoints is the target for correction.**

In confronting a broad situation to be handled we have of course the problem of finding out what's wrong before we can correct it. This is done by data analysis followed by situation analysis.

We do this by grading all the data for outpoints (5 primary illogics). We now have a long list of outpoints. This is data analysis.

We sort the outpoints we now have into the principal areas of the scene. The majority will appear in *one* area. This is situation analysis.

We now know what area to handle.

---

Example: Seventy data exist on the general scene. We find 21 of these data are irrational (outpoints). We slot the 21 outpoints into the areas they came from or apply to. Sixteen came from area G. We handle area G.

### EXPERIENCE

The remarkable part of such an exercise is that the data analysis of the data of a period of 1 day compares to 3 months operating *experience*.

Thus data and situation analysis is an instant result where experience takes a lot of time.

The quality of the data analysis depends on one knowing the ideal organization and purpose on which the activity is based. This means one has to know what its activities are supposed to be from a rational or logical viewpoint.

A clock is supposed to keep running and indicate time and be of practical and pleasant design. A clock factory is supposed to make clocks. It is supposed to produce enough clocks cheaply enough that are good enough to be in demand and to sell for enough to keep the place solvent. It consumes raw materials, repairs and replaces its tools and equipment. It hires workmen and executives. It has service firms and distributors. That is the sort of thing one means by *ideal* or theoretical structure of the clock company and its organization.

Those are the *rational* points.

From the body of actual current today data on the clock company one spots the outpoints for a **Data Analysis**.

One assigns the outpoints to the whole as a **Situation Analysis**.

One uses his admin know-how and expertise to repair the most aberrated subsection.

One gets a functioning clock factory that runs closer to the ideal.

Military, political and PR situations, etc., are handled all in the same way.

We call these two actions:

**Data Analysis**

**Situation Analysis.**

### DEFINITIONS

**Situation** – The broad general scene on which a body of current data exists.

**Data** – Facts, graphs, statements, decisions, actions, descriptions, which are supposedly true.

**Outpoint** – Any one datum that is offered as true that is in fact found to be illogical when compared to the 5 primary points of illogic.

**Pluspoint** – A datum of truth when found to be true compared to the 5 points.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 15 MAY 1970  
Issue II

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*Data Series 5*

**INFORMATION COLLECTION**

It is a point of mystery how some obtain their information. One can only guess at how they do it and looking at results wonder if it is actually done at all.

*Obtaining* information is necessary for any analysis of data.

If one obtains and analyzes *some* information he can get a hint of what information he should obtain in what area. By obtaining *more* data on that area he can have enough to actively handle.

Thus how one obtains information becomes a very important subject.

Nations have whole mobs of reporters sent out by newspapers, radio, TV and magazines to collect information. Politicians go jaunting around collecting information. Whole spy networks are maintained at huge expense to obtain information.

The Japanese in the first third of the 20th century had two maxims: "Anyone can spy." "Everyone must spy." The Germans picked this up. They had their whole populations at it. The Russian KGB numbers hundreds of thousands. CIA spends billions. MI-6 \_\_\_\_\_ well you get the idea.

It is not amiss however to point out that those 2 nations that devoted the most effort to espionage (Japan and Germany) were **both defeated horribly**.

Thus the **quantity** of data poured in is not any guarantee of understanding.

Newspapers today are usually devoted to propaganda, not news. Politicians are striving to figure out another nation's evil intentions, not to comprehend it.

The basic treatise on data collection and handling used to found the US intelligence data system ("strategic intelligence") would make one laugh – or cry.

All these elaborate (and expensive) systems of collecting information are not only useless, they are deluding. They get people in plenty of trouble.

A copy of *Time* magazine (US) analyzed for outpoints runs so many outpoints per page when analyzed that one wonders how any publication so irrational could continue solvent. And what do you know! It is going broke!

Those countries that spend the most on espionage are in the most trouble. They weren't in trouble and then began to spend money. They began to spy and then got into trouble!

News media and intelligence actions are not themselves bad. But irrational news media and illogical intelligence activity are psychotic.

So information collection can become a vice. It can be overdone.

If one had every org in a network fill out a thousand reports a week he would not obtain much information but he sure would knock them out of comm.

There is a moderate flow of information through any network so long as it is within the capability of the comm lines and the personnel.

Thus we get a rule about collecting data in administrative structures.

**Normal admin flows contain enough data to do a data and situation analysis.**

And

**The less data you have the more precise your analysis must be.**

And

**Indicators must be watched for in order to undertake a situation analysis.**

And

**A situation analysis only indicates the area that has to be closely inspected and handled.**

Thus, what is an "indicator"?

An *indicator* is a visible manifestation which tells one a situation analysis should be done.

An indicator is the little flag sticking out that shows there is a possible situation underneath that needs attention.

Some indicators about orgs or its sections would be – dirty or not reporting or going insolvent or complaint letters or any nonoptimum datum that departs from the ideal.

This is enough to engage in a data and situation analysis of the scene where the indicator appeared.

The correct sequence, then, is

1. Have a normal information flow available.
2. Observe.
3. When a bad indicator is seen become very alert.
4. Do a data analysis.
5. Do a situation analysis.
6. Obtain more data by direct inspection of the area indicated by the situation analysis.
7. Handle.

An incorrect sequence, bound to get one in deep trouble is

- A. See an indicator,
- B. **Act** to handle.

This even applies to emergencies **if one is fast enough to do the whole correct cycle in a split second.**

Oddly enough anyone working in a familiar area **can** do it all in a split second.

People that can do it like lightning are known to have "fast reaction time." People who can't do it fast are often injured or dead.

Example of an emergency cycle: Engineer on duty, normal but experienced perception. Is observing his area. Hears a hiss that shouldn't be. Scans the area and sees nothing out of order but a small white cloud. Combines sight and hearing. Moves forward to get a better look. Sees valve has broken. Shuts off steam line.

Example of an incorrect action. Hears hiss. Pours water on the boiler fires.

### **ADMIN CYCLE**

When you slow this down to an Admin Cycle it becomes very easy. It follows the same steps.

It is not so dramatic. It could string out over months unless one realized that the steps 1 to 7 should be taken when the first signs show up. It need not. However it sometimes does.

Sometimes it has to be done over and over, full cycle, to get a full scene purring.

Sometimes the "handle" requires steps which the area is too broken down to get into effect and so becomes "Handle as possible and remember to do the whole cycle again soon."

Sometimes "handle" is a program of months or years duration; its only liability is that it will be forgotten or thrown out before done by some "new broom."

### **DATA COLLECTION**

But it all begins with having a normal flow of information available and **observing**. Seeing a bad indicator one becomes alert and fully or quickly finishes off the cycle.

### **BAD INDICATOR**

What is a "bad indicator" really?

It is merely an outpoint taken from the 5 primary outpoints.

It is not "bad news" or "entheta" or a rumor. The "bad news" could easily be a falsehood and is an outpoint because it is false bad news!

"Good" news when it is a falsehood is an outpoint!

## RELIABLE SOURCE

Intelligence services are always talking "reliable sources." Or about "confirmed observation."

These are not very reliable ways of telling what is true. The master double spy Philby as a head MI-6 adviser was a Russian spy. Yet for 30 years he determined "reliable sources" for the US and England!

If three people tell you the same thing it is not necessarily a fact as they might all have heard the same lie. Three liars don't make one fact – they make three outpoints.

So it would seem to be very difficult to establish facts if leading papers and intelligence services can't do it!

Yes it is tough to know the truth.

But the moment you begin to work with them, it is rather easy to locate outpoints.

You are looking for outpoints. When they are analyzed and the situation is analyzed by them you then find yourself looking at the truth if you follow the cycle 1 to 7.

It's really rather magical.

If you know thoroughly what the 5 primary outpoints are they leap into view from any body of data.

Oscar says he leads a happy married life. His wife is usually seen crying. It's an outpoint – a falsehood.

The Omaha office is reported by Los Angeles to be doing great. It fails to report. The LA datum does not include that it is 6 months old. Three outpoints, one for time, one for falsehood, one for omitted datum.

Once you are fully familiar with the 5 primary outpoints they are very obvious.

"We are having pie for supper" and "We have no flour" at least shows out of sequence!

It is odd but all the "facts" you protest in life and ridicule or growl about are all one or another of the outpoints.

When you spot them for what they are then you can actually estimate things. And the pluspoints come into view.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 17 MAY 1970R  
Revised 16 September 1978

(Revisions In this type style)

(Revised to correct typographical errors in paragraphs  
2 and 4 under "FAULTS" section.)

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*Data Series 6R*

**DATA SYSTEMS**

Two bad systems are in current use on data.

The first is "reliable source." In this system a report is considered true or factual only if the source is well thought of. This is a sort of authority system. Most professionals working with data collection use this. Who said it? If he is considered reliable or an authority the data is considered true or factual. Sources are graded from A to D. A is highest, D lowest. The frailty of this system is at once apparent. Philby, as a high British intelligence official, was a Russian spy for 30 years. Any data he gave the UK or US was "true" because he was a "reliable source." He had every Western agent who was being sent into communist areas "fingered" and shot. The West became convinced you could not enter or overthrow communist held areas and stopped trying! Philby was the top authority! He fooled CIA and MI-6 for years!

Psychiatrists are "authorities" on the mind. Yet insanity and criminality soar. They are *the* "reliable sources" on the mind.

Need I say more?

The other system in use is multiple report. If a report is heard from several areas or people it is "true." The Russian KGB has a Department D that forges documents and plants them in several parts of the world. They are then "true."

Propaganda spokesmen located all over the world say the same thing to the press on every major occasion. This becomes "public opinion" in government circles and so is "true" because it is published and comes from so many areas.

Five informants could all have heard the same lie.

Thus we see these two systems of evaluation are both birdbrain.

**TWO PROBLEMS**

The two problems that information collection agencies have are

1. Data evaluation and
2. How to locate the areas they should closely investigate.

For (1), data evaluation, they use primarily reliable source and multiple report.

**Every item received that is not "Reliable" or "Multiple" is waste-basketed.**

They throw out all outpoints and do not report them!

Their agents are thoroughly trained to do this.

As for (2), areas to investigate, they cannot pinpoint where they should investigate or even what to investigate because they do not use their outpoints.

Using outpoints and data and situation analysis they would know exactly where to look at, at what.

## ERRORS

The above data errors are practiced by the largest data collection agencies on the planet-the "professionals." These advise their governments! And are the only advisers of their governments. Thus you can see how dangerous they are to their own countries.

Naturally they have agents who have what is called "flair." These, despite all systems, apply logic. They are so few that Eisenhower's intelligence adviser, General Strong, said in his book that they are too scarce so one is better off with a vast organization.

These agencies are jammed with false reports and false estimations.

An event contemporary with this writing where the US invaded Cambodia shows several data and situation errors. Yet the Viet Cong HQ were using computers. Yet their HQ was wiped out. The US President used CIA data which does not include, by law, data on the US. So the info on which the US President was acting was 50% missing! He was only told about the enemy evidently. When he ordered the invasion the US blew up!

A rather big outpoint (omitted facts) don't you think?

## FAULTS

The reason I am using intelligence examples is because these are the biggest human data collection "professionals" in the world.

The collection and use of data to estimate situations to guide *national* actions and the data collection by a housewife going shopping are based on the same principles.

Mrs. Glutz, told by a "reliable source," Nellie Jones, that things are cheaper at Finkleberries and told by enough TV admen she should buy **Kleano** tends to do just that. Yet Blastonsteins is really cheaper and by shaving up laundry soap and boiling it she can have ten dollars worth of **Kleano** for about fifty cents.

Errors in *national* data collection give us war and high taxes and for Mrs. Glutz gives her a busted budget and stew all week.

So at top and bottom, any operation requires a grasp of data evaluation and situation estimation.

Those who do it will win and those who don't, go up in a cloud of atomic particles or divorce papers!

Logic and illogic are the stuff of survive and succumb.

There are those who wish to survive.

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*Data Series 7*

**FAMILIARITY**

If one has no familiarity with how a scene (area) ought to be, one cannot easily spot outpoints (illogical data) in it.

This is what also could be called an **ideal** scene or situation. If one doesn't know the *ideal* scene or situation then one is not likely to observe non-ideal points in it.

Let us send a farmer to sea. In a mild blow, with yards and booms creaking and water hitting the hull, he is sure the ship is about to sink. He has no familiarity with how it should sound or look so he misses any real outpoints and may consider all pluspoints as outpoints.

Yet on a calm and pretty day he sees a freighter come within 500 feet of the side and go full astern and thinks everything is great.

An experienced officer may attempt madly to avoid collision and all the farmer would think was that the officer was being impolite! The farmer, lacking any familiarity with the sea and having no *ideal* as to what smooth running would be, would rarely see real outpoints unless he drowned. Yet an experienced sailor, familiar with the scene in all its changing faces sees an outpoint in all small illogicals.

On the other hand, the sailor on the farm would completely miss rust in the wheat and an open gate and see no outpoints in a farm that the farmer knew was about to go bust.

The rule is

**A person must have an ideal scene with which to compare the existing scene.**

If a staff hasn't got an idea of how a real org should run, then it misses obvious outpoints.

One sees examples of this when an experienced org man visiting the org tries to point out to a green staff (which has no ideal or familiarity) what is out. The green staff grudgingly fixes up what he says to do but lets go of it the moment he departs. Lacking familiarity and an ideal of a perfect org, the green staff just doesn't see anything wrong or anything right either!

The consequences of this are themselves illogical. One sees an untrained executive shooting all the producers and letting the bad hats alone. His erroneous ideal would be a quiet org, let us say. So he shoots anyone who is noisy or demanding. He ignores statistics. He ig-

nores the things he should watch merely because he has a faulty ideal and no familiarity of a proper scene.

### OBSERVATION ERRORS

When the scene is not familiar one has to look hard to become aware of things. You've noticed tourists doing this. Yet the old resident "sees" far more than they do while walking straight ahead down the road.

It is easy to confuse the novel with the "important fact." "It was a warm day for winter" is a useful fact only when it turns out that actually everything froze up on that day or it indicated some other outpoint.

Most errors in observation are made because one has no ideal for the scene or no familiarity with it.

However there are other error sources.

"Being reasonable" is the chief offender. People dub-in a missing piece of a sequence, for instance, instead of seeing that it **is** missing. A false datum is imagined to exist because a sequence is wrong or has a missing step.

It is horrifying to behold how easily people buy dub-in. This is because an illogical sequence is uncomfortable. To relieve the discomfort they distort their own observation by not-ising the outpoint and concluding something else.

I recall once seeing a Tammany Hall group (a New York political bunch whose symbol is a tiger) stop before the tiger's cage in a zoo. The cage was empty and they were much disappointed. I was there and said to them, "The tiger is out to lunch." They told those on the outer edge of the group, "The tiger is out to lunch." They all cheered up, accepted the empty cage and went very happily on their way. Not one said "Lunch?" Or "Who are you?" Or laughed at the joke. Even though it was sunset! I pitied the government of New York!

### ACCURATE OBSERVATION

There are certain conditions necessary for accurate observation.

First is a means of **perception** whether by remote communication by various comm lines or by direct looking, feeling, experiencing.

Second is an **ideal** of how the scene or area should be.

Third is **familiarity** with how such scenes are when things are going well or poorly.

Fourth is understanding **pluspoints** or rightnesses when present.

Fifth is knowing **outpoints** (all 5 types) when they appear.

Sixth is rapid ability to **analyze data**.

Seventh is the ability to **analyze** the **situation**.

Eighth is the willingness to **inspect** more closely the area of outness.

Then one has to have the knowledge and imagination necessary to **handle**.

One could call the above the **cycle of observation**. If one calls **handle** number 9 it would be the Cycle of Control.

If one is trained to conceive all variations of outpoints (illogics) and studies up to conceive an ideal and gains familiarity with the scene or type of area, his ability to observe and handle things would be considered almost supernatural.

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*Data Series 8*

**SANITY**

An observer has to be sane to sanely observe.

This has been so far out in the society that the word "sane" itself has come to mean "conservative" or "cautious." Or something you can agree with. The 19th century psychologist decided he could not define "normal" and there weren't any normal people. The 14th century psychiatrist is the 20th century "authority" on sanity. Yet an examination of such shows them to be unable to demonstrate it personally or bring it about, much less define it.

Dictionaries say it is "health, soundness of body or mind; level-headedness, reasonableness."

Yet sanity is vital to accurate observation.

**FIXED IDEAS**

The "idée fixe" is the bug in sanity.

Whenever an observer himself has fixed ideas he tends to look at them not at the information.

Prejudiced people are suffering mainly from an "idée fixe."

The strange part of it is that the "idée fixe" they think they have isn't the one they do have.

An example of this is the social "scientist" with a favorite theory. I have seen tons of these birds pushing a theory as though it was the last theory in the world and valuable as a ten-pound diamond. Such throw away any fact that does not agree with theory. That's how 19th century psychology went off the rails. All fixed ideas and no facts.

The physical sciences in Hegel's time did the same thing. There was no 8th planet in the solar system, even when found in a telescope, because "seven is a perfect number so there can only be seven planets."

History is full of idiocies-and idiots-with fixed ideas. They cannot observe beyond the idea.

A fixed idea is something accepted without personal inspection or agreement. It is the perfect "authority knows best." It is the "reliable source." A typical one was the intelligence report accepted by the whole US Navy right up to 7 Dec. 1941, the date of destruction of the US fleet by Jap planes. The pre-Pearl Harbor report, from unimpeachably reliable sources was "the Japanese cannot fly-they have no sense of balance." The report overlooked that the Japs were the world's greatest acrobats! It became a fixed idea that caused the neglect of all other reports.

A fixed idea is uninspected. It blocks the existence of any contrary observation.

Most reactionaries (people resisting all progress or action) are suffering from fixed ideas which they received from "authorities," which no actual experience alters.

That British red-coated infantry never took cover was another one. It took a score or two of wars and fantastic loss of life to finally break it down. If any single fixed idea destroyed the British Empire, this one is a candidate.

### NORMAL SCENE

The reason a fixed idea can get so rooted and so overlooked is that it appears normal or reasonable.

And somebody or a lot of somebodies want to believe it.

Thus a fixed idea can become an ideal. It is probably a wrong ideal. Incapable Jap pilots would be a wish for a navy. It would be wonderful! Red-coated infantry were supposed to be brave and unflinching.

In both cases the ideal is irrational.

A rational ideal has this law:

**The purpose of the activity must be part of the ideal one has for that activity.**

A navy that has an ideal that the enemy can't fly is stupidly avoiding its own purpose which is to fight.

British infantry had the purpose of winning wars, not just looking brave.

Thus one can analyze for a sane ideal by simply asking, "What's the purpose of the activity?" If the ideal is one that forwards the purpose, it will pass for sane.

There are many factors which add up to an ideal scene. If the majority of these forward the purpose of the activity, it can be said to be a sane ideal.

If an ideal which does not forward the activity in any way is the ideal being stressed then a fixed idea is present and had better be inspected.

This could be said to be a very harsh utilitarian view of things. But it is not. The artistic plays its role in any ideal. Morale has its part in any ideal.

An ideal studio for an artist could be very beautiful or very ugly so long as it served him to produce his art. If it was very beautiful yet hindered his artistic activities it would be a very crazy ideal scene.

A handsome factory that produced would be a high ideal. But its nearness to raw materials, transport and worker housing are the more important factors in an ideal of a factory. And its location in a country where the government made an atmosphere in which production could occur could be an overriding part of an "ideal scene."

You have to look at what the area is for before you can say whether it is ideal or not.

And if its area is too limited to produce or too expensive for it to be solvent, then it isn't a sane scene.

### URGES TO IMPROVE

Sometimes the urge to improve an activity is such that it injures or destroys the activity.

If one is familiar with the type of activity he must also realize that there is a law involved.

**The fact that something is actually operating and solvent can outweigh the untested advantages of changing it.**

In other words, an ideal scene might be vastly different but the actual scene IS operating.

So the factor of **obsessive change** enters. Change can destroy with ferocity.

Whole areas of London, jammed with small but customer-filled shops, have been swept away to make room for chromium high-rent modern stores which stand empty of buyers.

Birmingham, where you could get anything made, had all its tiny craft shops swept away and replaced with high-rent huge new buildings all on some progress-crazy psychotic break.

Possibly the new stores and the huge new shops fitted somebody's "ideal" but they did not match an actual operating environment.

It is this difference between an ideal scene and a practical scene which brings down many old businesses and civilizations.

Therefore, to have an ideal, familiarity with what works is desirable.

It is quite possible without any familiarity, to imagine a successful ideal. **But it must not have any fixed ideas in it.**

It is the fixed idea that knocks a practical operating living environment in the head.

Do-gooders are always at this. They see in a row of old shacks, not economic independence and a lazy life but P-O-V-E-R-T-Y. So they get a new housing project built, shoot taxes into the sky, put total control on a lot of people and cave in a society.

The do-gooder is pushing the 19th century fixed idea of the Comte de Saint-Simon-to gear the whole economy down to the poorest man in it. In other words to reward only the downstat. Everyone becomes a slave of course but it sure sounds good.

Newspapermen are probably the world's worst observers. They observe through the fixed ideas of the publisher or the prevailing control group. Their stories are given them before they leave the office. Yet their observations advise the public and the government!

The outpoints to be found in any contemporary newspaper brand most stories as false before one proceeds more than a paragraph.

Yet this is what the world public is expected to run on.

Naturally it distorts the scene toward raving insanity. This conflicts with the native logic of people so the public thinks the world a lot madder than it really is.

In two cities all newspapers were suspended from publication for quite a period. In both, crime dropped to zero! And resumed again when newspapers were again published.

The ideal scene of the citizen in his workaday world is vastly different than the scene depicted in a newspaper.

The difference between the two can make one feel quite weird.

Thus there should not be too wide a difference between the ideal and the represented scene. And not too wide a difference between the ideal and the actual scene.

R (reality) consists of the is-ness of things. One can improve upon this is-ness to bring about an ideal and lead the R up to it. This is normal improvement and is accepted as sane.

One can also degrade the R by dropping the representation (description) of the scene well below the actual. In the black propaganda work traditionally carried on by many governments this latter trick of corrupting the R is the means used to foment internal revolt and war.

Both actions of upgrade and downgrade are outpoints when reported as facts. "We made £1000 in reserves this week" is as crazily outpoint as "the government went broke this week" when either one is not the truth.

When the report says, "we should plan a higher income," it is leading to a higher idea! and is not an outpoint mainly because it is not representing any fact but a hopeful and ambitious management.

## 5 POINTS

When none of the outpoints are present, yet you do have reports and the scene is functioning and fulfilling its purpose one would have what he could call a sane scene.

If all 5 points were absent yet the scene was not functioning well enough to live, it would be such a departure from the ideal that that itself would be outpoint in that importance was altered. What is out here is the whole situation! The situation analysis would be instantly visible.

But in practice this last happens only in theory, not in practice. A collapsing situation is forecast by outpoints in its data.

Organisms and organizations tend to survive.

A decline of survival is attended also by outpoints.

### **SANITY IS SURVIVAL**

Anything not only survives better when sane but it is true that the insane doesn't survive.

Thus survival potential can be measured to a considerable degree by the absence of outpoints.

This does not mean that sane men can't be shot or sane organizations can't be destroyed. It means only that there is far less chance of them being shot and destroyed.

So long as men and organizations are connected to insane men and organizations, wild things can and do happen unexpectedly.

But usually such things can be predicted by outpoints in others.

When sane men and organizations exist in a broad scene that is convulsed with irrationality, it takes very keen observation and a good grip on logic and fast action to stay alive. This is known as "environmental challenge." It can be overdone! Too much challenge can overwhelm.

The difference between such happening to a sane man or organization and to the insane would be that the failure did not itself become a fixed idea.

### **INSANITY**

The 5 primary illogics or outpoints as we call them are of course the anatomy of insanity.

In their many variations the insanity of any scene can be sounded and the nucleus of it located.

By locating and then closely inspecting, such a point of insanity can then be handled.

When you know what insanity really is you can then confront it and handle it. One is not driven into a huge generality of "everything is insane."

By detecting and eliminating small insane areas, taking care not to destroy the sane things around it, one can gradually lift any situation up to sanity and survival.

By seeing what is insane in a scene and seeing why it is insane, one has by comparison also found what is sane.

By locating and understanding outpoints one finds the pluspoints; for any given situation.

And that is often quite a relief.

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Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex  
HCO POLICY LETTER OF 12 MARCH 1975  
Issue II

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Evaluators  
DSEC Students  
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FOLOs

*Data Series 40*

**THE IDEAL ORG**

(First appeared as LRH ED 102 INT,  
20 May 70, referring to evaluation.)

The ideal org would be an activity where people came to achieve freedom and where they had confidence they would attain it.

It would have enough space in which to train, process and administrate without crowding.

It would be located where the public could identify and find it.

It would be busy looking, with staff in motion, not standing about.

It would be clean and attractive enough not to repel its public.

Its files and papers, baskets and lines would be in good order.

The org board would be up-to-date and where the public could see who and what was where and which the staff would use for routing and action.

A heavy outflow of letters and mailings would be pouring out.

Answers would be pouring in.

Auditors would be auditing in Div IV HGC and Qual would be rather empty.

Supervisors would be training students interestedly and 2-way comming all slows.

The HCO Area Sec would have hats for everyone. And checked out on everyone.

There would be a pool of people in training to take over new admin and tech posts.

The staff would be well-paid because they were productive.

The Public Divisions would be buzzing with effective action and new people and furnishing a torrent of new names to CF.

The pcs would be getting full grades to ability attained for each, not 8 minutes from 0 to IV, but more like 30 processes. And they would be leaving with high praises.

The students would be graduating all on fire to audit.

One could look at this ideal org and know that this was the place a new civilization was being established for this planet.

The thousand or more actions that made it up would dovetail smoothly one with another.

And the PR Area Control would be such that no one would dream of threatening it.

Such an ideal org would be built by taking what one has and step by step building and smoothing, grooving in and handling each of its functions, with each of its divisions doing more and more of its full job better and better.

The business is always there-the skill with which it is handled and the results on pcs and students is the single important line which makes it possible to build the rest.

The ideal org is the image one builds toward. It is the product of the causative actions of many. Anything which is short of an ideal org is an outpoint that can be put right. The end product is not just an ideal org but a new civilization already on its way.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 23 MAY 1970

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*Data Series 9*

**ERRORS**

Many who begin to use "illogics," who have not drilled on them so they can rattle them off, choose errors instead of outpoints.

An error may show something else. It is nothing in itself.

An error obscures or alters a datum.

Example: Asking someone to spot the outpoints in a Russian passenger vacation cruise liner in a foreign port, the answers were, "The hammer and sickle are upside down." "The courtesy flag is not flying right side up." These aren't outpoints. The hammer and sickle weren't backwards so *saying* it was an outpoint. The actual outpoint was *passenger vacation cruise* liner. There is no Russian idle class. It was too big to be giving cruises to winning tractor drivers. Russian and vacation cruise liner just don't go together. Either the reports of Russian refusal to let Russians travel is false or it wasn't a vacation cruise liner but it was. Hence it's an outpoint. An omitted datum. Two contrary data means one is false. Investigation disclosed it was Russian all right and a vacation cruise liner all right. **But it was chartered to an Italian company that sold cruises to Italians!**

But this leads to a new outpoint. How come the workers paradise is building huge ships for capitalist pleasures?

If anyone like a Martian was tracing down what's out on this planet, this one outpoint would lead to others.

A situation analysis would indicate an investigation of Russia where outpoints abound and the Martian would know a lot of what's wrong on the planet,

In doing so he would find a lot of capitalistic outpoints which would lead him to investigate the so-called West and he would have the basic "cold war" of communism versus capitalism.

This would lead him into new data the two have in common (economics) and a data analysis of economics would discover the screwiest bunch on the planet, the international banker playing off both sides.

He would have analyzed the planet.

Given that he knew or could translate languages, it might take him a week, starting with a Russian luxury cruise liner, to run down the planetary bad spot.

Now if he *reversed* his investigation and used **pluspoints** he would arrive with a situation analysis of what group would be strong enough to handle the down spot and by investigation possibly pinpoint what could tip over the bad spot.

If he just used "errors" he would get no place.

The ideal he would have to be working from would be a planet at peace where individuals could go about their affairs and be happy without threats of immediate arrest or destruction. It would be a very simple ideal or it would be based only on how planetary populations and cultures survive and that is already laid down in an earlier rule in this series.

Ask somebody to look at a table used for meals at the end of a meal and indicate any outpoints. Usually he'll point out a dirty plate or crumbs or an ashtray not emptied. They are not outpoints. When people finish eating one expects dirty plates, crumbs and full ashtrays. If none of these things were present there might be several outpoints to note. The *end* of a meal with table and plates all clean would be a reversed sequence. *That* would be an outpoint. Evidentially the *dinner* has been omitted and that would be quite an outpoint! Obviously no meal has been served so there's a falsehood. So here are three outpoints.

It is best to get what outpoints are down pat. One does this first by thinking up examples and then by observing some body of data and then by looking at various scenes.

It will be found that outpoints are really few unless the activity is very irrational.

Simple errors on the other hand can be found in legions in any scene.

Child's games often include, "What's wrong with this picture?" Usually they are just errors like a road sign upside down. But if you had a *brown* rabbit in *winter* holding down a *man* with its front paws and a caption, "Japanese parasols attack \_\_\_\_\_," you'd have some real outpoints.

A lot of people would try to figure it out and supply *new* outpoints (being reasonable). A learned professor could point out the symbolism. Some would laugh it off. Some would be annoyed by it. And the reason anybody would do anything about it is that it is sort of painful to confront the irrational so instead of seeing its is-ness of illogics an effort is made to make it logical or to throw it away.

The reason misunderstood words or typographical errors were not regarded as a barrier to study was that people converted them or not-ised them. In actual fact a word one does not understand made a missing datum. Reasonableness or nonconfront enter in and one drops the book.

Errors do not count in pluspoints either.

That a factory has a few errors is no real indicator. A factory has pluspoints to the degree it attains its ideal and fulfills its purpose. That some of its machinery needs repair might not even be an outpoint. If the general machinery of the place is good for enough years to easily work off its replacement value there is a pluspoint.

People applying fixed or wrong ideals to a scene are only pointing up errors in their own ideals, not those of the scene!

A reformer who had a strict Dutch mother looks at a primitive Indian settlement and sees children playing in mud and adults going around unclothed. He forces them to live cleanly and cuts off **the sun by putting them** in clothes – they lose their immunities required to live and die off. He missed the pluspoint that these Indians had survived hundreds of years in this area that would kill a white man in a year!

Thus errors are usually a comparison to one's personal ideals. Outpoints compare to the ideal for that particular scene.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 23 JUNE 1970

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*Data Series 10*

**THE MISSING SCENE**

The biggest "omitted data" would be the whole scene.

A person who does not know how the scene should be can thereafter miss most of the outpoints in it.

An example is the continual rewrite of the International Code (signaling by flags between ships) by some "convention" composed of clerks who have never gone to sea. Not knowing the scene, the International Code of Signals now contains "How are your kidneys?" but nothing about lifeboats.

College education became rather discredited in Europe until students were required to work in areas of actual practice as part of their studies. Educated far from reality students had "no scene." Thus no data they had was related by them to an actual activity. There was even an era when the "practical man" or "practical engineer" was held in contempt. That was when the present culture started to go down.

On the other hand one of the most long-lived activities around is the wine industry of Portugal. It has almost no theory trained. It is total scene. Every job in it is by apprenticeship for years. It is very constant and very successful.

A good blend would be theory and practical in balance. That gives one data *and* activity. But it could be improved by stressing also the ideal scene.

**BODIES OF DATA**

Data classifies in similar connections or similar locations.

A body of data is associated by the subject to which it is applicable or by the geographical area to which it belongs.

A body of data can also be grouped as to time, like an historical period.

Illogic occurs when one or more data is misplaced into the wrong body of data for it.

An example would be "Los Angeles smog was growing worse so we fined New York." That is pretty obviously a misplace.

"Cars were no longer in use. Bacterial warfare had taken its toll."

"I am sorry madam but you cannot travel first class on a third class passport."

Humanoid response to such displacements is to be *reasonable*. A new false datum is dreamed up and put into the body of data to explain why that datum is included. (Reasonableness is often inserted as explanation of other outpoints also.)

In the smog one, it could be dreamed up that New York's exports or imports were causing LA smog.

In the car one, it could be imagined that bacteriological warfare had wiped out all the people.

In the train one, it could be inserted that in that country, passports were used instead of tickets.

The brain strains to correctly classify data into its own zones and is very rejective or imaginative when it is not.

Intelligence tests accidentally use this one very often.

It remains that an outpoint can occur when a datum belonging to one zone of data, location or time, is inserted into another zone where it doesn't.

Algebra is sometimes hard to learn for some because **numbers** are invaded by **letters**.  $2x = 10$ .  $X$  is of course 5. But part of a new student's mind says letters are letters and make words.

Primitive rejective responses to foreigners is a mental reaction to a body of people, in this case, being invaded by a person not of that tribe.

If the scene is wholly unknown, one doesn't know what data belongs to it. Thus a sense of confusion results. Recruits can be sent for ruddy rods for rifles and apprentice painters can be ordered to get cans of sky blue lampblack.

A sense of humor is in part an ability to spot outpoints that should be rejected from a body of data. In fact a sense of humor is based on both rejection and absurd outpoints of all types.

Reasonable people accept displacements with an amazing tranquility by imagining connecting links or assuming they do not know the ideal scene. A reasonable person would accept a pig in a parlor by imagining that there was a good reason for it. And leave the pig in the parlor and revise their *own* ideal scene!

Yet pigs belong to a body of data including barns, pens, farms, animals. And parlors belong to a body of data including teacups, knickknacks, conversation and humans.

Possibly Professor Wundt who "discovered" in 1879 that humans were animals had seen too many pigs in parlors! And based the whole of "psychology" on a confusion of bodies of data!

Murder in a hospital, as done by psychiatry, would be a confusion of bodies of *actions*. Actions belong to their own bodies of data.

One *drives* a car, *rides* a horse. One doesn't ride a car but one can drive a horse. But the *action*, the motions involved with, driving a horse are very different than those used in driving a car. This is a language breakdown called a "homonym." One word means two different things. Japanese is an easy language except for its use of the same word for several different things. Two Japanese talking commonly have to draw Chinese characters (Japanese is written with Chinese characters) to each other to unravel what they mean. They are in a perpetual struggle to pry apart bodies of data.

"1234 Red 789 P 987 Green 432 Apple" as a statement would probably tie up CIA codebreakers for weeks as they would *know* it was a code. The same statement would tie up a football coach as he would *know* it was a team play. A mathematician would *know* it fitted into some other activity than his. Hardly anyone would classify it as a totally meaningless series of symbols.

So there is a reverse compulsion-to try to fit any datum found into *some* body of data.

The mind operates toward logic, particularly in classes of things.

The sensible handling of data of course includes spotting a datum, terminal, item, action, grouped in with a body of data wrong for it. And in spotting that a datum does not have to belong anywhere at all.

Included in mental abilities is putting similar data into one type of action, items, or data. Car parts, traffic rules, communications, are each a *body* of data in which one can fit similar data.

When a person has some idea of the scene involved, he should be able to separate the data in it into similar groups.

An org board is an example of this. Sections are broad classes of action or items into which one can fit the related data. Departments are a broader body of related data, actions, items. Divisions are even broader but still cover related classes of data. The whole org is a very broad class of data, determined in part by the type of product being made.

If a person has trouble relating data to its proper body of data (if he were unaware or "reasonable") he would have an awful lot of trouble finding his way around an org or routing despatches or getting things or wearing his own hat.

Orders are a broad class of data. Orders from proper sources is a narrower body of data. If a person cannot tell the difference he will follow anyone's orders. And that will snarl him up most thoroughly.

I once knew a carpenter so obliging and so unable to classify orders that he built knickknacks, cabinets, shelves, for any staff member who asked and wasted all the time and materials and orders from his boss that were to have built a house! The house materials and money and the carpenter's time and pay were all expended without anything of value to show

for it! Not only was he unable to relate orders to their own classes but also couldn't relate materials and plans to a house!

In most miscarriages of projects it will be found that someone on the line cannot relate data or actions to their own classes. Along with this goes other illogics.

So the ability to spot illogics in a known scene can directly relate to efficiency and even to success and survival.

A switch intended for a house put into an airplane electrical system cuts out at 30,000 feet due to the wrong metal to withstand cold and there goes the airplane. A part from one class of parts is included wrongly in another class of parts.

So there is an **incorrectly included datum** which is a companion to the **omitted datum** as an outpost.

This most commonly occurs when, in the mind, the scene itself is missing and the first thing needed to classify data (scene) is not there.

An example is camera storage by someone who has no idea of types of cameras. Instead of classifying all the needful bits of a certain view camera in one box, one inevitably gets the lens hoods of all cameras jumbled into one box marked "lens hoods." To assemble or use the view camera one spends hours trying to find its parts in boxes neatly labeled "camera backs," "lenses," "tripods," etc.

Here, when the scene of what a set up view camera looks like and operates like, is missing, one gets a closer identification of data than exists. Lens hoods are lens hoods. Tripods are tripods. Thus a wrong system of classification occurs out of scene ignorance.

A traveler unable to distinguish one uniform from another "solves" it by classifying all uniforms as "porters." Hands his bag to an arrogant police captain and that's how he spent his vacation, in jail.

Lack of the scene brings about too tight an identification of one thing with another. This can also exclude a vital bit making a disassociation.

A newly called-up army lieutenant passes right on by an enemy spy dressed as one of his own soldiers. An experienced sergeant right behind him claps the spy in jail accurately because "he wasn't wearing 'is' at the way we do in the Fusileers!"

Times change data classification. In 1920 anyone with a camera near a seaport was a spy. In 1960 anyone not carrying a camera couldn't be a tourist so was watched!

So the scene for one cultural period is not the scene for another.

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Thus a class of data for a given time belongs broadly or narrowly to itself. Including a datum in it or from another time or excluding a datum from it, or forcing a datum to have a class can in any combination produce an illogical situation.



Some knowledge of the scene itself is vital to an accurate and logical assembly or review of data.

The scene therefore, knowledge of, is the basic "omitted data."

The remedy of course is to get more data on what the scene itself really should consist of. When the *scene* is missing one has to study what the *scene* is supposed to consist of, just not more random data about it.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 30 JUNE 1970

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*Data Series 11*

**THE SITUATION**

Probably the hardest meaning to get across is the definition of "**Situation.**"

One can say variously, "Isolate the actual situation" or "Work out what the situation is" and get the most remarkable results.

To some, a despatch is a situation. A small error to others is a situation.

Yet, if one wishes to know and use data and logic one must know exactly what is meant *in this* logic series by **situation.**

English has several meanings for the one word. In the dictionary it's a "place," a "state or condition of affairs," "a momentous combination of circumstances," "a clash of passions or personalities," or "a job." One gets the feeling that people are fumbling around for a meaning they know must be there.

For our purposes we had better give an *exact* definition of what is meant by **situation.** If we are going to do a situation analysis by doing an analysis of data, then WHAT is a *situation?*

We can therefore specifically define for *our* purposes in logic the word **situation.**

**A situation is a major departure from the ideal scene.**

This means a wide and significant or dangerous or potentially damaging **circumstance** or **state of affairs** which means that the **ideal scene** has been departed from and doesn't fully exist in that area.

**THE IDEAL SCENE**

One has to work out or know what the ideal scene would be for an organization or department or social strata or an activity to know that a wide big flaw existed in it.

To be somewhat overly illustrative about it, let us take a town that has no one living in it.

One would have to figure out what was the ideal scene of a town. Any town. It would be a place where people lived, worked, ate, slept, survived. It could be pretty or historical or well designed or quaint. Each of these would possibly add purpose or color to the town.

**But** this town in question has **no** people living in it.

That is a departure from the ideal scene of towns.

Therefore **the situation** would be **no people live in this "town."**

Data analysis would lead us to this by noting outpoints.

- 6 P.M. - No smoke from house chimneys. (omitted item)
- 9 P.M. - No lights. (omitted item)
- Dawn - No dogs. (omitted terminals)
- 1910 election poster. (wrong time)

That would be enough. We would then realize that a **situation** existed because data analysis is also done against the ideal scene.

We would know enough about it to look more closely.

No people! That's *the situation*.

## HANDLING

Thus if one were responsible for the area one would now know what to handle.

How he handled it depends upon (a) the need, (b) *availability of resources*, and (c) *capability*.

Obviously if it's supposed to have people in it and if one needs a town there one would have to get a bright idea or a dozen and eventually get people to live there. How fast it could be done depends on the availability of resources-those there or what one has (even as little resource as a voice, paper, pen, comm lines).

One's own capability to get ideas or work or the capabilities of people are a major factor in *handling*.

But so far as *the situation* is concerned, it exists whether it is handled or not.

## HOW TO FIND A SITUATION

When you are called upon to find out if there **is** a situation (as an inspector or official or soldier or cat or king, whatever) you can follow these steps and arrive with what the situation is every time.

1. Observe.
2. Notice an oddity of any kind or none.
3. Establish what the ideal scene would be for what is observed.
4. Count the outpoints now visible.

5. Following up the outpoints observe more closely.
6. Establish even more simply what the ideal scene would be.
7. *The situation will be the most major departure from the Ideal Scene.*

### HANDLING

Just as you proceed to the **most major situation** – go big, when it comes to *handling* it usually occurs that reverse is true – go small!

It is seldom you can handle it all at one bang. (Of course that happens too.)

But just because the **situation** is big is no real reason the solution must be.

Solutions work on gradient scales. Little by more by more.

When you really see a **situation** it is often so big and so appalling one can feel incapable.

The *need* to handle comes first.

The resources available come next.

The capability comes third.

Estimate these and by getting a very bright workable (often very simple) idea, one can make a start.

An activity can get so wide of the ideal scene the people in it are just in a confusion. They do all sorts of odd irrelevant things, often hurt the activity further.

Follow the steps given 1-7 above and you will have grasped the **situation**. You will then be able to do (a), (b), (c).

That begins to make things come right.

In that way most situations can be both defined and handled.

### INTERFERENCE

Lots of people, often with lots of authority, get mired into situations. They do not know they are in anything that could be defined, isolated or stated. They bat madly at unimportant dust motes or each other and just mire in more deeply.

Whole civilizations uniformly go the route just that way.

So do orgs, important activities and individuals.

One can handle exactly as above, if one practices up so he can really do the drill on life.

The only danger is that the situation can be so far from any ideal that others with fixed ideas and madness can defy the most accurate and sensible solutions.

But that's part of the situation, isn't it?

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Data analysis is done to make a more direct observation of exactly the right area possible. One can then establish the exact **situation**.

It's a piece of freedom to be able to do this.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 5 JULY 1970

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*Data Series 12*

**HOW TO FIND AND ESTABLISH AN IDEAL SCENE**

In order to detect, handle or remedy situations one has to be able to understand and work out several things.

These are defining the ideal scene itself, detect without error or guess any departure on it, find out **why** a departure occurred and work out a means of reverting back to the ideal scene.

In order to resolve a situation fully one has to get the real reason **why** a departure from the ideal scene occurred.

"What was changed?" or "What changed?" is the same question.

That "change" is the root of departures comes from a series of plant experiments I conducted. (The type of experimentation was undertaken to study cellular life behavior and reaction to see if it was a different *type* of life-it isn't. The experiments themselves were later repeated in various universities and were the subject of much press for them over the world.)

In setting up conditions of growth I observed that plants on various occasions greatly declined suddenly. In each case I was able to trace the last major **change** that had occurred and correct it. Changes made in temperature, water volume, humidity, ventilation, greatly affected the plants in terms of wilt, decreased growth rate, increase in parasites, etc.

When **the** change was isolated and the condition reverted to that occurring during the previous healthy period, a recovery would occur.

At first glance this may seem obvious. Yet in actual practice it was not easy to do.

Gardeners' records would omit vital data or alter importance or drop out time, etc. A gardener might seek to cover up for himself or a fellow worker. He tended to make himself right and would enter falsehoods or reassurance that was a falsehood into the analysis.

A new gardener would seem to affect the plants greatly and one could build a personality influence theory on this-until one found that, being untrained in the **procedure used, he would enter even** more outpoints than usual.

At such a juncture one would of course train the gardener. **But** that didn't locate **what** had been changed. And one had to locate that to get the plants to recover. The conditions in use were extreme forcing conditions anyway and lapse of duty was very apparent. Six-

teen-foot hothouse American corn from seeds usually furnishing 5-foot stocks, 43 tomatoes to the truss where 5 is more usual were the demands being met. So any change showed up at once.

The fact of change itself was a vital point as well. One discovery was that life does best in a near optimum constancy-meaning that change just as change is usually harmful to plant life.

The fact of isolating change in the environment as the sole harmful cause was one discovery.

That one had to isolate **the** change in order to obtain full recovery was another discovery.

Change itself was not bad but in this experimental series conditions were set as optimum and the beneficial changes had already been made with remarkable results. Thus one was observing change from the optimum.

This would be the same thing as "departures from the ideal scene."

The action was always

1. Observe the decline.
2. Locate the exact change which had been made.
3. Revert **the** change.
4. A return to the near ideal scene would occur if one were maintaining the ideal scene meanwhile.

## THE IDEAL SCENE

There are two scenes:

- A. The ideal scene
- B. The existing scene,

These of course can be wide apart.

How does one know the ideal scene?

At first thought it would be *very* difficult for a person not an expert to know the ideal scene.

For years certain "authoritarian" people in the field of mental healing fought with lies and great guile to obscure the fact that the ideal scene in mental healing can be known to anyone. Such imprisoned and tortured and murdered human beings with the excuse that they themselves were the only experts. "It takes 12 years to make a psychiatrist." "Expert skill is required to kill a patient."

The existing scene these "experts" made was a slaughterhouse for asylums and the insanity and crime statistics soaring.



They fought like maniacs to obscure the ideal scene and hired and coerced an army of agents, "reporters," "officials," and such to smash anyone who sought to present the ideal scene or ways to attain it. Indeed it was a world gone mad with even the police and governments hoodwinked by these "experts."

Yet any citizen knew the ideal scene had he not been so propaganda frightened by the existing scene.

By constantly pounding in the "naturalness" of an existing scene consisting of madness, crime, torture, seizure and murder, these mad "experts" **put the ideal scene so far from reach that it appeared incredible**. It was so bad a situation that anyone proposing the ideal scene was actively resisted!

Yet the ideal scene is so easy to state that any citizen could have stated it at any time. And often believed it was occurring!

The ideal scene of an asylum would be people recovering in a calm atmosphere, restored to any previous ability, emerging competent and confident.

The ideal scene in the society would be, probably, a safe environment wherein one could happily make his way through life.

Of course, the technology of the mind was the missing data. But the experts in charge of that sector of life paid out hard cash to hoods to prevent any such technology developing-a matter fully documented.

The gap between the ideal scene and the existing scene can be very wide and in any endeavor elements exist that tend to prevent a total closure between the two.

However, approached on a gradient with skill and determination, it can be done.

## DEPARTURE

The mental awareness that something is wrong with a scene is the point at which one can begin reverting to the ideal scene.

Without this awareness on the part of a **group** then an individual can be much impeded in handling a situation.

The mental processes of the person seeking to improve things toward an ideal scene or change them back to an ideal scene must include those who are also parts of the scene.

Seeing something wrong without seeking to correct it degenerates into mere faultfinding and natter. This is about as far as many people go. That something, real or imagined, is wrong with the scene is a not uncommon state of mind. Not knowing what's intended or being done, or the limitations of resource or the magnitude and complexity of opposition, the arm-chair critic can be dreadfully unreal. He therefore tends to be suppressed, particularly by reactionaries (who try to keep it all as it is regardless).

Unfortunately, the continual battle of life then is between the critic and the reactionary. As this often blows up in pointless destruction, it can be seen there could be something wrong with both of them.

Particularly the inactive carping critic is at fault on three counts.

- A. He isn't doing anything about it.
- B. He is not conceiving or broadcasting a real ideal scene.
- C. He is not providing any gradient approach to actually attain an ideal scene.

The reactionary of course simply resists any change regardless of who is suffering providing the reactionary can retain what position and possession he may have.

A revolutionary of course usually

1. Is doing something about it even if violent.
2. Is conceiving and broadcasting his version of the ideal scene, and
3. Is planning and acting upon some means of bringing about his own ideal scene.

History and "progress" seem to be the revolutionary making his version of progress over the dead bodies of reactionaries.

And although it may be history and "progress" the cycle is usually intensely destructive and ends up without attaining an ideal scene and also destroying any scene existing.

The ancient world is filled with ruins over which one can wander in contemplative and philosophic reverie. These attempts to make and maintain an ideal scene certainly left enough bruised masonry around.

So it is really not enough to natter and it's rather too much to thrust violent change down on the heads of one and all including the objectors.

Violent revolution comes about when the actual ideal scene has not been properly stated and when it excludes significant parts of the group.

It's no good having a revolution if the end product will be a **further** departure from the ideal scene.

The pastoral nonsense of Jean Jacques Rousseau was about as wide from an ideal scene as you could get, and it and other efforts, also wide, brought on the French Revolution.

The Russian 1917 revolution had already been preceded by the democratic Kerensky revolt. But it failed because Russia being Russia was about a century and a half late.

Also the French Revolution was late.

And in both cases those who should have led didn't. Lesser ranks overthrew command.

These and countless other human upheavals mark the fluttering pages of history and history will be written in similar vein again and again to eternity unless some sense and logic gets into the scene.

Revolt is only an expression of too long unattended departures from the ideal scene of society.

Usually the stitches taken to mend the growing social order are too weak and too hastily improvised to prevent the cultural fabric from being torn to rags.

Street battles and angry infantry are the direct opposite of the ideal political scene.

What was needed in such a case was an awareness of departure from the ideal scene, the discovery of **Why** a departure occurred and a gradient, real and determined program to return the scene closer to the ideal.

The elements of improved mechanical arts and progress in the humanities may be utilized to effect the recovery. In any event (which is missed by the reactionary and his "good old days") cultures do change and those changes are a part of any new ideal scene. So one does not achieve a reversion to the ideal by turning back the clock. One must be bright enough to include improvements in a *new* ideal scene.

### IDEAL SCENE AND PURPOSE

Let us look this over, this concept of the ideal scene, and see that it is not a very complex thing.

One doesn't have to be much of an expert to see what an ideal scene would be.

The complex parts of the whole may not make up the whole, but they are not really vital to conceiving an ideal scene for any activity, as small as a family or as big as a planet.

The entire concept of an ideal scene for any activity is really a clean statement of its **purpose**.

All one has to ask is "What's the purpose of this?" and one will be able to work out what the ideal scene of "this" is.

To give a pedestrian example let us take a shoe shop. Its purpose is obviously to sell or provide people with shoes. The ideal scene is almost as simple as "This activity sells or provides people with shoes."

Now no matter how complex may be the business or economics of shoe sales, the fact remains that that is almost the ideal scene.

Only one factor is now missing: **Time**.

The complete ideal scene of the shoe shop is then, "This activity is intended to provide people with shoes for (time)." It can be always or for its owner's lifetime or for the duration of the owner's stay in the town or the duration of the state fair.

Now we can see departures from the ideal scene of this shoe store.

One has to work out fairly correctly what the purpose of an activity is and how long it is to endure before one can make a statement of the ideal scene.

From this one can work out the complexities which compose the activity in order to establish it in the first place including the speed of the gradient (how much shoe store how fast) and also how to spot *the fact of* departure from the ideal scene.

This process would also work on any portion *of* the shoe store if the main ideal is not also violated. The children's department, the cashier, the stock clerk also have their sub-ideal scenes. And departures from *their* ideal scenes can be noted.

It doesn't matter what the activity is, large or small, romantic or humdrum, its ideal scene and its sub-ideal scenes are arrived at in the same way.

### METHODS OF AWARENESS

Statistics are the only sound measure of any production or any job or any activity.

The moment that one goes into any dependence on opinion, he goes into quicksand and will *see too late* the fatal flaw in restoring anything.

If the fact that anything can be given *production* statistics seems too far out, it is visible that even a guard, who would at first glance seem to be producing nothing but giving only security, is actually producing minutes, hours, weeks, years, of continued production **Time**.

Probably the most thoughtful exercise is not conceiving the ideal scene but working out what the production statistic of it is. For here, the activity or subactivity must be very correctly staticized to exactly measure the ideal scene of any activity or the statistic will itself bring about a departure!

Just as the purpose from which the ideal scene is taken must be correct, so must the statistic be all the more thoughtfully correct.

As an example, if the ideal scene of the shoe store is given the total statistic of its income then three things can happen:

1. It may cease to provide people with shoes that persuade them to come back for more.
2. It may sell shoes without enough profit to cover overhead and cease to exist.
3. It may conduct itself with more interest in the cashier than the customer and lose its trade.

Probably its statistic is "percentage of citizens in the area profitably shod by this store."

Working out how long it takes to wear out an average pair of shoes, any ex-customer would be retired from the percentage after that time span had elapsed from buying his last pair.

Given a fairly accurate and realistically updated census figure, that statistic would probably tell the tale of the ideal scene, which has its element of continuance.

The sole fixation on making money can depart from the scene. Abandonment of making any money would certainly cause a departure of the shoe store.

A commando battalion would have just as serious an examination for its ideal scene and statistic as a shoe store! And it would give a very, very effective activity if fully worked out. You'd really have to work out, probably better than the generals who think they have, the real purpose of a commando battalion (which is probably "to disperse enemy preparations by unexpected actions and overinvolve enemy manpower in expensive guarding"). The statistic could be something like "our individual soldiers freed from opponents" and/or "casualties not occurring by reason of interrupted enemy preparations."

In effect the commando battalion would be "producing." The results would be an effective increase in men under arms for their own side.

### WHY

Knowing, then, the ideal scene and its statistic, one, by keeping the statistic, can notice without "reasonableness" or somebody's report or some fifth column propaganda, an immediate departure from the ideal scene.

Remember, violent change only becomes seemingly vital when the departure from the ideal scene is noticed too late .

Opinion, reports, subject to outpoints as they almost always are, seldom tell one more than somebody else's prejudices or his efforts to cover or failures to observe.

Now that a departure is seen (because the statistic drops) one can quickly go about noticing when and so get at **Why**.

When he has the **Why** of the departure he can proceed to handle it.

The statistic, guarded against false reports, and verified, is a clean statement not as subject to outpoints as other types of statements.

Whole activities have been smashed by not having a statistic of success but taking an opinion of trouble, and reversely, by having a statistic indicating disaster but a broadcast opinion of "great success." Probably the latter is the more frequent.

It is not possible to locate **Why** the departure soon enough to remedy unless one takes the most reliable datum available-which is the datum most easily kept clean of outpoints-which is a statistic.

You don't really even know there is a Why unless there has been a departure. And the departure may be very hard to spot without a statistic.

I have seen a group producing like mad, doing totally great, but which had no statistic, become the subject of wild outpoints and even contempt within itself.

If an activity lacks an ideal scene and a correct statistic for it, it has no stable datum with which to rebuff opinion and outpoints. To that extent the group goes a bit mad.

Group sanity depends. then. upon an ideal scene. correct sub-ideal scenes and statistics to match.

One of the calmest safest groups around had a bad reputation with fellow groups because it did not have or make known its ideal scene and did not have or release its statistics.

And it had a hard time of it for quite a while, meantime working exhaustedly but dedicatedly.

Planet, nation, social groups, businesses, all their parts and the individual have their ideal scene and their statistic, their departures and successes and failures. And none fall outside these data.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 6 JULY 1970

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*Data Series 13*

**IRRATIONALITY**

Any and all irrationality is connected to departures from an ideal scene.

Therefore outpoints indicate departures.

It must follow then that rationality is connected to an ideal scene.

These three assumptions should be studied, observed and fully grasped.

They are very adventurous assumptions at first glance for if they are true then one has not only the definition of sanity in an organization or individual but also of neurosis and psychosis. One also sees that organizations or social groups or companies or any third dynamic (the urge to survival as a group) activity can be neurotic or psychotic.

It therefore would follow that the technology of the ideal scene, existing scene, departures, outpoints and statistics would contain or indicate the means of establishing sane groups or individuals or measuring their relative sanity or re-establishing relative sanity in them.

**THE PLAGUE OF MAN**

Man has been harassed by irrationality in individual and group conduct since there has been Man.

The existing scene of Man's activities is so immersed in departures and outpoints that at first survey there would seem to be no possible handling of the situation.

Most people have accepted the existing conditions as "inevitable" and toss them off with a "that's life."

This is of course an overwhelmed attitude.

And it is true that the departure from any ideal is so distant as to obscure any feeling of reality about possibly achieving an ideal scene even in a limited area.

Philosophies exist to "prove" that chaos is needful to furnish challenge. That is like saying "Be glad you're crazy" (as 19th century psychologists *did* say). Or "Suffering refines one," as the playwrights of the early 20th century so fondly used in their plots.

One whole religious order preached the necessity to accept Man as he is.

Thus Man is plagued with defeatism, has lacked technology, and civilization after civilization has succumbed, either in a flash of flame and war or in the slow erosion of grinding distress.

Most men, it has been said, live lives of quiet desperation.

One doesn't have to live through several wars to learn that Man and his leaders are something less than sane.

Every sword-waving conqueror has exploited Man's seeming inability to avoid brotherly slaughter and no conqueror or army seems to have noticed that wars only rarely shift boundaries no matter how many are killed. Europe for centuries has excelled in the development of marble orchards and failed remarkably to establish any lasting political scene at all.

In other lands government leaders, who should have at least a partial duty of preserving their citizenry have sat raptly listening to the advice of madmen for some centuries now. US leaders lately have taken to acting on the mental health guidance of many civilian committees, each one of which contains at least one member of an organization directly connected to Russia! The country most interested in fomenting US civil commotion! A former head of CIA once cracked for a joke, "What if there were a Russian KGB agent inside CIA?" The shudder of horror that went through US politicians was interesting to see. Yet every new employee of CIA was "vetted" before employment by members of two organizations connected to Russia! The "American" Psychological Association and the "American" Psychiatric Association are directed by the World Federation of Mental Health founded by Brock Chisholm, the companion of Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers, the famous US communist traitors. And the US government pays the WFMH to hold congresses which are attended by Russian KGB delegates. And all intelligence given the President on Vietnam, where the US was "fighting communism" was passed through the hands of a man whose parents are both Russian born communists. And the US Defense Department intelligence on the same war was led and "coordinated" by another communist-connected employee.

With that many outpoints showing up in their social welfare and intelligence scene, the US government seems something less than bright in wondering, "What riots?" "Why drugs?" "Why defeats?"

The statistics of the US welfare and social scene under the domination of the World Federation of Mental Health are soaring insanity, crime and riot graphs. It is so bad that Russia will never have to fight an atomic war. The US economic, political and social scene will deteriorate and is deteriorating so rapidly that the US will have lost any will to fight or any economic or social power to resist Russia.

(In case you wonder as to the factualness of data given above, it is all documented.)

I have given this existing scene so that you can see the outpoints. The deteriorated state of public safety in the US is well known. The fantastic sums it spends are well known.

I have given visible outpoints.

One glance at psychiatric and psychological statistics (which are all negative) would tell any sane person that they must be doing something else as they were given all the money,



political power and authority ever needed to handle the scene. But it got worse! So, checking the scene for outpoints, one finds them directly connected to the No. 1 US enemy. Their data is marvellous for outpoints. Paid to serve the US, their literature discusses mainly abolishing boundaries and the Constitution.

The US official, so drowned in the chatter and confusion of double-talk and false intelligence and situation reports, apparently cannot see any solution. And heaps money on his traitors and finances their avid destruction of the country.

Yet, outpoints are so many and so visible that even the citizen sees them while the official remains apparently numb and inactive.

Very well, Man can and does get drowned in his own irrationality. And his civilizations rise and fall.

Man's primary plague is irrationality. He is not in the grip of a "death wish," nor is he having a love affair with destruction. He has just lacked any road out or the technology to put him on it.

### RESOLVING THE SCENE

All the US would have to do is count up the outpoints, look at the statistics, drop their passionate affair with Russian psychiatry, conceive an ideal scene of a productive America, re-channel welfare monies into decent public works to give people jobs and improve productivity per capita, knock off foreign funds and wars, give the money to increasing the value of American resources and even now the US would become all right. National production would catch up with destructive inflation, money would return to value and an ideal national scene would be approached. Even the military-industrial clique would be happy making bulldozers instead of tanks and youth would have a future in sight instead of a foreign-made grave. The odd part of it is, even the Senate and House would vote for such a program as their own statistic today is how much federal money can they bring home to their own states.

The only ones that would resist are the people who are the ones causing the above outpoints and who knowingly or unknowingly serve other masters than the US. And that's a simple security problem after all.

I have put the example on a large canvas just to show that the steps of handling departures are the same for all situations large or great.

When done this way, by the steps mentioned in the Data Series, big situations can be analyzed as well as little ones.

Available resources and all that play a part in getting the solution into effect. But the cost in time and action of the original effort to introduce the cycle of revertment to an ideal scene is not anywhere near as costly as *letting the departure continue*.

The **easier** thing to do in all cases is to work out the ideal scene, survey the existing scene for outpoints, work out statistics that *should* exist, find out WHY the departure, program a gradient solution back to the ideal, settle the practical aspects of it and go about it.

### LOSING ONE'S WAY

One's direction is lost to the degree one fails to work out the ideal scene.

It is so easy to toss off an "ideal scene" that is not *the* ideal scene that one can begin with a false premise.

As he tries to work with an incorrect "ideal scene" for an activity he may fail and grow discouraged without recognizing that he is already working with an omitted datum-the *real* ideal scene for that activity.

This is a major reason one can lose one's way in handling a situation.

Also in trying to find a **why** of departure one may refuse to admit that something he himself did was the reason for the departure-or why the ideal scene never took place. It requires quite a bit of character to recognize one's own errors; it is much easier to find them in a neighbor. Thus one may choose the wrong **why**, for this and other reasons.

Failures to examine the scene, reasonableness which causes blindness to the obvious, errors of penetration and defensive reasons not to admit it all impede a proper analysis.

The existing scene may be missing in one's view because one doesn't really look at it or because one has no correct ideal scene for it.

Many would rather blame or justify than be honest. Others would rather criticize than work.

But this all adds up to outpoints in the examination itself.

If one keeps at it one will however arrive at the right answers with regard to any scene.

### BUILDING THE IDEAL SCENE

To suppose one can instantly hit upon an ideal scene for any activity without further test is to be very fond of one's own prejudices.

There is however a test of whether you have the ideal scene or not.

*Can you staticize it?*

Strangely, but inevitably, since we live in the physical universe where there is both time and association of beings with beings and the physical universe and the physical universe with itself, there is a production-consumption factor in all living.

There seems to be a ratio between producing and consuming, and establishing it would probably resolve that strange subject, economics, as well as social welfare and other things.

It seems to be fatal to consume without producing. Many social observations teach us this.

Evidently one cannot, at the physical universe level, produce without consuming. And it seems that it is destructive to produce only and consume too little. One can produce far more than one consumes. apparently, but cannot consume far more than one produces.

This seems to be true of groups.

Some dreamers puffing on a hash pipe of unreality believe one can really be happy producing nothing and consuming everything. The idyllic ideal of a paradise where no one produces has been tried.

In interviewing secretaries in New York I found the larger percentage had the personal ideal scene of "marrying a millionaire." Aside from there not being that many millionaires, the dream of idle luxury forever was so far from any possible ideal scene that it was busy ruining their lives and giving their current male escorts a life of critical hell. One, having married a boy who was fast on the road to becoming a millionaire, was so dissatisfied with him not being one right now that she ruined his life and hers.

In short, it sounds nice, but having met a few who *did* marry millionaires, I can attest that they were either not producing and failing as beings or were working themselves half to death.

These no-production dreams, like the harp in heaven, lead at best to suicidal boredom. Yet Madison Avenue's ads would have one believe that one and all should own all manner of cloth, wood and metal just to be alive.

A whole civilization can break down, flop, on propaganda of no-production, total consumption. The sweat that flies off a "workers' paradise" would rival the Mississippi!

There is some sort of balanced ratio and it favors apparently, for pride and life and happiness, higher production of *something* than consumption. When it gets too unbalanced in *values*, something seems to happen.

The unhappiness and tumult in current society is oddly current with the Keynesian economic theory of creating want. It's a silly theory and has lately become to be abandoned. But it was in vogue forty years or more, as I recall. It produced the "welfare era" of the psychiatrist and the total slavery of the taxpayer!

So, whatever the economics of it, an ideal scene apparently *has* to have a statistic or the whole thing caves in, either from lack of continuity in time, from disinterest, or from plain lack of supply.

Death is possibly, could be in part, a cessation of interested production.

Hard pressed, a living being dreams of some free time. Give him too much and he begins to crave action and will go into production and if blocked from doing so will tend to cave in. Loss of a job depresses people way out of proportion and subsequent declines often trace back to it.

Destructive activities carry their own self-death. The state of veterans after wars is not always traced to wounds or privation. Destructive acts put a brand on a man.

Some of this is answered by the absence of production.

### IDEAL SCENE AND STAT

Whatever the facts and economic rules may be about production and the ideal scene, it would seem to be the case, sufficient at least for our purposes, that this rule holds good:

**The correctly stated ideal scene will have a production statistic.**

The way one defines "production" in this is not necessarily so many things made on an assembly line. That's an easy one.

It isn't just pairs of shoes. Production can be defined as the regulation or safeguarding of it, the planning or the designing of it, a lot, lot, lot of things.

A stat is a positive numerical thing that can be accurately counted and graphed on a two-dimensional thing.

To test the correctness of an ideal scene, one should be able to assign it a correct statistic.

If one can't figure out a statistic for it, then it probably is an incorrectly stated ideal scene and will suffer from departures.

Wrong stats assigned the ideal scene will wreck it. A wrongly conceived ideal scene will derail the activity quickly.

To understand something it is necessary to have a datum of comparable magnitude. To understand logic one needs to be able to establish what is illogic. One then has two things for comparison.

The ideal scene can be compared to an existing scene. This is one way to establish the ideal scene. But both need a factor to keep them in reality.

To test the ideal scene for correctness one needs to be able to formulate its statistic.

The exercise of testing the statement of the ideal scene, to keep it real and not airy-fairy and unattainable, is to work out a realistic stat for it.

One can go back and forth between the statistic and the stated ideal scene, adjusting one, then the other until one gets an attainable statistic that really does measure the validity of the stated ideal scene.

A statistic is a tight reality, a stable point. which is to measure any departure from the ideal scene.

In setting a statistic one has to outguess all efforts to falsify it (predict possible out-points in collecting it) and has to see if following the statistic would mislead anyone from the ideal scene.

So let's walk back to the shoe store.

Test statement of ideal scene: to make money.

Test statistic: pairs of shoes sold.

Now if you tried to marry up those two you'd get a prompt catastrophe. The potential departure would be immediate.

We sell shoes at no profit to raise the stat, we make no money. We try only to make money, we sell cheap shoes at high cost and our customers don't come back and we don't make money.

So those two are both no good.

Departure would occur, indeed it already exists right in the badly worked out ideal scene and the stat.

Test ideal scene: Cobblers are entitled to the shoes they make.

Test statistic: how many shoes cobbler makes.

So that's loopy!

Test ideal scene: all citizens furnished with shoes.

Test statistic: number of shoes given away.

Well, that's bonkers for a shoe *store* in any economic set-up. The citizens for sure would have no shoes once the shoe store was empty, for if everything is *given* away, who'd raise cows for hides or drive nails in soles unless he had a gun held on him so what workers' paradise is this? Slave state for sure. So that's no ideal scene for a shoe store no matter how "ideal" it looks to a do-gooder. Too airy-fairy. Since no shoes would exist to be given away.

Test ideal scene: shoes for any worker who has coupons.

Test statistic: number of coupons collected.

Well, maybe. In some society. But can the shoe store get shoes for the coupons? Maybe if there's enough economic police.

But then this would have to be a monopoly shoe store and the quality would not be a factor,

So this must be an army quartermaster depot or a state monopoly. If no incentive were needed it would work. Sure would be hard on the corns but it would barely work. Rather insecure though.

But this is a shoe *store* where people buy.

Test ideal scene: to provide workers with good shoes that can be replaced from suppliers.

Test statistic: ??? Number of shoes from suppliers given to workers ... Happy workers ...??? Amount of control that can be exerted on suppliers ...??? Ah. Number of shoes supplied well-shod workers.

Okay, that's a QM depot. Now what's a shoe *store*?

And we probably get what was given in an earlier example:

Ideal scene: to provide people with shoes and continue in business for owner's lifetime.

Statistic: percentage of citizens in area profitably shod by this store.

But even this would need to be played back and forth. And if this shoe store was in a socialist country both might require amendment. And if it was in a beach resort thronged with tourists who were also mostly foreigners the ideal scene and statistic would suffer an immediate departure and the store would fail, crash if the ideal scene were not correctly stated and the statistic real. The class of tourist would have a bearing on it.

Maybe the state has currency control demands on shopkeepers and requires them to get in foreign currency or no new stock!

Thus you could get:

Ideal scene: engendering acquisitiveness for novelty footwear made in this country.

Statistic: pairs of gift shoes bought by foreigners.

That sure would shift the whole atmosphere of the store!

Thus one plays the ideal scene against the statistic.

Maybe one can't find any ideal scene for the activity and no statistic of any significance to anyone. Could be that the activity is totally worthless even to oneself as a hobby. Although this opens the door to cynicism or a lazy way of not doing anything about anything, it just could be. Even a "reporter" who writes nothing could have an ideal scene and statistic. But it would have to be really real even then. Like,

Ideal scene: unsuspected as a spy while accepted as a "reporter."

Statistic: cash collected for reports undetectedly delivered to my government.

If that seems unreal as a scene the staff of *TIME* magazine recently held a mass meeting protesting the use of *TIME* credentials for government spying. "Nobody will talk to us anymore," the staff of that dying WFMH mouthpiece wept.

So anything could have an ideal scene, even a police state.

Idealism has nothing to do with it.

## VIABLE

The word "viable" means capable of living, able to live in a particular climate or atmosphere.

Life over a period of time requires **viability**, or the ability to survive.

Any organism or any group or any part of a group must have a potential of survival. It must be viable-life-able.

This is true of any ideal scene. The statistic measures directly the relative survival potential of the organism or its part.

This tells you the plain fact that life contains the essential purpose of living, no matter how many misguided philosophers or generals may decree otherwise.

The planetary population is now not fully viable since weapons exist capable of making it a billiard ball at the whim of some madman.

The potential survival of the whole is of course an influence and limitation on its parts.

Men who live "only for self" don't live.

An organism or group can live a dangerous life in that it risks its survival. But is more of a threat than its enemies if it does not know or adjust its ideal scene.

A military company, told on posters the ideal scene is all brag in the bar with girls on each arm, who find in fact that their actual scene is military police outside every bar with

clubs and a real short life under the orders of sadistically disinterested and inexperienced government, is presented with an instantly visible departure.

The government believed such posters were needful to get recruits and did not realize that a truthfully stated scene and an effort to promote survival to commanders would also have recruited and conscription needn't be resorted to as the end product of lies.

Men will become part of the most onerous and dangerous groups imaginable providing the purpose is there and stated and they have a chance of survival.

The ideal scene of a nation worshipping death is that of a nation that will not survive anyway. At least not as that nation.

A group or an organism must be viable. The state is relative to the time the group needs to live to accomplish its purpose.

Each part of a group, in any ideal scene, should contribute viability to the whole group.

Production of something is mandatory on any part of a group if the group is to be fully viable.

Painting, writing, music, all have positive roles in a society. So productivity, as is viability, can be seen as a very broad inclusive term.

The sub purposes of any group make up the sub-ideal scene of its various parts.

In other words each part of a broad group has its own ideal scene and its own statistic.

These combined bring about the broad group's ideal scene.

The statistics each lead to viability of the part and then the whole group.

In reverse, with so many parts of a planet desirous of extinguishing so many other parts, the viability of the planet becomes questionable.

In an organization each part has its own ideal scene and its own statistic on up to the main ideal scene and the main statistic.

In practice one works back from the ideal scene of the group into its smallest part, so that all lesser ideal scenes and lesser statistics mount up to and bring about the main ideal scene and statistic.

Examining the lesser ideal scenes and statistics, one can find outpoints first in how the whole thing is organized and then the main ideal scene and the statistics and how the lesser ones bring it about.

Dominant is the viability of the whole. Where any part does not support total viability it is an outpoint. Contributive is the viability of each part and cohesive is the scheme in which the lesser ideal scenes and the lesser statistics bring about the **big** ideal scene and the **big** statistic. If this does not occur the non-supportive lesser ideal scene or statistic is an outpoint.

Groups that falter have to have all this restudied. As departures *did* occur, the organization itself, as part of any action, must be reexamined against experience and new greater and lesser ideal scenes and statistics must be worked out for it and put into use.

Agreement of the group is a necessary ingredient as many reformers have learned, often too late, and as many groups have seen, also generally too late.

The trick is to correct the ideal scene and statistic and all lesser ones of the group while it is still alive.

After that one can have better dependence upon them and keep the statistics up and the purpose going forward.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 7 JULY 1970

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*Data Series 14*

**WORKING AND MANAGING**

By actual experience in working and managing in many activities I can state flatly that the most dangerous worker-manager thing to do is to work or manage from something else than statistics.

Interpersonal relations with many strata of many societies in many lands with many activities demonstrates plainly that Man's largest and most unjust fault consists wholly of acting on opinion.

Opinions can be as varied as the weather in Washington, all on the same subject. When one says "opinion" one is dealing with that morass of false reports and prejudices which make up the chaos of current social orders.

Some seek an answer in status. "If one has **status** one is safe" is about as frail as a house of cards. Ask some recently deposed dictator or yesterday's idol what his status was worth. Yet many work exclusively for status. In Spain it is enough to have an executive *de-gree*. One doesn't have to do any executiving. Work at it? Caramba no!

In capitalisms it is enough to be an heir and in communisms it is only necessary to be the son of a commissar. Work? Nyet.

Revolts are protests against idle status. Where are the kings of yesteryear?

Riding along on the last generation's statistics is as fatal as a diet of thin air.

Undeserved status is a false statistic. Nothing is more bitterly resented, unless it is a statistic earned without status by those who live by status alone!

William Stieber, the most skilled intelligence chief of the 19th century, who won the Franco-Prussian war for Bismarck, was hated by German officers because he was not a proper officer but a civilian!

When German officers took over German intelligence they lost two wars in a row and the caste is very unlamentedly dead.

So long as "character" can be reviled, so long as "opinion" is used, so long as governments run on rumors and false reports, the social scene will continue to be a mess.

You will not believe it but governments think newspaper stories are "public opinion." One US President was astounded to be given a wildly enthusiastic public reception at an airport. The press had been hammering him for a year and the poor fellow thought it was "public opinion." Texts on public relations remark this strange governmental fixation on believing the press.

That means all a nation's enemies have to do is bribe or hire some underpaid reporters or semibankrupt publishers, and voila! it can steer the government any way it wishes!

Do a survey on any personality or subject and the conflicts in opinion are revealed as fantastic.

Seven witnesses to one street accident will even give seven conflicting accounts.

Thus this whole field of "opinion" and "reports" is a quicksand endangering both personal repute and management skill.

It is so bad that wars and revolutions stem directly from the use of opinion and the neglect of statistics.

In a chaos it is necessary to set up one point or terminal which is stable before one can really decide anything much less get anything done.

A statistic is such a stable point. One can proceed from it and use it to the degree that it is a correct statistic.

One can detect then, when things start to go wrong well before they crash.

Using opinion or random rumors or reports one can go very wrong indeed. In fact, using these without knowing the statistics one can smash a life or crash a group.

The US Navy operates on the social attainments and civilized behavior of their people.

A naval officer is promoted on the basis of his amiability and the social skill of his wife!

A clerk is promoted because he marries the boss's daughter.

A governor is elected because he could play a guitar!

This is a whirlwind of chaos because of the falseness of the statistics used.

So the stat used is itself an outpoint in each case.

## **PREDICTION**

Outpoints are more than useful in prediction.

The whole reason one does a data analysis and a situation analysis is to predict.

The biggest outpoint would be a missing ideal scene, the next biggest would be a correct statistic for it.

If these are missing then prediction can become a matter of telling fortunes with bamboo sticks.

One predicts in order to continue the viability of an organism, an individual, a group, an organization, a state or nation or planet, or to estimate the future of anything.

The more outpoints the less future.

A disaster could be said to be a totality of outpoints in final and sudden culmination.

This gives one a return to chaos.

The closer one approaches a disaster the more outpoints will turn up. Thus the more outpoints that turn up the closer one is approaching a disaster.

When the outpoints are overwhelming a condition of **death is approached**.

By being able to predict, the organism or individual **or group can correct the** outpoints before disaster occurs.

Each sphere of activity has its own prediction.

A group of different activities with a common goal can be predicted by the outpoints turning up in parts of the general activity.

In theory if all parts of a main group or organization had an ideal scene for each, a statistic and an intense interest in maintaining the ideal scene and statistic of each part, the survival would be infinite.

Any group or organism or individual is somewhat interdependent upon its neighbors, on other groups and individuals. It cannot however put them right unless it itself has reached some acceptable level of approach to its ideal scenes.

The conflict amongst organisms, individuals and groups does not necessarily add up to "the survival of the fittest," whatever that meant. It does however mean that in such conflict the best chance of survival goes to the individual, organism or group that best approaches and maintains its ideal scene, lesser ideal scenes, statistic and lesser statistics.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 8 AUGUST 1970

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*Data Series 15*

**WRONG TARGET**

There is an additional specific outpost.

It is **Wrong Target**.

This means in effect **an incorrect selection of an objective to attempt or attack**.

Example: Josie Ann has been sitting in the house reading. Her brother Oscar has been playing ball in the yard. A window breaks. Josie Ann's mother rushes into the room, sees Josie Ann and the ball on the floor, spans Josie Ann.

This outpost contains the element, amongst other things of injustice.

There is another version of this:

Example: A firm has its premises flooded. The manager promptly insists on buying fire insurance.

Example: The people of Yangville are starving due to food scarcity in the land. The premier borrows 65 million pounds to build a new capital and palace.

Example: The government is under attack and riot and civil disorder spreads. The government officials campaign to put down all "rightists" for trying to establish law and order.

Example: A man is beaten and robbed on the main street of a town. The police demand to know why he was there and put him in jail for a long period of investigation.

Example: The multibillion dollar drug cartels push out 65 tons of habit-forming hard drugs. A government campaigns against cigarettes.

Example: A boy wants to be an accountant. His family forces him to join the army as a career.

It is noted that the very insane often attack anyone who seeks to help them.

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This outpost is very fundamental as an illogic and is very useful.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1970  
Issue I

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Executive Hats  
Ethics Hats

*Data Series 16*

**INVESTIGATORY PROCEDURE**

Correction of things which are not wrong and neglecting things which are not right puts the tombstone on any org or civilization.

In auditing when one reviews or "corrects" a case that is running well, one has trouble. It *is made* trouble.

Similarly on the third dynamic, correcting situations which do not exist and neglecting situations which do exist can destroy a group.

All this boils down to **correct investigation**. It is not a slight skill. It is **the** basic skill behind any intelligent action.

**SUPPRESSIVE JUSTICE**

When justice goes astray (as it usually does) the things that have occurred are

1. Use of justice for some other purpose than public safety (such as maintaining a privileged group or indulging a fixed idea) or
2. Investigatory procedure.

All suppressive use of the forces of justice can be traced back to one or the other of these.

Aberrations and hate very often find outlet by calling them "justice" or "law and order." This is why it can be said that Man cannot be trusted with justice.

This or just plain stupidity brings about a neglect of intelligent investigatory procedures. Yet all third dynamic sanity depends upon correct and unaberrated investigatory procedures. Only in that way can one establish causes of things. And only by establishing causes can one cease to be the effect of unwanted situations.

It is one thing to be able to observe. It is quite another to utilize observations so that one can get to the basis of things.

## SEQUENCES

Investigations become necessary in the face of outpoints or pluspoints.

Investigations can occur out of idle curiosity or particular interest. They can also occur to locate the cause of pluspoints.

Whatever the motive for investigation the action itself is conducted by sequences.

If one is incapable mentally of tracing a series of events or actions, one cannot investigate.

Altered sequence is a primary block to investigation.

At first glance, omitted data would seem to be the block. On the contrary, it is the end product of an investigation and is what pulls an investigation along-one is looking for omitted data.

An altered sequence of actions defeats any investigation. Examples: We will hang him and then conduct a trial. We will assume who did it and then find evidence to prove it. A crime should be provoked to find who commits them.

Any time an investigation gets back to front, it will not succeed.

Thus if an investigator himself has any trouble with seeing or visualizing sequences of actions he will inevitably come up with the wrong answer.

Reversely, when one sees that someone has come up with a wrong or incomplete answer one can assume that the investigator has trouble with sequences of events or, of course, did not really investigate.

One can't really credit that Sherlock Holmes would say "I have here the fingerprint of Mr. Murgatroyd on the murder weapon. Have the police arrest him. Now, Watson, hand me a magnifying glass and ask Sgt. Doherty to let us look over his fingerprint files."

If one cannot visualize a series of actions, like a ball bouncing down a flight of stairs or if one cannot relate in proper order several different actions with one object into a proper sequence, he will not be able to investigate.

If one can, that's fine.

But any drilling with attention-shifting drills will improve one's ability to visualize sequences. Why? Stuck attention or attention that cannot confront alike will have trouble in visualizing sequences.

## INVESTIGATIONS

In HCO Policy Letter 11 May 1965 Ethics Officer Hat, HCO Policy Letter 1 Sept 1965 Issue VII, HCO Policy Letter 1 Feb 1966 Issue II and pages 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the *Manual of Justice*, the subject of investigation as applied to justice is given.

It will be noted that these are *sequences* of actions.



Neglect of these items or a failure to know and follow them led here and there to suppressive uses of justice or to permitting orgs to be suppressed by special interest groups in the society.

Indeed, had these been in and followed we would have had a great deal less trouble than we did.

But investigation is not monopolized by law and order.

All betterment of life depends on finding out pluspoints and why and reenforcing them, locating outpoints and why and eradicating them.

This is the successful survival pattern of living. A primitive who is going to survive does just that and a scientist who is worth anything does just that.

The fisherman sees seagulls clustering over a point on the sea. That's the beginning of a short sequence, point No. 1. He predicts a school of fish, point No. 2. He sails over as sequence point No. 3. He looks down as sequence point No. 4. He sees fish as point No. 5. He gets out a net as point No. 6. He circles the school with the net, No. 7. He draws in the net, No. 8. He brings the fish on board, No. 9. He goes to port, No. 10.

He sells the fish, No. 11. That's following a pluspoint-cluster of seagulls.

A sequence from an outpoint might be: Housewife serves dinner. Nobody eats the cake, No. 1, she tastes it, No. 2, she recognizes soap in it, No. 3. She goes to kitchen, No. 4. She looks into cupboard, No. 5. She finds the soap box upset, No. 6. She sees the flour below it, No. 7. She sees cookie jar empty, No. 8. She grabs young son, No. 9. She shows him the set-up, No. 10. She gets a confession, No. 11. And No. 12 is too painful to describe.

Unsuccessful investigators think good fish catches are sent by God and that when cake tastes like soap it is fate. They live in unsuccessful worlds of deep mystery.

They also hang the wrong people.

## DISCOVERY

All discoveries are the end product of a sequence of investigatory actions that begin with either a pluspoint or an outpoint.

Thus all knowledge proceeds from pluspoints or outpoints observed.

And all knowledge depends on an ability to investigate.

And all investigation is done in correct sequence.

And all successes depend upon the ability to do these things.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1970  
Issue II

Remimeo

*Data Series 17*

**NARROWING THE TARGET**

When you look at a broad field or area it is quite overwhelming to have to find a small sector that might be out.

The lazy and popular way is to generalize "They're all confused." "The organization is rickety." "They're doing great."

That's all very well but it doesn't get you much of anywhere.

The way to observe so as to find out what to observe is by discarding areas.

This in fact was the system I used to make the discoveries which became Dianetics and Scientology.

It was obvious to me that it would take a few million years to examine all of life to find out what made it what it was.

The first step was the tough one. I looked for a common denominator that was true for all life forms. I found they were attempting to survive.

With this datum I outlined all areas of wisdom or knowledge and discarded those which had not much assisted Man to survive.

This threw away all but scientific methodology, so I used that for investigatory procedure.

Then, working with that, found mental image pictures. And working with them, found the human spirit as different from them.

By following up the workable one arrived at the processing actions which, if applied, work, resulting in the increase of ability and freedom.

By following up the causes of destruction one arrived at the points which had to be eradicated.

This is of course short-handing the whole cycle enormously. But that is the general outline.

Survival has been isolated as a common denominator to successful actions and succumb has been found as the common denominator of unsuccessful actions. So one does not have to reestablish these.

From there, to discover anything bad or good, all one has to do is discard sterile areas to get a target necessary for investigation.

One looks broadly at the whole scene. Then discards sections of it that would seem unrewarding. He will then find himself left with the area that contains the key to it.

This is almost easier done than described.

Example: One has the statistics of a nine division org. Eight are normal. One isn't. So he investigates the area of that one. In investigating the one he discards all normal bits. He is left with the abnormal one that is the key.

This is true of something bad or something good.

A wise boy who wanted to get on in life would discard all the men who weren't getting on and study the one who was. He would come up with something he could use as a key.

A farmer who wanted to handle a crop menace would disregard all the plants doing all right and study the one that wasn't. Then, looking carefully he would disregard all the should be's in that plant and wind up with the shouldn't be. He'd have the key.

Sometimes in the final look one finds the key not right there but way over somewhere else.

The boy, studying the successful man, finds he owed his success to having worked in a certain bank seven states away from there.

The farmer may well find his hired man let the pigs out into the crop.

But both got the reason why by the same process of discarding wider zones.

Pluspoints or outpoints alike take one along a sequence of discoveries.

Once in a purple moon they mix or cross.

Example: Gross income is up. One discards all normal stats. Aside from gross income being up only one other stat is down-new names. Investigation shows that the public executives were off post all week on a tour and that was what raked in the money. Conclusion-send out tours as well as man the public divisions.

Example: Upset is coming from the camp kitchen. Obvious outpoints. Investigation discloses a 15-year-old cook holding the job solo for 39 field hands! Boy is he pluspoint. Get him some help!

### **DRAWN ATTENTION**

Having attention dragged into an area is about the way most people "investigate." This puts them at effect throughout.

When a man is not predicting he is often subjected to outpoints that leap up at him. Conversely when outpoints leap up at one unexpectedly he knows he better do more than gape at them. He is already behindhand in investigating. Other signs earlier existed which were disregarded.

## ERRORS

The usual error in viewing situations is not to view them widely enough to begin with.

One gets a despatch which says Central Files don't exist.

By now keeping one's attention narrowly on that, one can miss the whole scene.

To just order Central Files put back in may fail miserably. One has been given a single observation. It is merely an outpoint: Central Files omitted.

There is no **why**.

You follow up "no CF" and you may find the Registrar is in the Public Division and Letter Registrars never go near a file and the category of everyone in CF is just "been tested." You really investigate and you find there's no HCO Exec Sec or Dissem Sec and there hasn't been one for a year.

The cycle of "outpoint, correct, outpoint, correct, outpoint, correct" will drown one rapidly and improve nothing! But it sure makes a lot of useless work and worry.

## WISDOM

Wisdom is not a fixed idea.

It is knowing how to use your wits.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1970  
Issue III

Remimeo

*Data Series 18*

**SUMMARY OF OUTPOINTS**

**OMITTED DATA**

An omitted anything is an outpoint.

This can be an omitted person, terminal, object, energy, space, time, form, sequence, or even an omitted scene. Anything that *can* be omitted that *should* be there is an outpoint.

This is easily the most overlooked outpoint as it isn't there to directly attract attention.

On several occasions I have found situation analyses done which arrived at no **why** that would have made handling possible but which gave a false Why that would have upset things if used. In each case the outpoint that held the real clue was this one of an omitted something. In a dozen cases it was omitted personnel each time. One area to which orders were being issued had no one in it at all. Others were undermanned, meaning people were missing. In yet another case there were no study materials at all. In two other cases the whole of a subject was missing in the area. Yet no one in any of these cases had spotted the fact that it was an omitted something that had caused a whole activity to decay. People were working frantically to remedy the general situation. None of them noticed the omissions that were the true cause of the decay.

In crime it is as bad to omit as it is to commit. Yet no one seems to notice the omissions as actual crimes.

Man, trained up in the last century to be a stimulus-response animal, responds to the therenesses and doesn't respond as uniformly to not-therenesses.

This opens the door to a habit of deletion or shortening which can become quite compulsive.

In any analysis which fails to discover a **why** one can safely conclude the Why is an omission and look for things that *should* be there and aren't.

## ALTERED SEQUENCE

Any things, events, objects, sizes, in a wrong sequence is an outpoint.

The number series 3, 7, 1, 2, 4, 6, 5 is an altered sequence, or an incorrect sequence.

Doing step two of a sequence of actions before doing step one can be counted on to tangle any sequence of actions.

The basic outness is no sequence at all. This leads into **Fixed Ideas**. It also shows up in what is called disassociation, an insanity. Things connected to or similar to each other are not seen as consecutive. Such people also jump about subjectwise without relation to an obvious sequence. Disassociation is the extreme case where things that are related are not seen to be and things that have no relation are conceived to have.

*Sequence* means linear (in a line) travel either through space or time or both.

A sequence that should be one and isn't is an outpoint.

A "sequence" that isn't but is thought to be one is an outpoint.

A cart-before-the-horse out of sequence is an outpoint.

One's hardest task sometimes is indicating an inevitable sequence into the future that is invisible to another. This is a consequence. "If you saw off the limb you are sitting on you will of course fall." Police try to bring this home often to people who have no concept of sequence; so the threat of punishment works well on well-behaved citizens and not at all on criminals since they often are criminals because they can't think in sequence – they are simply fixated. "If you kill a man you will be hanged," is an indicated sequence. A murderer fixated on revenge cannot think in sequence. One has to think in sequences to have correct sequences.

Therefore it is far more common than one would at first imagine to see altered sequences since persons who do not think in sequence do not see altered sequences in their own actions or areas.

Visualizing sequences and drills in shifting attention can clean this up and restore it as a faculty.

Motion pictures and TV were spotted by a recent writer as fixating attention and not permitting it to travel. Where one had TV raised children, it would follow, one possibly would have people with a tendency to altered sequences or no sequences at all.

## DROPPED TIME

Time that should be noted and isn't would be an outpoint of "dropped time."

It is a special case of an omitted datum.

Dropped time has a peculiarly ferocious effect that adds up to utter lunacy.

A news bulletin from 1814 and one from 1922 read consecutively without time assigned produces otherwise undetectable madness.



A summary report of a situation containing events strung over half a year without saying so can provoke a reaction not in keeping with the current scene.

In madmen the present is the dropped time, leaving them in the haunted past. Just telling a group of madmen to "come up to present time" will produce a few miraculous "cures." And getting the date of an ache or pain will often cause it to vanish.

Time aberrations are so strong that dropped time well qualifies as an outpoint.

### **FALSEHOOD**

When you hear two facts that are contrary, one is a falsehood or both are.

Propaganda and other activities specialize in falsehoods and provoke great disturbance.

Willful or unintentional a falsehood is an outpoint. It may be a mistake or a calculated or defensive falsehood and it is still an outpoint.

A false anything qualifies for this outpoint. A false being, terminal, act, intention, anything that seeks to be what it isn't is a falsehood and an outpoint.

Fiction that does not pretend to be anything else is of course not a falsehood.

So the falsehood means "other than it appears" or "other than represented."

One does not have to concern oneself to define philosophic truth or reality to see that something stated or modeled to be one thing is in actual fact something else and therefore an outpoint.

### **ALTERED IMPORTANCE**

An importance shifted from its actual relative importance, up or down, is an outpoint.

Something can be assigned an importance greater than it has.

Something can be assigned an importance less than it has.

A number of things of different importances can be assigned a monotone of importance.

These are all outpoints, three versions of the same thing.

All importances are relative to their actuality.

### **WRONG TARGET**

Mistaken objective wherein one believes he is or should be reaching toward A and finds he is or should be reaching toward B is an outpoint.

This is commonly mistaken identity. It is also mistaken purposes or goals.

If we tear down X we will be okay often results in disclosure that it should have been Y.

"Removing the slums" to make way for modern shops kills the tourist industry. Killing the king to be free from taxation leaves the tax collector alive for the next regime.

Injustice is usually a wrong target outpost.

Arrest the drug consumer, award the drug company would be an example.

Military tactics and strategy are almost always an effort to coax the selection of a wrong target by the enemy.

And most dislikes and spontaneous hates in human relations are based on mistaken associations of Bill for Pete.

A large sum of aberration is based on wrong targets, wrong sources, wrong causes.

Incorrectly tell a patient he has ulcers when he hasn't and he's hung with an outpost which impedes recovery.

The industry spent on wrong objectives would light the world for a millennium.

### **SUMMARY**

These are the fundamental outpoints required in data analysis and situation analysis.

They have one infinity of variation. They should be very well known to anyone seeking third dynamic sanity.

They are the basic illogics.

And while there may be others, these will serve.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 13 OCTOBER 1970  
Issue II

Remimeo

*Data Series 19*

**THE REAL WHY**

"**Why**" as used in logic is subject to non-comprehension.

**Why** = that basic outness found which will lead to a recovery of stats.

**Wrong Why** = the incorrectly identified outness which when applied does not lead to recovery.

**A Mere Explanation** = a "Why" given as **the Why** that does not open the door to any recovery.

Example: A mere explanation: "The stats went down because of rainy weather that week." So? So do we now turn off rain? Another mere explanation: "The staff became overwhelmed that week." An order saying "Don't overwhelm staff" would be the possible "solution" of some manager. **But the stats wouldn't recover.**

The *real Why* when found and corrected leads straight back to improved stats.

A wrong Why, corrected, will further depress stats.

A mere explanation does nothing at all and decay continues.

Here is a situation as it is followed up:

The stats of an area were down. Investigation disclosed there had been sickness 2 weeks before. The report came in: "The stats were down because people were sick." This was a mere explanation. Very reasonable. But it solved nothing. What do we do now? Maybe we accept this as the correct Why. And give an order, "All people in the area must get a medical exam and unhealthy workers will not be accepted and unhealthy ones will be fired." As it's a correction to a wrong Why, the stats *really* crash. So that's not it. Looking further we find the real WHY. In the area there is no trained-in org bd and a boss there gives orders to the wrong people which, when executed, then hurt their individual stats. We org board the place and groove in the boss and we get a stat recovery and even an improvement.

The correct **Why** led to a stat recovery.

Here is another one. Stats are down in a school. An investigation comes up with a mere explanation: "The students were all busy with sports." So management says "No sports!" Stats go down again. A new investigation comes up with a wrong Why: "The students are being taught wrongly." Management sacks the dean. Stats really crash now. A further more competent investigation occurs. It turns out that there were 140 students and only the dean

and one instructor! And the dean had other duties! We put the dean back on post and hire two more instructors making three. Stats soar. Because we got the right **Why**.

Management and organizational catastrophes and successes are **all** explained by these three types of **Why**. An arbitrary is probably just a wrong **Why** held in by law. And if so held in, it will crash the place.

One really has to understand logic to get to the correct **Why** and must really be on his toes not to use and correct a wrong **Why**.

In world banking, where inflation occurs, finance regulations or laws are probably just one long parade of wrong **Whys**. The value of the money and its usefulness to the citizen deteriorate to such an extent that a whole ideology can be built up (as in Sparta by Lycurgus who invented iron money nobody could lift in order to rid Sparta of money evils) that knocks money out entirely and puts nothing but nonsense in its place

Organizational troubles are greatly worsened by using mere explanations (which lead to no remedies) or wrong **Whys** (which further depress stats). Organizational recoveries come from finding the real **Why** and correcting it.

The test of the real **Why** is "When it is corrected, do stats recover?" If they do that was it. And any other remedial order given but based on a wrong **Why** would have to be cancelled quickly.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 26 NOVEMBER 1970

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*Data Series 20*

**MORE OUTPOINTS**

While there could be many many oddities classifiable as outpoints, those selected and named as such are major in importance whereas others are minor.

**WRONG SOURCE**

"Wrong Source" is the other side of the coin of wrong target.

Information taken from wrong source, orders taken from the wrong source, gifts or materiel taken from wrong source all add up to eventual confusion and possible trouble.

Unwittingly receiving from a wrong source can be very embarrassing or confusing, so much so that it is a favorite intelligence trick. Dept D in East Germany, the Dept of Disinformation, has very intricate methods of planting false information and disguising its source.

Technology can come from wrong source. For instance Leipzig University's school of psychology and psychiatry opened the door to death camps in Hitler's Germany. Using drugs these men apparently gave Hitler to the world as their puppet. They tortured, maimed and slaughtered over 12,000,000 Germans in death camps. At the end of World War II these extremists formed the "World Federation of Mental Health," which enlisted the American Psychiatric Association and the American Medical Association and established "National Associations for Mental Health" over the world, cowed news media, smashed any new technology and became the sole advisors to the US government on "mental health, education and welfare" and the appointers of all health ministers through the civilized world and through their graduate Pavlov dominated Russian communist "mental health." This source is so wrong that it is destroying Man, having already destroyed scores of millions. (All statements given here are documented.)

Not only taking data from wrong source but officialdom from it can therefore be sufficiently aberrated as to result in planetary insanity.

In a lesser level, taking a report from a known bad hat and acting upon it is the usual reason for errors made in management.

**CONTRARY FACTS**

When two statements are made on one subject which are contrary to each other, we have "contrary facts."

Previously we classified this illogic as a falsehood, since one of them must be false.

But in doing data analysis one cannot offhand distinguish which is the false fact. Thus it becomes a special outpoint.

"They made a high of \$12,000 that week" and "They couldn't pay staff" occurring in the same time period gives us one or both as false. We may not know which is true but we do know they are contrary and can so label it.

In interrogation this point is so important that anyone giving two contrary facts becomes a prime suspect for further investigation. "I am a Swiss citizen" as a statement from someone who has had a German passport found in his baggage would be an example.

When two "facts" are contrary or contradictory we may not know which is true but we do know they can't both be true.

Issued by the same org, even from two different people in that org, two contradictory "facts" qualifies as an outpoint.

---

These two will be found useful in analysis.

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HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex  
HCO POLICY LETTER OF 15 MARCH 1971

Issue II

(Corrected & reissued 31 August 1974)

(Only change is to delete from reference under title  
HCO B 15 March 71, "Additional List", which was never issued.)

Remimeo  
Admin Students

*Data Series 21*

**DATA SERIES AUDITING**

(Reference: HCO B 24 July 70, "Data Series" and HCO B 28 August 70, Confidential for Auditors only)

Whenever a student cannot grasp or retain the data of the **Data Series** Policy Letters, he must be audited on the Data Series Rundown (also called the Hubbard Consultant Rundown).

The reason for this is that he himself has **Outpoints** and it is necessary to *audit* him on this subject.

When the student has outpoints, it has been found that he has a terrible time grasping or retaining the Data Series material.

This does not mean the student is in any way crazy. It just means he is illogical and has outpoints in his thinking.

This will reflect as well in his other studies. So handling this is a vital action.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 31 JANUARY 1972

Remimeo

*Data Series 22*

**THE WHY IS GOD**

When beings operate mainly on illogics, they are unable to conceive of valid reasons for things or to see that effects are directly caused by things they themselves can control.

The inability to observe and find an actual useable **Why** is the downfall of beings and activities. This is factually the **Why** of people not finding **Whys** and using them.

The prevalence of historical Man's use of "fate," "kismet" (fatalism), superstition, fortune telling, astrology and mysticism confirms this.

Having forgotten to keep seed grain for the spring, the farmer starves the following year and when asked **Why** he is starving says it is the Gods, that he has sinned or that he failed to make sacrifice. In short, unable to think, he says "The Why is God."

This condition does not just affect primitives or backward people.

All through the most modern organizations you can find "The **Why** is God" in other forms.

By believing that it is the fault of other divisions or departments, a staff member does not look into his own scene. "The reason I cannot load the lumber is because the Personnel Section will not find and hire people." It does not seem to occur to this fellow that he is using a **WHY** which he can't control so it is not a **Why** for his area. It does not move the existing to the ideal scene. Thus it is not a **Why** for him. Yet he will use it and go on nattering about, it. And the lumber never gets loaded. The real **Why** for him more likely would be, "I have no right to hire day laborers. I must obtain this right before my area breaks down totally," or "My department posts are too specialized. I need to operate on all-hands actions on peak loads."

A Course Supervisor who says, "I haven't got any students because Ethics keeps them for weeks and Cramming for months" is using a "The **Why** is God." As he cannot control Ethics or Cramming from his post his **Why** is illogical. The real **Why** is probably "I am not mustering all my students daily and keeping them on course. If they are ordered to Ethics or Cramming they must be right here studying except for the actual minutes spent in Ethics and Cramming."

But this does not just apply on small activities. It applies to whole nations. "The reason we Germans cannot advance is because England is against us." This wrong **Why** has killed many tens of millions in two world wars.

Intelligence organizations are often almost dedicated to "the Why is over there." It seldom is.

Most staffs of orgs, when pay is poor, are completely addicted to over-thereness. In one org, the Finance Banking Officer was continuously hammered to "give more money" by the people who were responsible for making the money and yet who were not raising a finger to do so. An actual survey of four org staffs showed that only 2% were aware that their pay depended upon the org gross income!

Thus survival is very closely tied to logic. If one finds he is sinking into apathy over his inability to get his job done, it *is certain* that he is operating on self-conceived wrong **Whys** in areas that he cannot ever hope to control.

And in living any life, most major points of decline can be traced to the person's operating on Whys that do not allow him to improve his own scene.

The Greek cut open the guts of birds to find the **Why**. He called this "divination" or "augury." Don't look now, but that civilization has long been dead!

Just as anyone will be whose illogic leads him to over-thereness to find his **Why**.

Strength and power in the individual consists of being logical enough to find **Whys** he can use to advance his existing scene toward the ideal scene.

The Why is **not** God. It lies with **you** and your ability to be logical.

God helps those who help themselves.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 17 FEBRUARY 1972

Remimeo

*Data Series 23*

**PROPER FORMAT AND CORRECT ACTION**

When doing an evaluation, one can become far too fixated on outpoints and miss the real reason one is doing an evaluation in the first place.

To handle this, it is proper form to write up an evaluation so as to keep in view the reason one is doing one.

This is accomplished by using this form

**Situation:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Data:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Stats:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Why:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Ideal scene:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Handling:** \_\_\_\_\_

**CONSISTENCY**

The whole of it should concern itself with the same general scene, the same subject matter. This is known as **consistency**. One does not have a situation about books, data about bicycles, stats of another person, a **Why** about another area, a different subject for ideal scene and handling for another activity.

The situation, whether good or bad, must be about a certain subject, person or area, the data must be about the same, the stats are of that same thing, the **Why** relates to that same thing, the ideal scene is about the scene of that same thing and the handling handles that thing and *especially is* regulated by that **Why**.

A proper evaluation is all of a piece.

## SITUATION

First, to do an evaluation, some situation must have come to notice. There is a report or observation that is out of the ordinary.

This "coming to notice" occurs on any line. Usually it is fairly major, affecting a large portion of the area, but it can be minor.

So **observation** in general must be continuous for situations to be noted.

To just note a situation and act on it is out of sequence as it omits evaluation. You can be elated or shocked uselessly by noting a situation and then not doing any evaluation,

It is the hallmark of a rank amateur or idiot to *act* on reports without any evaluation.

So, the first step is noting, from general alertness, a situation exists.

A situation is defined as a not expected state of affairs. It is either very good or it is very bad.

If it is very good it must be evaluated and a Why found so one can even upgrade an ideal scene.

If it is very bad, it must be evaluated and a Why found so that it can be handled to more closely approach the ideal scene.

## DATA

Data is the information one has received that alerts one to the situation.

Intelligence systems use various (mainly faulty) methods of "evaluating" data so as to "confirm it." They do this uniformly from reports. No matter how many reports one may see there is always a question as to their truth. Intelligence chiefs have started most wars (US vs. Germany 1917) or failed to start them in time (US vs. Japan 1936) by depending on "authoritative sources," "skilled observers," "valid documents" and other confetti they class as "reports" or "documents."

As noted above, the "raw document" or "raw materials" as they are called have led, when accepted, to the most terrifying catastrophes. British Admiral Hall, without permission of the British government, leaked the famous "Zimmerman telegram" to US President Wilson and stampeded the US into World War 1. The alleged German "instructions" to their US Ambassador "intercepted" by Hall were passed on with confidence tricks and President Wilson, elected to keep the US out of the war, being no great evaluator, dived overboard on one flimsy questionable report and carried America into the disaster of two world wars and a communist supremacy.

The US was lulled by false Japanese assurances and false data on the smallness of Japanese armaments and considered the country no danger. The true situation would have led to a US declaration of war in 1936! Before Japan could sink the whole Pacific fleet in one raid and cause 41/2 years of war and open all of China to communist supremacy.

These are just a couple of the thousands of disasters in international affairs brought about by a pathetic reliance on reports or documents.

If you knew the game well, with a half a dozen agents and a document factory, you could have half the countries of the planet in turmoil. Because they rely on reports and "authoritative sources" and "expert opinion" instead of data as viewed in this Data Series.

If one does not court disaster and failures one does NOT rely on reports, but an absence of reports or a volume of reports carefully surveyed for outpoints and counted.

To do this one must be **very** skilled at spotting outpoints. Most people confuse simple errors with actual outpoints.

You can get so good at this you can recognize outpoints and pluspoints at a fast glance over reports.

Essentially, "data" regarded from the angle of outpoints is a lack of consistency. "Our Div 2 is doing very well" doesn't go with gross income \$2.

This gives you a guideline, the "string to pull" (see investigation checksheet on following down things you just don't understand, the first emergence of the Data Series).

So the **data** you give is not a lot of reports. It is a brief summary of the "strings pulled" on the outpoint or pluspoint route to finally get the **Why**.

Example: (from a situation where an org was going broke) "The sign-ups reported for service and new names to Central Files were both high yet gross income was down. An investigation of the service area showed no backlogs and no new customers with the staff idle. Tech Services was fully staffed. Examining complement showed no one in the Department of Income. People were signed up but there was no one to receive the money." The **why** of course was a wrong complement particularly **no cashier** and an Executive Director neglecting his duties.

Example: (on a situation of a stat soaring) "The Promo Dept had very down stats with no promo going out. Bulk mail was low. Div 6 was idle, yet the GI was soaring. Nothing in the org could be found to account for it. Investigation of what promo incoming public had, showed that the promo was coming from a lower level org promoting itself as a route to upper level services." The **Why** of course was an effective promo campaign being run **outside** the org. And one could bolster that up and get the org active too.

**Data**, then, is the Sherlock Holming of the trail that gave the **Why**. It at once reflects the command the evaluator has of the **Data Series**. And his own cleverness.

Sometimes they come in a sudden blue flash a yard long, a piece of insight into what **must** be going on if these outpoints add up this way. Rapid investigation of further data on this trail proves or disproves the flash of insight. One does **not** run on insight alone (or crystal balls).

To one not trained and practiced in evaluation the finding of a **Real Why** may look as mysterious as an airplane to an aborigine.

It is a fact that people who do not understand evaluation can get the idea that management acts on personalities or whims or that management has spies everywhere to know that the Distribution Secretary never came to work.

To the expert it is easy. To the ignorant it looks very supernatural.

It is the **trail** followed that counts.

This is what is required under "**data**."

## STATS

Situations and **data** trails are supported by statistics.

Where statistics are not in numeral form this may be harder. Where they are outright lies, this is an outpoint itself.

A person or nation without any statistic may be a puzzle at first but statistical approximations can exist and be valid.

Statistics of CIA would be very hard to dig up. They don't even let the US Congress in on it. But the deteriorating overseas influence of the US would show that CIA was not batting any high average and that its data fed to policy-makers (its avowed purpose) might well be false or misleading causing policy errors that cause a deteriorating scene.

So statistics can be estimated by the scene itself even when absent in numerical form.

England has lost its whole empire in a quarter of a century, without a single defeat in war. This gives an adequate statistic for the government's good sense or lack of it. It is at this writing losing even parts of the homeland and is itself joining what might be called the Fourth Reich and so will soon cease to exist as a political sovereignty. This statistic can even be drawn as a dive-bombing down curve.

A deckhand's statistic may not exist on a chart but the areas he tends do exist for view.

One either has a numerical statistic or a direct observation. One can use both.

I once answered the question, "Why are paid completions high and gross income low?" by finding that the "paid" completions stats were false.

So one statistic can be compared to another.

Three or more stats can be compared to each other and often lead directly to a **Why**.

The main point is **don't act without statistical data**.

After a fine data analysis, one may well find the stats are quite normal and there is **no** situation.

One may have a great PR PR PR data analysis and collide with statistics you'd need a submarine to read.

And one may have data that says the whole staff of Keokuk should be shot without waiting for dawn and then discover that, by stats, they're doing great.

And one can also do a data analysis that shows somebody should be commended and prove it by stats and then discover belatedly the stats are false and the guy should have been shot.

However, if one looks at all available stats after doing a data analysis one may find they look good at a glance but are sour as green apples. One could see a high lot of stats, GI, etc., and *then* see a cost stat that shows someone is making \$2 million at a cost of \$4 million and that the place is going straight into the garbage can.

**Do not** give a Why or recommend handling without inspecting the actual stats. And **do not** be thrown off a situation you are sure exists without looking at **all** the stats. (Example: High hour interns' stats throw one off interfering until one sees NO interns graduating and NO programs completed by them.)

### THE WHY

This is the jewel in the crown, the main dish at dinner, the gold mine in the towering mountains of mystery.

A real **Why** must lead to a bettering of the existing scene or (in the case of a wonderful new scene) maintaining it as a new ideal scene.

Therefore the **Why** must be something you can do something about. (See THE WHY IS GOD policy letter.)

Thus the **Why** is limited by what you can control. It is **never** that other division or top management or the bumps on the moon.

Even if all this were true, the **Why** must be something which **you can do something about yourself from your level of authority or initiative** that will lead to **the improvement of a poor existing scene toward the Ideal Scene.**

The **Why** is a special thing then. It is a key that opens the door to effective improvement.

It is not a prejudice or a good idea. It is where all the analysis led.

And a **Real Why** when used and handled and acted upon is like a magic carpet. The scene at once becomes potentially better or gets maintained.

"Acting on a wrong Why" is the stuff of which coffins are made.

No matter how brilliant the program that follows, there it is, the same old mud.

Wrong Whys work people half to death handling a program which will lay ostrich eggs and rotten ones at that.

It will cost money and time that can't be afforded easily.

It will distract from the real tiger in the woods and let him roar and eat up the goats while everyone is off chasing the ghosts which "really were the cause of it all."

Wrong Whys are the tombstones of all great civilizations and unless someone gears up the think will be the mausoleum of this one.

Do not think you won't get them. It takes 28,000 casualties in battle, they say, to make a major general. Well it may take a few wrong Whys to make an evaluator.

The evaluator who has done the evaluation is of course responsible for it being correctly done and leading to the right conclusion and verified by stats to give the correct real **Why**.

And the real ones are often too incredible to have been arrived at in any other way. Or they are so obvious no one noticed.

In one instance Whys were found by experts for six months on a certain course without improving the flagrantly bad situation but actually messing it up more until a huge real Why jumped out (the students had never been trained on earlier levels) and the situation began to improve.

Using one Why for all situations can also occur and fads of Whys are common. True, a Why often applies elsewhere. That's what gives us technology including policy. But in any area of operation where a situation is very abnormal the Why is likely to be very peculiar and too off the ordinary to be grasped at once.

There can be an infinity of wrongnesses around just one rightness. Thus there can be an infinity of wrong Whys possible with just one real Why that will open the door.

For the real Why *does* open the door. With it on a good situation one can maintain it and with a bad situation one can improve it.

Thus the **Real Why** is the vital arrival point to which evaluation leads.

### THE IDEAL SCENE

If a bad situation is a *departure* from the ideal scene and if a good situation is attaining it or exceeding it, then the crux of any evaluation is **the Ideal Scene** for the area one is evaluating.

Viewpoint has a lot to do with the ideal scene.

To Russia a collapsed America is the ideal scene. To America a collapsed Russia is an ideal scene.

To some have-not nations both Russia and the US competing at vast expense for the favor of a coy petty ruler is the ideal scene to that ruler.

To most other parts of the world both these major countries interested only in their own affairs would be an ideal scene.

So, with viewpoint the ideal scene can be "bad" or "good."

The ideal scene is not necessarily big and broad. An intelligence evaluator that gave the ideal scene as "a defeated enemy" on every evaluation would be very inexpert.



By **consistency** the ideal scene must be one for that portion of an activity for which one is trying to find the Why.

Example: (Situation: renewed activity on a front held by one platoon. Evaluation: No other points along the lines are active and a tank road toward the front where the activity is. **Why**: area being prepared for a tank breakout.) **Ideal Scene**: an uninhabitable area in front of the platoon. (Which could be done with napalm as there is a wood there and a heavy crossfire maintained and a renewed supply of bazookas for the platoon if the napalm didn't work.)

Example: (Situation: a lot of silence from Plant 22. Evaluation: no trucks arriving with materials, no raw materials being sent by outside suppliers, suppliers irate. **Why**: The accounting office forgot to pay the raw materials bill and the suppliers held up all further supplies.) **The Ideal Scene**: high credit rating and good accounts PR established with all creditors. (And handling would include a recommendation for an evaluation of the accounting office as to why it forgot and why there is no high credit PR with a new ideal scene for that accounting office, which might be a wholly different thing: **Ideal Scene**: an accounting office that enforces income greater than outgo.)

By giving the **Ideal Scene** for every situation, the evaluator is not led into a fatal contempt for the competence of all work actually being done.

The ideal scene clarifies for one and all whither we are going.

But even more important, the evaluation that includes an ideal scene postulates a win from the viewpoint of those for whom it is being done or for one's activities.

Sometimes when one gets to the ideal scene and writes it down he finds his Why won't really lead to it, in which case he must get another Why or familiarize himself with the scene in general to find out what he is trying to send where.

In the case of an abnormally good situation one finds he has exceeded what was formerly thought to be the ideal scene and must state a new one entirely with the **Why** concerned with how to maintain it.

Anyone reading a full evaluation in proper form can better estimate whether the **Why** and handling are workable if the **Ideal Scene** is there. And sometimes it will be found that the evaluator is trying to do something else entirely than what everyone else thinks is a correct attainment.

Thus it is a very healthy thing to include the ideal scene. It serves as a discipline and incentive for the evaluator and those executing the program.

## HANDLING

Handling must be **consistent** with the situation, the evaluation, the Why and the ideal scene.

Handling must be **within the capabilities** of those who will do the actions.

Handling must be **within the resources available**.

Handling quite often but not always requires a **bright idea**. It is peculiarly true that the less the resources available the brighter the idea required to attain effective handling.

Handling must be **supervised** by one person who acts as a coordinator of the program and a checker-offer and debug expert.

And last but most important handling must be **effective and final**.

The *steps* of handling are in program form. They are numbered 1-2-3, etc. Or A-B-C, etc.

They can be in the sequence they will be done but this is mostly important when one person or one team is going to do the whole thing step by step.

These steps are called **targets**.

Each part of the program (each **target**) is assigned to someone to do or to get done.

Care must be taken not to overload persons already loaded and where this occurs one appoints a special personnel or mission for that specific target.

The supervision must see that each target gets fully done and no targets not-done and no targets half-done.

It is up to supervision to keep track of all completions on a **master** sheet.

Supervision debugs those targets that bog or lag by finding in them a **Why**, which may mean a rapid evaluation of that target to rephrase it or get it clarified without altering its intended accomplishment.

Supervision can reassign a target.

## PROJECTS

It is expected that any complex or extensive target will have a **project** written for it by the person to whom it is assigned if not by the originator.

By completing this project the target is **done**.

Often these projects have to be passed upon by a senior before being begun.

## COMPLIANCE

When the **master** sheet shows all targets **done** (not not-done and not half-done and not falsely reported) full situation handling can be expected.

## REVIEW

When the supervisor reports all targets done, it is in the hands of fate whether the situation will now be progressed toward or attain the ideal scene.

The accuracy of the data, the skill of the evaluator, the correctness of the **why**, the competence of the supervisor and the skill of those executing the targets and the willingness

of those receiving the effects of all this activity (their human emotion and reaction) determine whether this evaluation approaches or attains the ideal scene.

All such evaluations should be **reviewed** as soon as the actions have had time to take effect.

An idiot optimism can suppose all is well and that it is needless to review.

But if this **why** was wrong *then the situation will deteriorate* and a worsening situation will be apparent.

Thus a sharp watch has to be set. No thirst for "always being right" or arrogance about never being wrong must prevent an honest review.

**Was** the ideal scene approached or attained?

Or was it a wrong Why and now is all Hades breaking loose?

Now we *don't* have just renewed insistence that the **Why** was right and that the program must go in in spite of all.

We have a wrong Why.

## MAGIC

**It will be found that where you have a real why people will cooperate all over the scene.**

The only **exception** is where there are traitors around. But this is an easy explanation, too often bought to excuse wrong Whys.

The Germans, when they found in World War II, how ineffective the Italian intelligence service was, couldn't believe it, tried to improve it, became convinced they were traitors, probably shot them in scores and took the service over themselves. And lost Italy even more rapidly. Whatever the right Why was, the Germans had the wrong one. And so does any executive who has to shoot everybody-he just can't find the right Whys.

It is **no** disgrace to find a wrong Why. It is only a disgrace not to keep trying on and on until one does find it. Then the clouds open, the sun shines, the birds pour out their souls in purest melody and the ideal scene is approached or reached.

So **review** is damnably important.

Situations have to be handled very fast.

And reviews have to be as quick as possible after effect can occur.

## WHOLE VIEW

So here you have the whole view.

The keynotes are **observe, evaluate, program, supervise** and **review**.

The heart of Observe is accuracy.

The heart of Evaluate is a cool, cold knowledge of the Data Series.

The heart of Program is knowing the scene.

The heart of Supervise is getting it **fully** done.

The heart of Review is **humility**.

### SUMMARY

If you cannot roll all this off rapidly then misunderstood words in this series are in the way. Or one is battling with some outpoint in his own life.

The Data Series is for **use**.

It works because it has unlocked logic.

In management one is very fortunate since he can program and handle.

In intelligence one is less fortunate as his handling can only be suggested and many an intelligence officer has watched a useless Battle of the Bulge after he told them all about it and "they" had other ideas. But the Data Series works in intelligence as well.

Data analysis was not developed in a professorial out of a lost-to-the-world tower. It was evolved by attempting to explain logic, then was developed on one of the hottest cross-fire but successful evaluation posts on the planet against a background of blood, sweat and tears war intelligence experience.

So it is itself **real**.

The key to it is handling **Data**.

So here it is.

I do sincerely hope it serves you in helping to attain your ideal scene.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 29 FEBRUARY 1972R  
Issue II  
Revised 4 July 1977

*(Revisions in this type style)*

Remimeo

*Data Series 24R*

**HANDLING**  
**POLICY, PLANS, PROGRAMS**  
**PROJECTS AND ORDERS DEFINED**

The words "policy," "plans," "programs," "projects" and "orders" are often used interchangeably one for the other, incorrectly.

To handle any confusions on the words and substance of "policy," "plans," "programs," "projects" and "orders" the following **descriptive definitions** (see Scn Logic No. 5) are laid down for our use.

**Policy:** By this is meant long-range truths or facts which are not subject to change expressed as operational rules or guides.

**Plans:** Short-range broad intentions as to the contemplated actions envisaged for the handling of a broad area to remedy it or expand it or to obstruct or impede an opposition to expansion. A plan is usually based on observation of potentials (or resources) and expresses a bright idea of how to use them. It always proceeds from a **Real Why** if it is to be successful.

**Program:** A series of steps in sequence to carry out a plan. One usually sees a program following the discovery of a **Why**. But in actual fact a plan had to exist in the person's mind, whether written or not, before a program could be written. A program, thus, carries out the plan conceived to handle a found **Why**. A plan and its program require authorization (or okay) from the central or coordinating authority of the general activities of a group before they can be invested in, activated or executed.

**Projects:** The sequence of steps written to carry out **one** step of a program. Project orders often have to be written to execute a program step. These should be written but usually do not require any approval and often are not generally issued but go to the person or persons who will accomplish that step of a program. Under the category of **project** would come orders, work projects, etc. These are a series of **guiding steps** which if followed will result in a full and successful accomplishment of the program target.

**Orders:** The verbal or written direction from a lower or designated authority to carry out a program step or apply the general policy.

In short:

**Policy** = the rules of the game, the facts of life, the discovered truths and the invariable procedures.

**Plans** = the general bright idea one has to remedy the WHY found and get things up to the ideal scene or improve even that. (Approval.)

**Program** = the sequence of major actions needed to do the plan. (Approval.)

**Project** = the sequence of steps necessary to carry out one step in a program. (No approval.)

**Orders** = some program steps are so simple that they are themselves an order or an order can simply be a roughly written project.

Thus, by these definitions a data analysis would look like this:

**Policy:** (What brings the evaluation into existence in the first place.)

**Situation:** (Departure from or improvement of the ideal scene expressed in *policy*.)

**Data:** (Observations leading to **investigation**.)

**Statistics:** (The independent continuing survey of production or lack of it.)

**Why:** (The real reason found by the investigation.)

**Ideal Scene:** (The state of affairs envisioned by policy or the improvement of even that.)

**HANDLING:**

**A Plan** whether written in full or not based on the **why** to use the resources available to move the existing scene toward the ideal scene.

**A Program:** A sequence of broad steps to get the plan executed.

**Projects:** Any sequence of steps ordered or written to get a program step completed.

**Orders:** The program step itself or the verbal or written project to get the program step fully *done*.

Thus a handling could look like this:

**HANDLING:**

Plan: To use Bob Bartlett to replace the incompetent exec found in the **why**.

1. Find a replacement for Bartlett. **Personnel.** \_\_\_\_\_
2. Program Bob Bartlett to get his incomplete cycles caught up. **Dir of Personnel Enhancement.** \_\_\_\_\_
3. Train Bob Bartlett. **Dir of Training.** \_\_\_\_\_
4. Write Garrison Mission Orders for Bartlett. **Action Mission Writer.** \_\_\_\_\_
5. Write recall orders for G. Zonk (the incompetent found in the \_\_\_\_\_

**why). Personnel.**

6. Send Bartlett to relieve Zonk. **Action.**
7. On Zonk's return assign to bilge cleaner. **Personnel.**

---

This of course is a very simple plan and simple program.

The orders are seen as "**Personnel**," "Dir of Personnel Enhancement," "**Action Mission Writer**," etc., at the paragraph ends. The program step itself is an **order** to the person or unit named at program step end. But **it also authorizes that person or unit to do the step or issue orders to do the step or even write a project and get it done.**

That final end word on the program step is an **authority** as well as being an order to the person or unit named.

### ROUND-UP

A copy of a full program marked **Master** is placed in a folder. The folder is marked on the edge with the program name and number. The program itself is stapled along its left edge to the inside left cover of the folder.

A "*Flag Rep*" is responsible for "LRH programs." A Deputy Executive Director or Deputy Commanding Officer is responsible for an ED's or C/O's programs.

The responsibility lies in seeing that *each* step is **fully** effectively **done**.

All related papers, copies of projects' orders, etc., are collected in that folder and as each done is reported and investigated as **done** it is marked off on the **Master** program sheet.

When *all* those projects or orders bred by the program steps are **done** then the **program** is considered **done**.

One does not "report progress" but only **done**s and when something is **not** done yet it is chased up by the '*Flag Rep*' or Deputy ED or C/O and "debugged."

### DEBUGGING

The word "bugged" is slang for snarled up or halted.

**Debug** is to get the snarls or stops out of it.

This itself requires an evaluation. The evaluation may be done at a glance or it may take a full formal evaluation by form.

The ideal scene here is the program step **done** or even improved.

So the **Why** here would be the **real** reason it was not being done or couldn't be done and that may require *hours* to locate and sometimes days to remedy.

When "debugging" one usually finds the persons assigned the target already have a "**Why**" and it is usually a false Why for if it was the right one the program step would get done.

Thus debugging usually begins with finding "their Whys"-which is to say reasons, excuses, apologies, etc. Getting these into view is a main part of the program step evaluation.

A project, often written, comes out of this **debug evaluation**.

In extreme cases it will be found that the whole program is based on a wrong **Why** and rapidly needs redoing by the original authority. Example: The **Why** found was that the **Jinx office was not making money**. In doing one step of the program: "3. Survey past invoices to find where money is coming from and why they don't get it now. **mission**," the mission sent finds Jinx Office was making money by the ton but it was being wasted by their having bought a huge building whose rent is three times normal rental "in the hopes new subtenants would pay the rent but nobody wants the place." Rapid debug is needed because the target can't really be done. They **are** making money and they do get it now.

In such a case doing the program unearthed a new **Real Why** and scrubbed that program.

A super-frantic hysterical communication would be sent to the authority of the program, "New **Why** found by Pgm 891 target 3 observation. Jinx Office paying \$80,000 a quarter for skyscraper. Obvious real Why ED has delusions of grandeur, is a bad business head. Suggest Pgm 891 redone on new Why and suggest plan of mission here for instant offload of this skyscraper and office into proper quarters and replacement of ED." At which the '*Flag Rep*' or Deputy ED or Deputy C/O will approach the authority for the pgm to get immediate cancellation of 891 and all program targets and a new Program 891R based on the **Real Real Why**.

Debug, however, is not always so dramatic. "We don't have anyone to put on it" is the usual excuse as they sit lazily chatting amongst their piled up dev-t.

So one evaluates the area against the program target and finds a **Why** that, executed as a *project will* get that target done.

The **Perfect Debug Evaluation** (a) gets the target done (b) improves the area (c) leaves no dregs of human emotion and reaction behind it.

Just plain screaming often works. But if one has to, there is a real **Why** there someplace that should be found, a project handed out and done.

## HANDLING SUMMARY

You can find out all the **situations** and **Whys** in the world but if there isn't a **plan** and **program** and if these are not **done** fully, then nothing beneficial will happen. Indeed the not-dones, half-dones and backlogs will mount up (per HCO P/L 26 Jan 72, Admin Know-How 29, Executive Series 5) and set the whole thing a step backwards.



Bad programs and clumsy projects develop useless traffic (dev-t) and tie people up all over the place, pull them off normal needful actions and send the existing scene even further from the ideal scene. They make people very busy but nothing beneficial is gained and as the useless actions distract from normal duties, the whole place is at risk.

Staffs subjected to programs that are not based on sound observation evaluation, a **real why** and the points in Data Series 23, become apathetic as they see no result.

So programs that are bad and programs that are right but don't get fully done are alike deadly. **There is no substitute for correctly done data analysis.**

**There is no excuse for not getting correct programs done.**

In this way and only in this way can one raise the existing scene toward an ideal scene.

Data analysis is a powerful tool. **you can use it.**

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 19 MARCH 1972  
Issue II

Remimeo

*Data Series 25*

**LEARNING TO USE DATA ANALYSIS**

After one has studied data analysis he is expected to be able to use its principles easily and swiftly,

The barriers to being able to use data analysis are, in the order of frequency:

1. Misunderstood words. One has not gotten the definitions of the words used. This does not mean "new words." It is usually old common words. It is not just long words, it is more usually little ones. To handle this one takes each policy letter (or chapter) in turn and looks it over carefully to see what words he cannot rapidly define. To help in this one uses an E-Meter and "Method 4" Word Clearing which is the method of using a meter to see if-"Are there any words in this policy misunderstood?" Any upset or antagonism or boredom felt comes only from a misunderstood word or misunderstood words.
2. The person has himself an outpoint in his routine thinking. This is found and handled by what is called an "HC (Hubbard Consultant) List." This list assessed on a meter detects and handles this.
3. Lack of knowledge of an existing or an ideal scene. This is handled by observing the existing scene directly or indirectly by reports and for the ideal, study of the basic policy of the scene which gives one its ideal, its expected products and form of organization.
4. Not having studied the Data Series. Handled by studying it properly.
5. Not having studied data analysis from the viewpoint of needing to apply it.
6. Thinking one already knows all about analyzing and data. Handled by looking over some past failures and realizing they could have been prevented by a proper collection of data and analyzing it.
7. Tossing off "reasons" personally on one's own personal area which are usually just excuses or justifications and not Whys. "I was too tired," "I should have been tougher," "They were just bums anyway," which loads up one's own life with wrong Whys. Handled by being more alert to and more honest about the causes and motives of one's life and the scene, and doing a better analysis.
8. Confusing errors with outpoints. Handled by practice.

9. Confusing outpoints with Whys. Handled by learning to observe and better study of data analysis.
10. Too narrow a situation. Handled by getting more data and observing the scene more broadly.
11. Missing "omitted data" or particles or people as a frequent outpoint. Handled by knowing the ideal scene better. What *should* be there and isn't.

### THE BEGINNER

When one begins to apply data analysis he is often still trying to grasp the data about data analysis rather than the outpoints in the data. Just become more familiar with the Data Series.

Further one may not realize the ease with which one can acquire the knowledge of an ideal scene. An outpoint is simply an illogical departure from the ideal scene. By comparing the existing scene with the ideal scene one easily sees the outpoints.

To know the ideal scene one has only to work out the correct products for it. If these aren't getting out, then there is a departure. One can then find the outpoints of the various types and then locate a **Why** and in that way open the door to handling. And by handling one is simply trying to get the scene to get out its products.

Unless one proceeds in this fashion (from product back to establishment), one can't analyze much of anything. One merely comes up with errors.

The definition and nature of products is covered in several P/Ls and especially in HCO P/L 13 Mar 72 Establishment Officer Series No. 5.

An existing scene is as good as it gets out its products, not as good as it is painted or carpeted or given public relations boosts.

So for **any** scene, manufacturing or fighting a war or being a hostess at a party, there are **products**.

People who lead pointless lives are very unhappy people. Even the idler or dilettante is happy only when he has a product!

There is always a product for any scene.

The analyst when he begins may get the wrong product. He may get a doingness instead of something one can have. And he may look upon a half completion or half-done thing as a completed product.

All this makes his data analysis faulty. As he can't figure out an ideal scene, he then has nothing to compare the existing scene to. It is simply a matter of the cost and time involved in not or half getting a product compared to the ideal scene of a really valuable product with exchange value and what it takes to get it. These two things can be worlds apart. The trail that leads to a **Why** that will close the gap is plainly marked with one kind or another of outpoints. Where the most and biggest are, there is the **Why**. Found, the real **Why** and actual handling will move the existing toward ideal.

Hideously enough, what I say about products is true. Even a government could have a product. Like "a prosperous happy country." An intelligence agency often muffs its product such as, "a properly briefed head of state." But to do it the head of state would have to have a product concerning other nations like, "friendly, cooperative allies which are a help and no threat," or some other product. Otherwise the agency would wind up going straight out of the intelligence business and being required to conduct its business by assassination of foreign notables or other actions to do handlings based on wrong **Whys**.

As there would be no product, there could not really be an ideal scene. If there is no ideal scene then there is no way to compare the existing scene. Thus, outpoints would expose situations but no **WHY** would really be possible as there's no ideal scene to approach. One has often heard some agency or activity say, "Where the hell are we going anyway?" Translated this would be, "We haven't had any ideal scene set up for us." And translated further, "The policy-makers have no product in view." So they aren't going any place really and lack of an objective would cause them to go down and lack of a product would cause them to be miserable.

That's the way life has been running.

Parents and others often ask children, "What will you do when you grow up?" Or "What are you going to *be*?" This is not baffling for a 5-year-old, perhaps, but it is a confuser for a child of 12. There are **Be**, **Do** and **Have** as three major conditions of existence. One must **BE** in order to **Do** and **Do** in order to **Have**. A product is the *Have*. It is not the **Do**. Most people give "Do" as "product." A product is a completed thing that has exchange value within or outside the activity.

If one asked a 12-year-old, "What product are you going to make when you grow up?" he'd likely give you the exchange reward as the answer, like "money." He has omitted a step. He has to have a product to exchange for money.

To "make money" directly he'd have to be the Secretary of the Treasury, superintendent of the mint or a counterfeiter!

Only if you cleared up product and exchange with him could he begin to answer the question about what's what with growing up.

Let's say this is done and he says he is set on making photographs of buildings. The **do** now falls into line-he'd have to photograph things well. The **be** is obvious architectural photographer. The exchange of architectural photographs for salary or fee is feasible if he is good.

So now we find he is a poor boy and no chance of schooling or even a box camera. That's the existing scene.

The ideal scene is a successful architectural photographer making pictures of buildings.

You see the gap between the existing scene and the ideal scene.

Now you can follow back the outpoints and get a **Why**.

It isn't just that he's poor. That's no **Why** as it opens no doors to get from existing scene to ideal scene.

We investigate and find his "father" is very religious but an alcoholic and that the boy is illegitimate and his "father" hates his guts.

So we find a **Why** that his "father," much less helping him, is not about to let him amount to anything whatever ever.

This opens a door.

Handling often requires a bright idea. And we find the local parson has often shown interest in the boy so an obvious handling is to get the parson to persuade the "father" to let the boy apprentice in the local photo store and tell the boy what he has to do to make good there.

Situations cannot be handled well unless a real **Why** is found.

And a real **Why** cannot be found unless *the* product is named and an ideal scene then stated. This compared to the existing scene gives us, really the first outpost.

In going the other direction, to find a **Why** of sudden improvement, one has to locate poor existing scenes that suddenly leap up toward ideal scenes. This is done by locating a high product period (by stats or other signs of production) and comparing **it** as an ideal scene to the existing scenes before it (and just after if there was a slump) and looking into that for a **Why**. But one is looking for *Pluspoints*. And these lead to a real **Why** for the prosperity or improvement.

A "Who" will often be found. Like "James Johnny was shop foreman then." Well, he's dead. So it's not a **Why** as it leads nowhere. What did James Johnny **do** that was different? "He got out products" leads nowhere. We keep looking and we find he had a scheduling board and really kept it up-to-date and used it as a single difference. Aha "The **Why** is a kept up scheduling board!" The handling is to put a clerk on doing just that and hatting the current foreman to use it or catch it. Result, up go the stats and morale. People can look at it and see what they're producing today and where they're at!

So not all **Whys** are found by outpoints. The good situations are traced by pluspoints.

If the high peak is current, one has to find a **Why**, in the same way, to maintain it.

### STANDARD ACTION

A beginner can juggle around and go badly adrift if he doesn't follow the pattern:

1. Work out exactly what the (person, unit, activity) should be producing.
2. Work out the ideal scene.
3. Investigate the existing scene.
4. Follow outpoints back from ideal to existing,
5. Locate the real **Why** that will move the existing toward ideal.

6. Look over existing resources.
7. Get a bright idea of how to handle.
8. Handle or recommend handling so that it stays handled.

This is a very sure-fire approach.

If one just notes errors in a scene, with no product or ideal with which to compare the existing scene, he will not be doing data analysis and situations will deteriorate badly because he is finding wrong Whys.

### THINKING

One has to be able to think with outpoints. A crude way of saying this is "learn to think like an idiot." One could also add "without abandoning any ability to think like a genius."

If one can't tolerate outpoints at all or confront them one can't *see* them.

A madman can't tolerate pluspoints and he doesn't see them either.

But there can be a lot of pluspoints around and no production. Thus one can be told how great it all is while the place edges over to the point of collapse.

An evaluator who listens to people on the scene and takes *their* **Whys** runs a grave risk. If these *were* the Whys then things would be better.

A far safer way is to talk only insofar as finding what the product is concerned and investigating.

One should observe the existing scene through data or through observers or through direct observation.

An evaluator often has to guess what the **Why** might be. It is doing that which brings up the phrase "Learn to think like an idiot." The **Why** will be found at the end of a trail of outpoints. Each one is an aberration when compared to the ideal scene. The biggest idiocy which then explains all the rest and which opens the door to improvement toward the ideal scene is the **Why**.

One also has to learn to think like a genius with pluspoints.

Get the big peak period of production (now or in the past). Compare it to the existing scene just before.

Now find the pluspoints that were entered in. Trace these and you arrive at the **Why** as the biggest pluspoint that opened the door to improvement.

But once more one considers resources available and has to get a bright idea.

So it is the same series of steps as above but with pluspoints.

## VETERAN

A veteran evaluator can toss off evaluations in an hour or two, mainly based on how long it takes him to dig up data.

A big tough situation may require days and days.

Sometimes luck plays a role in it. The data that was the key to it was being sat on by someone not skilled in the subject and who had no idea of relative importances. Sometimes the datum pops up like toast from an electric toaster. Sometimes one has it all wrapped up and then suddenly a new outpost or pluspoint appears that changes the whole view of the evaluator.

Example: A firm's blacklist has just been published in a newspaper or as a scandal. Evaluator: "They do *what?*" in a voice of incredulity. "They ship their security files to Memphis in open crates? Because they are saving on postage?" Wrath could dangerously shoot a wrong somebody. The idiocy is not believable. But a new datum leads to personnel who hired a reporter in disguise because it no longer requires or looks up references.

Example: Situation where stats soared. "They used schoolchildren to pass out literature?" That's just a point but a strange one. Turns out they also hired a cashier and had **Never had one on post before!** Why? Nobody to take money.

Man gets dedicated to his own pet theories very easily. A true scientist doesn't fixate on one idea. He keeps looking until he finds it, not until his pet theory is proven. That's the test of an evaluator.

## STATISTICS

One always runs by statistics where these are valid.

Statistics must reflect actual desired **Product**. If they do not they are not valid. If they do they give an idea of ideal scene.

From a statistic reflecting the desired products one can work out the departure from the ideal scene.

A backlog of product production must reflect in a stat. As a backlog is *negative* production.

From such tools an evaluator can work.

---

The use of data analysis is relatively easy compared to learning a musical instrument.

You have the hang of how it is done.

So why not just be a veteran right now and **do it**.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 12 JUNE 1972

Remimeo

*Data Series 26*

*Establishment Officer Series 18*

**LENGTH OF TIME TO EVALUATE**

It will be found that long times required to do an evaluation can be traced each time to **An individual why for each evaluator.**

These, however, can be summarized into the following classes of Whys:

This list is assessed by a Scientology auditor on a meter. The handling directions given in each case are designations for auditing actions as done by a Scientology auditor and are given in the symbols he would use.

1. **Misunderstood words.** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Handled with Word Clearing [Method I and Method 4 of the Word Clearing Series].)
2. **Inability to study and an inability to learn the materials.** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Handled by a Study Correction List HCOB 4 Feb 72.)
3. **Outpoints in own thinking.** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Handled by what is called an HC [Hubbard Consultant] List HCOB 28 August 70.)
4. **Personal out-ethics.** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Use P/L 3 May 72 by an auditor. Has two listing and nulling type lists.)
5. **Doing something else.** \_\_\_\_\_  
(2-way communication on P/L 3 May 72 or reorganization.)
6. **Impatient or bored with reading.** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Achieve Super-Literacy. LRH Executive Directive 178 International.)

**7. Doesn't know how to read statistics so doesn't know where to begin.**

(Learn to read stats from Management by Stat P/Ls.)

---

**8. Doesn't know the scene.**

(Achieve familiarity by direct observation.)

---

**9. Reads on and on as doesn't know how to handle and is stalling.**

(Get drilled on actual handling and become Super- Literate.)

---

**10. Afraid to take responsibility for the consequences if wrong.**

(HCOB 10 May 72 Robotism. Apply it.)

---

**11. Falsely reporting.**

(Pull all withholds and harmful acts on the subject.)

---

**12. Assumes the Why before starting.**

(Level IV service facsimile triple auditing.)

---

**13. Feels stupid about it.**

(Get IQ raised by general processing.)

---

**14. Has other intentions.**

(Audit on L9S or Expanded Dianetics.)

---

**15. Has other reasons not covered in above.**

(Listing and nulling to blowdown F/N item on the list.)

---

**16. Has withholds about it.**

(Get them off.)

---

**17. Has had wrong reasons found.**

(C/S Series 78.)

---

**18. Not interested in success.**

(P/L 3 May 72 and follow as in 14 above.)

---

**19. Some other reason.**

---

(Find it by 2-way comm.)

**20. No trouble in the first place.**

(Indicate it to person.)

When this list is assessed one can easily spot why the person is having trouble with the Data Series or applying it. When these reasons are handled, one can then get the series restudied and word cleared and restudied and it will be found that evaluations are much easier to do and much more rapidly done.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 25 MAY 1973

Remimeo

*Data Series 27*

**SUPPLEMENTARY EVALUATIONS**

(Starrate all evaluators)

If one knows how to evaluate an existing scene correctly (which means by the purest and most exacting application of the Data Series) and still does not achieve an improvement toward the ideal scene, several things may be the reason.

First amongst these is of course poor evaluation. Second would be a considerable disagreement in the evaluated scene with the WHY, especially if it is interpreted as condemnatory. Third would be a failure to obtain actual compliance with the targets in the evaluation. Fourth would be interference points or areas which, although affecting the scene being evaluated, are not looked at in relationship to it.

In any scene being evaluated, there are two areas which are not likely to get much attention from the evaluator as they may not be remarked on in any of the reports or data being used in his evaluation. These two types of area are (1) **local environment** and (2) **relay points and lines between policy and order source and the scene itself**.

These two areas may be looked at as (1) the plane upon which the scene exists and (2) the upper stages of authority under which the scene reacts.

**THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT**

The surrounding area to the scene being evaluated in the matter or a person would be the general third dynamic or other dynamic in which he or she lives his day-to-day life and which influences the person and therefore influences his hat or post. The search for the WHY which exactly causes Joe or Joanna to fail to hold post or wear a hat and which when handled will greatly better Joe or Joanna may well be their reactions to environments at their level and which may be or may not be there with them. Family or distant friends, not visible to an evaluator, or the work environment or on-the-job friends of Joe or Joanna may greatly influence Joe or Joanna.

This might prove too inviting for the evaluator to blame environment for the state of the existing scene and a caution would have to be introduced: that any WHY must lead to a bettered scene and must not just explain it.

### EVAL BY RELAY PTS.

Thus, in such a problem it should be understood that one has **two** existing scenes, one, the person and two, his environment; that they interrelate does not make them just one scene. Thus two evaluations about Joe or Joanna are possible, each with its program. To go about it otherwise is likely to prove as unsuccessful as the original evaluation of the person. Life and orders are reaching Joe or Joanna through relay points which are not ordinarily taken into consideration. Thus those areas should be separately evaluated. Usually, in the case of a person, something would have to be done to those areas, on the same plane as the person, by the person himself. So the program might include what the person himself could do about them.

The local environment of a material object, such as a machine or an office or a vehicle, may also be evaluated as well as the machine or the office or vehicle itself.

In short, there are relay points of difficulties that produce situations, on the same plane as the person or thing being evaluated. And these make **additional** evaluations possible and often profitable to the evaluator in terms of bettered ideal scenes. Yet at first glance, or using only the usual reports, it may seem that there is only one situation such as the person himself.

Completely in the interests of justice, it is unfair to put down a target in some greater area situation like "Remove Joe." It may well be that stats did go down when Joe was appointed to a post. Well, that may be perfectly true. But by only then evaluating Joe and not the greater zone of Joe's *personal* scenes, one may very well come up with a very wrong and abrupt and unjust target. **Who** in other words, when found, may not solve the scene at all even when one only targets it as "specially train" or "audit" without removal. There may be another scene that is having an effect on Joe which, if not evaluated properly with a proper program of its own, will make nonsense out of any program about Joe himself related only to his post or position. Another scene may be relaying fatality to Joe which if unhandled will unsuit him to any other post of any other kind.

Thus Joe and Joanna would have, each of them, **two** or more full evaluations possible. What the person is failing at or not doing on the job may have a plain enough **Why** that can be corrected by programming and moved to an ideal scene or at least toward it. What is hitting the person at an environmental or familial or social level might be an entirely different situation, requiring its own evaluation, with a proper **Why** and program for Joe or Joanna to carry out themselves or even with some help from others.

In a broader case, we have, let us say, an organization or division that is in a situation. One, of course, can evaluate it as itself, finding a proper **Why** and a nice bright idea and a program'. And one can also do a second evaluation of the local environment. This might be the society or an adjacent division or even another organization. And this will require the location of a situation and finding its **Why** and working out a program to handle that can be done by the org or the division itself or with help from outside.

The local environment outside the scene being evaluated is then a proper subject for another evaluation.

It is a serious error to only evaluate the local environment as all too often the person or org or division will insist that that is the **only** situation and also that it is totally beyond any



remedy by their own actions. Thus, if the evaluator is going to evaluate the local environment of a subject that is in a situation, he does it **after** he has evaluated the subject on its own ground totally.

### EVALUATION OF ECHELONS

On any command or communication channel there are always a certain number of points extending from source through relay points down to the final receipt or action point. These may be very numerous. Some may be beyond the authority of any evaluator. But each is capable of having **its own situation** that will cause an evaluation of the receipt or action point to fail.

These can be called "echelons" or step-like formations. The receipt or action point that is to comply finally with the program may be the subject of hidden sources of effect in the relay points of any program or order.

Thus, as in the case of a dangerous decline of some activity somewhere, an evaluator has several evaluations possible and probably necessary.

It would be, by experience, a severe error to try to evaluate all these different scenes (such as many echelons each in a different area) in one evaluation and find a **Why** for the lot as one is attempting to find a single **Why** for several different scenes in different places which violates the strict purity of evaluation procedure.

One may find the exact and correct **Why** for the point of action and do a splendid program only to find that somehow it didn't come off or didn't last. Yet it was the right **Why** for that scene. Hidden from view is the influence on that scene from one or more upper echelons which have, themselves, an individual situation and need their own **Why** and their own program. Only then can the influence on the action point be beneficial in its entirety.

There is a system by which this is done.

1. One recognizes that there is a situation in an area which has not responded well to previous evaluation or has not maintained any benefit received very long.
2. One realizes that there are several, echelons above the point being evaluated.
3. One draws these points without omission. This makes a sort of graph or command chart. It includes every command or comm relay point above the level of the point being evaluated.
4. The points, if any, **below** the point under consideration as in I above are then added to the chart below it.
5. One now undertakes a brief study of **each** of these points above and below to see if any have a situation of its own that could influence the success or failure of the original point evaluated as in I above.
6. One does a full separate evaluation of each of these echelon points where any situation seems to exist. Each of the evaluations done must have its own local situation, **Why** and program. Care is taken not to evaluate "n o- situations."

Care is also taken to keep this **Series** of evaluations consistent with the main idea of remedying I above.

7. The evaluations are released as a series and executed as feasible.

In doing such a series, brand new data may leap out as to the interrelationship of all these relay points and this may bring about a recommendation for a change of organization requiring new policy. But this would be another evaluation entirely as it is in effect an evaluation of basic organizational policy and may even require that tech be issued or withdrawn.

Take a case where the area which has not bettered or sustained a betterment has in actual fact two echelons below it and six above. The area, let us say, is a continental management office of an international hotel chain. Below it are its state offices and below that the hotels on that continent. Above it is the international comm relay center, the international headquarters executive at international headquarters for that continent, above that the international management organization, above that the chief executive of the international management organization, above that the advisors to the board and above that the board itself.

By drawing these out as a series of echelons one sees that there is potentially a series of eight evaluations in addition to the main evaluation of that continental office which is where the situation originally was. By scanning over all these eight other influencing areas, one may find one or more of them which have situations of real influence on the original evaluation subject.

One then evaluates separately and handles separately **while still going on handling the original subject**.

One can then also do the local environment evaluation of the original subject if there seems to be a situation there.

No evaluation is done where there is no situation. But one should assert in a covering note to the series that there are no known situations in the remaining points.

Doing a series of evaluations and local environment evaluations can be extremely fruitful only so long as one realizes that they comprise separate situations which only by their influence are preventing an ideal scene from being achieved in the original area where betterment cannot be attained or maintained.

Supplementary evaluations, when necessary and when done, can rescue a long series of apparently fruitless evaluations of a subject and move the evaluator himself toward a more ideal and happier scene of success.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1973R

Issue I-R  
Revised 22 June 1975

Remimeo

***Data Series 28R***

(Data Series 28 is cancelled because it could be misinterpreted and I did not authorize its release. The data contained in it would have been written by me as a P/L had I considered them vital to evaluation.)

**CHECKING EVALS**

In checking over the evaluations of others, there is no substitute for following the hard and fast rule of insisting upon

- a. Purity of evaluation
- b. Consistency
- c. Workability
- d. Authenticity of the data.

There are no small rules. To quote one of these, "The situation is the direct opposite of the ideal scene." This is not necessarily true and is not a precise definition. A situation is the most major departure from the ideal scene. That's purity by definition.

A Why is not necessarily opposite to an ideal scene. But it is of the same order of thing.

- Example: Stat of Income Divided by Staff sunk to 15 cent.
- Ideal Scene: Staff producing under competent management.
- Sit: Execs not coming to work.
- Why: The ED has forbidden any exec to be paid.

If you look this over it is consistent. But it is not reversals or opposites.

The stat found the area, the ideal scene was easy. Search of data found the sit as the biggest departure. Further search found the Why. Further search and knowledge of the existing scene would get a bright idea (which would not be sacking the ED who is probably the only one coming to work, but more likely getting the ED and execs into a hello-okay session and resolve their hates and ordering execs be paid at once).

## THE COMMON BUG

(Orders of Day Item 24 Feb 75)

"I found that getting the sit was a common bug. Evidently people don't do a real stat analysis and get an ideal scene, look for its furthest departure and get the sit and then look for data and find the Why.

"There are many ways to go about it but the above is easy, simple and foolproof.

"It would look like this on a worksheet:

"GDS analysis to find the area and a conditional guess.

"Ideal scene for that area.

"Biggest depart from it for the **Situation**.

- Stats
- Data
- Outpoint counts
- Why
- Ethics
- Why
- **Who**
- Ideal scene
- Handling
- Bright idea.

"If you're very good your GDS analysis will get confirmed by data.

"The real Why opens the door to handling.

"And you can handle.

"This doesn't change eval form. It's just a working model.

"All good evals are very consistent-all on same railroad track. Not pies, sea lions, space ships. But pies, apples, flour, sugar, stoves.

"I think evaluators get dispersed and Q and A with data, lacking any guideline. And so take a near forever.

"Last one I did, the GDS analysis gave the whole scene and then it got confirmed, all on the same outline as above. That org is still booming!

"It took 6½ hours, *including* doing the majority of the targets!

"It doesn't take days or weeks, much less months!

"It takes hours."

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1973  
Issue I

Remimeo

*Data Series 29*

**OUTPOINTS, MORE**

I recently surveyed a number of possible new outpoints. Almost all of them were simply the basic outpoints in a different guise and needed no special category.

However, two new outpoints did emerge that are in addition to the basic number.

The new outpoints are

**ADDED TIME**

In this outpoint we have the reverse of dropped time. In added time we have, as the most common example, something taking longer than it possibly could. To this degree it is a version of conflicting data = something takes three weeks to do but it is reported as taking six months. But added time must be called to attention as an outpoint in its own right for there is a tendency to be reasonable about it and not see that it IS an outpoint in itself.

In its most severe sense, added time becomes a very serious outpoint when, for example, two or more events occur at the same moment involving, let us say, the same person who could not have experienced both. Time had to be **added** to the physical universe for the data to be true. Like this: "I left for Saigon at midnight on April 21st, 1962, by ship from San Francisco." "I took over my duties at San Francisco on April 30th, 1962." Here we have to add time to the physical universe for both events to occur as a ship would take two or three weeks to get from San Francisco to "Saigon."

Another instance, a true occurrence and better example of added time happened when I once sent a checklist of actions it would take a month to complete to a junior executive and received compliance in full in the next return mail. The checklist was in her hands only one day! She would have had to add 29 days to the physical universe for the compliance report to be true. This is also dropped time on her part.

**ADDED INAPPLICABLE DATA**

Just plain added data does not necessarily constitute an outpoint. It may be someone being thorough. But when the data is in no way applicable to the scene or situation and is added it is a definite outpoint.

Example: Long, long reams of data on an eval write-up, none of which is giving any clue to the outpoints on the scene. By actual survey it was found that the person doing it did not know any Why (not having used outpoints to find it) and was just stalling.

Often added data is put there to cover up neglect of duty or mask a real situation. It certainly means the person is obscuring something.

Usually added data also contains other types of outpoints like wrong target or added time.

In using this outpoint be very sure you also understand the word *inapplicable* and see that it is only an outpoint if the data itself does not apply to the subject at hand.

There is more about another already named outpoint:

### WRONG SOURCE

This is the opposite direction from *wrong target*.

An example would be a president of the United States in 1973 using the opinions and congratulations of Soviet leaders to make his point with American voters.

A more common version of this, not unknown in intelligence report grading for probability, would be a farmer in Iowa reporting a Mexican battleship on Mud Creek. The farmer would be a wrong source for accurate naval reports.

A private taking an order from a sergeant that countermands an order he had from a lieutenant would be an example of wrong source.

What is sometimes called a "Hey You" "organization" is one that takes orders from anyone = a repeating outpoint of wrong source.

There are many examples of this outpoint. It must be included as a very important outpoint on its own. It produces a chaos of illogical ideas and actions when present.

### PLUSPOINTS

**Correct Time** or the expected time period is a pluspoint.

**Adequate Data** is a pluspoint.

**Applicable Data** is a pluspoint.

**Correct Source** is a pluspoint.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1973  
Issue II

Remimeo

*Data Series 30*

**SITUATION FINDING**

There is an ironbound rule in handling things:

**Where you find outpoints you will  
there also find a situation.**

If several outpoints come to view in any scene (or even one), if you look further you will find a situation.

There is not any real art to finding situations if you can see outpoints.

The sequence is simple. (1) You see some outpoints in a scene, (2) you investigate and "pull a few strings" (meaning follow down a chain of outpoints) and (3) you will find a situation, and (4) then you can evaluate.

Statistics are leaders in pointing the way. They should be X, they are not X. That is conflicting data. Behind that you will find a situation.

If anyone has any trouble finding situations then one of three things is true (a) he cannot recognize outpoints when he sees them, (b) he does not have any concept of the ideal scene or want it, or (c) he does not know how to pull strings, which is to say ask for or look for data.

On the positive side, to find situations one has to (A) be able to recognize outpoints, (B) has to have some idea of an ideal scene and want it, and (C) has to be able to "pull strings."

Evaluation is very much simpler when you realize that the art lies in finding situations. To then find a Why is of course only a matter of counting outpoints and recognizing what (that can be handled) is retarding the achievement of a more ideal scene.

**REASONABLENESS**

One often wonders why people are so "reasonable" about intolerable and illogical situations.

The answer is very simple: they cannot recognize outpoints when they see them and so try to make everything seem logical.

The ability to actually see an outpoint for what it is, in itself is an ability to attain some peace of mind. For one can realize it is what it is, an outpoint. It is not a matter for human emotion and reaction. It is a pointer toward a situation.

The moment you can see this you will be able to handle life a lot better.

The human reaction is to **react!** to an outpoint. And then get "reasonable" and adopt some explanation for it, usually untrue.

You can safely say that "being reasonable" is a symptom of being unable to recognize outpoints for what they are and use them to discover actual situations.

### NATIVE THINK

It may come as a surprise or no surprise at all that the ability to evaluate as given in this Data Series is not necessarily native to a being.

In a native state a being detests illogic and rejects it. He seldom uses it for any other purposes than humor or showing up a rival in debate as a fool or using it in justice or a court of law to prove the other side wrong or guilty.

A being is dedicated to being logical and he does, usually, a wonderful job of it.

But when he encounters illogic he often feels angry or frustrated or helpless.

He has not, so far as I know, ever used illogic as a systematic tool for thinking.

Certain obsolete efforts to describe Man's thinking processes stressed "associative thought" and various other mechanisms to prove Man a fully logical "animal." The moment they tried to deal with illogic they assigned it to aberration and sought drugs, tortures or executions that would "cure it." None of them ever thought of *using* illogic as a tool of rational thinking! Thus they did not advance anyone's intelligence and conceived intelligence as unchangeable and fixed.

The only Greek school of philosophy that dealt with illogic was the Sophist school. But even they had no real idea of the illogic. They were employed by politicians to make their political acts seem *reasonable!*

Even humorists have no real idea of illogic. Reading their ideas of the theory of humor shows them to be off the mark. They don't really know what is "funny."

Laughter is rejection, actually.

And humor you will find usually deals with one or another outpoint put in such a way that the reader or audience can reject it.

The groan of most humorists is that too often their hearers go reasonable on them. **Pat.** "Who was that hobo I saw you with last night?" **Mike:** "That wasn't no oboe, that was my fife." **Listener** (puzzled): "But maybe it was a very slender hobo."

The tendency of a being is to try to keep it reasonable, logical, rational. And that is of course a very praiseworthy impulse or all life's endeavors might unhinge.

The fear of being illogical is a secret fear of being crazy or insane. (Not an idle fear when psychiatry was roaming around loose.) Or at the least being thought a fool or dullard or at the very very least, unworldly and uneducated.

To evaluate and be a fine evaluator is to be able to prevent a slump toward a painful collapse. And to be able to steer the way from the non-ideal present to the ideal future.

A person who feels queasy about his sanity really doesn't dare look at outpoints or confront and use illogic. Yet it is the way to full sanity itself.

The ability to evaluate puts one at cause over both the mad and ideal. It places a being at a height it is unlikely he has ever before enjoyed in the realm of commanding the situations of life.

Evaluation is a new way to think.

It is very worthwhile to acquire such an ability as it is doubtful if it ever before has been achieved.

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HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 25 NOVEMBER 1973  
Issue I  
Corrected and reissued 17 May 1974

Remimeo

*Data Series 31*

**FINAL TARGETS**

The first, foremost and most usual reason evaluations fail is because the programs to handle are not done.

The evaluator, with all the study for an ideal scene, the exhaustive search for data and the collection and count of outpoints and pluspoints, with the discovery thereafter of the right Why and the brightest of ideas to handle may yet be totally defeated by the simple fact that no one ever chases up the target execution and gets the program really and honestly **done**.

He can even have someone who is responsible for getting his program executed only to find they are themselves issuing additional or even contrary orders. Or even issuing whole new programs which have no relation to evaluation at all.

Circumstances have been found where a person with the duty of getting targets done was so deficient in the ability to confront that he accepted any excuse at all and was even pushed over into other subjects. The remedy for this of course is HCOB 21 Nov 73, "The Cure of Q & A, Man's Deadliest Disease."

It can be so bad that persons entrusted with target execution *did not even speak to or approach any person who had a target to do* while not reporting at all or reporting marvelous progress with the program!

So, sad to have to relate, it is not enough to be a fantastic and able evaluator. If the program is never truly done, the evaluation is merely a mental exercise.

The ability to supervise and obtain cooperation and execution is mandatory for the skill of any evaluator.

HCO P/L I Sept 73, "Admin Know-How No. 30" and HCO P/L 15 Oct 73, Admin Know-How Series 31, "Administrative Skill," give the evaluator some of the additional data he needs to obtain execution of his programs.

One can say right here that the thought, "Oh well, I'm just a sort of technician here and it's really not up to me to **run** things. I just evaluate and it's up to 'them' to see that they carry it out," is very likely to occur.

But if one's repute as an evaluator is to be established, it will come about because

**The Existing Scene moved up markedly toward or became the Ideal Scene.**

If that does not occur, then seniors or workers don't blame the supervisors or communicators. They blame the evaluator. "Oh him! He evaluated the building situation and look, the whole situation went to hell."

No justice at all. The data and Why and all the rest were quite right. The on-paper evaluation was perfect. It would have "handled the hell" out of it. But lamentably the program just was never done. Altered or falsely reported or untouched, the targets just weren't done.

So the test of an evaluation is:

**Did it move the Existing Scene toward or attain the Ideal Scene?**

And that *cannot occur* without the program being fully and totally and correctly *done*.

See also HCO P/L 26 Jan 72, "Not-dones, Half-dones and Backlogs" for more data on this.

Thus it is **vital** that four final targets exist on *every* evaluation,

These are

\_\_\_\_\_ Fourth from last number of the evaluation program.) Verify from personal *inspection of* the existing evidence or the scene itself that every target has been fully done without omission, alteration, falsehood or exaggerated reports.

**Evaluator.**

\_\_\_\_\_ (Third from last number of the evaluation program.) Look at current statistics and the results of the above inspection and the **situation** of this evaluation as written above **and see if the situation is no longer a threat.**

**Evaluator.**

\_\_\_\_\_ (Second from last number of the evaluation program.) Look again at the **Ideal Scene** as written above. Then look at the above two targets and further investigate and **see if the Ideal Scene has now been approached more closely or attained.**

**Evaluator.**

\_\_\_\_\_ (Last numbered target of the evaluation program.) (A) If the above three targets do not show a favorable approach toward or attainment of the **Ideal Scene**, gather new data, investigate further and **re-evaluate** or (B) If the **Ideal Scene** has been more closely approached or attained the following commendations or awards are assigned:

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**Evaluator.** \_\_\_\_\_

This signifies the conclusion of the evaluation.

(Note: The last four targets may be made available on a mimeograph sheet for the use of an evaluator in ending off his evaluation.)

By using this program ending, it is abundantly clear to all those concerned with the evaluation including the evaluator that

**The program and its successful execution are an integral part of an evaluation.**

Unless the program is fully, truthfully and successfully done, an evaluation alone cannot remedy any situation and the ideal scene will not be attained.

The reason for and the final objective of any evaluation is the approach toward or attainment of the **Ideal Scene**.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 14 DECEMBER 1973

Remimeo

*Data Series 32*

**TARGET TROUBLES**  
**TARGETS JUNIOR TO POLICY**

A target given on an evaluation may not set aside management policy or technical releases.

Where such a target is written or misused to supplant policy a great deal of trouble can follow.

Example: Org policy in authorized issues states that accounts for the week must be finalized at 2:00 P.M. Thursday. Someone writes an evaluation and puts a target in it to end the week on Sunday. People doing the target actions change to Sunday. This is out of phase with all other actions and chaos results.

People tend to take orders from anyone and anything in a poorly organized area.

When they use evaluation or project targets instead of policy the whole structure may begin to cave in.

**No eval TGT is senior to official issues and where these conflict the target has the junior position.**

The only way a target can change policy is to propose that such and such a policy be officially reviewed on proper channels or that a new policy be written and passed upon properly by those in actual authority.

Someone attempting to do a target who finds that it conflicts with policy or official technical releases and yet goes on and does the target is of course actionable.

**TARGETS OUT OF CONTEXT**

**Context:** "The interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs."

**Out of Context:** Something written or done without relation to the principal meaning of a work.

Targets must be written within the meaning of the whole evaluation.

Example: The evaluation is about pie. There is a target that says to polish shoes just because the evaluator happened to think of it and squeezed it into the program. A program written to increase pies winds up with the ideal scene of polished shoes. No pies get increased so the evaluation fails.

Targets must be **done** within the *context* of the evaluation.

Example: An evaluation is done to increase central office collections. It calls for another evaluation to be done on a statistic. The person doing that target reduces the number of items collected upon and crashes central office collections.

The person **did not read or understand the whole evaluation** before he did the target and so did it in a way that accidentally defeats the ideal scene.

Example: An evaluation is done to fill up a big hotel of 450 guest capacity. One of its targets calls for project orders sending a team to the hotel. The person who writes the project orders does not look at the evaluation or the hotel plans and specifies 30 guests must be gotten! The evaluation is defeated.

### FALSELY EVALUATING

A person who evaluates a situation without chasing up all the data or even looking at the data in his files can bring about a false evaluation.

Example: A person has come back into an organization at a high level. The place crashes. The evaluator does not examine personnel changes at the time of the crash and comes up with "too many football games" as his Why and the evaluation fails.

### FALSE DONES

False reports that a target has been done when it has not been touched or has been half done at best is actionable in that he is defeating not only the evaluation but the organization.

Example: The evaluator has an ideal scene of repaired machines that will increase production. The mechanic reports all machines repaired now when he has not even touched them. The evaluator sees production remains low, looks around for a new Why. But his Why is falsely reported dones on his accurate eval!

### PERSONAL CONTACT

Targets seldom get done without personal contact.

Evaluations should carry the name or post of the person who is overall responsible for the completion of the program.

Sitting at a desk while one is trying to get people to do targets has yet to accomplish very much. One can have messengers or communicators or Flag Representatives getting the targets done but these in turn must depend upon personal contact.

A person assigned responsibility for getting a whole program done is not likely to accomplish much without personal contact being made.

This can be done on a via. Mr. A in location A remote from Mr. C in location C can get a target done reliably only if he has a Mr. B in that area whose sole duty it is to personally

contact Mr. C and have Mr. C get on with it despite all reasons why not. That is how targets get done. That is also how they can be reviewed.

Target troubles are many unless the program is under direct contact supervision. Even then targets get "bugged" (stalled). But the evaluator can find out why if personal contact is made and the target can be pushed through.

## SUCCESS

Therefore the success of an evaluation in attaining an ideal scene depends in no small measure on

1. Both evaluator and target executor realizing policy and technical materials are senior to targets in programs and that targets do not set senior policy aside. One of the best ways to prevent this is to know and refer to policy and technical issues in targets.
2. Targets must be written in context with the evaluation and done in context with the ideal scene. The best way to achieve this in writing an eval's targets is to make them consistent with the Why and ideal scene. The best way to be sure that targets will be DONE in context is to require that anyone doing a target must first read the whole evaluation (and be word cleared on it) before he does his target so that he does his target in a way to improve the existing scene in the eval not some other scene.
3. To prevent false evaluation one may require that the evaluator attests that all **pertinent data and statistics have been examined and to discipline** such failures whenever an evaluation fails.
4. To prevent false dones one must review the evidence of dones and statistics after the program is complete and discipline all falsely reporting persons and re-assign the targets or in any way possible get them actually done.
5. The way to get a whole program done, target by target, is through personal contact. Supervise it by personal contact with those assigned the targets. Or use a communicator or messenger. Where the people doing the targets are remote from the evaluator one must have someone there to do the personal contact. And be sure THAT person isn't just sitting at a desk but is actually doing personal contact on targets. Thus all evaluations, on the issue itself or by organizational pattern, should have someone who can personally contact people getting the targets done fully and completely.

If these points about evaluations and their programs are understood, one can and only then can move things toward the ideal scene.

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HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex  
HCO POLICY LETTER OF 3 JULY 1974RB  
Re-revised 6 November 1978  
Re-revised 29 January 1979

(Only revision is addition of items Y and Z)  
(Revisions in this type style)

Remimeo

*Data Series 33RB*

**EVALUATION, CRITICISM OF**

There are six duties of a person who is responsible for passing evaluations:

1. To see that the evaluation is correct and that it can accomplish or approach the ideal scene,
2. That those doing evaluations, by the process of the criticism itself, become trained and better evaluators,
3. That persons doing evaluations become correctly and well-trained by the process of training, cramming and, as needed, ethics,
4. To see that evaluations do occur on existing situations,
5. To see that unevaluated situations do not exist and,
6. To make sure that the Data Series is used to its full potential.

When an evaluation is rejected, care must be taken that the criticism is correct and not capricious.

If one gives out-tech criticisms of evaluations, no evaluator will really ever learn evaluation. He will just become confused and desperate. The quality of evaluations will deteriorate and the Data Series potential will be defeated.

Therefore the only criteria that may be used in calling attention to outnesses in an eval, a requested rewrite or correction are

- A) Purity of form (all parts of an eval included).
- B) Verification of stats.
- C) Date coincidence correct and proven on graphs, using all graphs that have to do with the situation.
- D) GDS analysis supporting the eval (stat management P/Ls apply).
- E) Exactly offered data not borne out by an inspection of files.

- F) No situation.
- G) Insufficiently broad situation.
- H) Inconsistent – Policy – Situation – Stats – Data – Why – Ideal Scene – Handling – Tgts, not on same subject. The inconsistency must be precisely pointed out.
- I) Outpoints in the eval itself-such as in bright idea or handling, etc. The outpoint must be precisely noted and named. This does not include outpoints in the data section which are the outpoints on which the eval is based.
- J) Not all pertinent or available data applicable or needed was examined by the evaluator. The excluded data must be exactly stated as to what it is and where found. Not looking at all applicable or important data makes it a partial eval.
- K) Wrong Why.
- L) Weak handling.
- M) Handling does not include targets to handle directly or indirectly the more serious outnesses found in the data mentioned.
- N) Absence of ethics handling on serious ethics matters found in the data mentioned or of the ethics Why.
- O) No method of implementing the evaluation or maintaining the scene and getting its targets done. Such as a broken line between evaluator and scene or omitted terminals or ethics Who(s) depended upon to do the targets.
- P) Sequence of handling incorrect or omitted. A production target must come first. Errors of solid organize for many early consecutive targets without production in them, no organizing at all are flunks.
- Q) Vague generalities in postings which do not name the new person or the person to replace the person being moved up.
- R) Musical chairs.
- S) No resources or ways to get them or non-utilization of known resources or excessive use of resources for no real gain.
- T) Off-policy orders or orders that set policy.
- U) No target or targets to get in the policies mentioned under "Policy."
- V) Unreadable or illegible presentation of the eval for criticism or review.
- W) Failure to return eval promptly with corrections.
- X) Bright idea isn't bright enough.
- Y) *No eval.*
- Z) *No data trail, incorrect data trail.*

If the reviewer, corrector or critic of evaluations does the above **and nothing else** he will be rewarded with better and better evaluations, less and less time spent correcting, more and more gain by use of the Data Series and a happier and more productive scene entirely.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 18 JULY 1974

Remimeo

*Data Series 34*

**SITUATION CORRECTION**

I have just reviewed a number of attempted evaluations and was struck by the similarity of errors in them. None of these evaluations would have reached any ideal scene or even improved the existing scene.

The real reason for this is that the majority of them had a highly generalized situation such as "Bidawee Biscuit Company failing" or "Stats down from last year." They then proceeded on a data trail and got a "Why."

In these cases the Why they found was actually the situation!

Each of them had failed to use the data trail to find the situation. They were using the data trail to find a Why!

The evals then had no Why.

The handling was just a bunch of orders that were in fact unevaluated orders since no real Why had been found,

Like in playing a game these evaluators had started 50 feet back of the starting line and when they got to the starting line (the situation) they assumed it was the finish.

If you look at an "evaluation" that has a generalized "situation" like "continental products getting fewer" you will find in a lot of cases (not always accurately) that what was put down as the "Why" was in fact the situation. This left the "eval" without a Why. Thus the ideal scene would be wrong and the handling ineffective.

Example: (not in form) "Situation: Gus Restaurant failing." "Data: Customers refusing food, etc., etc." "Why: The food isn't good." "Ideal scene: A successful Gus Restaurant." "Handling: Force Gus to serve better food, etc., etc." That isn't an eval. That is an observation that if Gus Restaurant is to survive it better get evaluated. It is being eval'd because it *isn't* surviving. Now look at this: The data trail led to "the food isn't good." *That's* a situation. Why isn't it good enough? Well it turns out the cook got 15% commission from the store for buying bad food at high prices. And Gus didn't know this. So bang, we handle. Gus Restaurant achieves ideal scene of "Gus Restaurant serving magnificent chow."

In this example if you used the situation for a Why the Who would probably be Gus!

The data trail of outpoints from a highly general "situation" (that is only an observation like failing stats) will lead one to the situation and *then* a closer look (also by outpoints) will lead one to the real Why and permit fast handling.

### **DATA TRAIL**

People can get too fixated on the history of something. They can call this a "data trail." Well, all right, if it's a trail of outpoints.

But significances of history have little to do with evaluation.

Let us say you see the machine division is failing.

Now if you simply take masses of data about it and just start turning over 10 or 12 sheets at a time looking for outpoints only and keep a tally of what they are and to whom they belong, you will wind up with your situation area and probably your situation without reading any significances at all.

Now that you have your area and situation in it You can start really reading all about it and get that existing scene's data and its outpoints. And your Why leaps at you.

### **SUBSTITUTION**

You can't substitute stats for a situation or a situation for a Why.

But substitution of one part of an eval for another is a common fault.

Substituting a general hope for the ideal scene you really would and could achieve makes a sort of failed feeling in an eval. "Gus Restaurant being best in town" is nice but "Lots of customers very well fed so Gus Restaurant survives" is what you are trying to achieve. That can occur and will be reached if you find the real Why.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 19 JULY 1974

Remimeo

*Data Series 35*

**EVAL CORRECTION**

An evaluation submitted for an okay is only reviewed to the first major outness (see HCO P/L 3 July 74, Data Series 33) and is then returned for correction.

Only when no major correction is necessary does one then verify all data or go to an extensive review of the whole eval.

This makes the line very fast. It also saves a great deal of work by one and all. If the stats are incorrectly given, that's it. Reject. If the Why is really the situation, that's it.

On the reject one gives the letter of Data Series 33 that is not correct and any reference to the Data Series that would seem helpful.

An evaluation corrector will see how well this rejection system works when you find that the eval, let us say, has no situation on it, but only some stats. Why verify anything as a whole new body of data may have to be found.

In correcting evals, if a situation is given, I usually call for the main stats of the unit being evaluated to see if these show any reason to handle it at all. I recently found an activity had had its chief removed when his stats were in Power. The activity then crashed. And that was the situation. It was made by an evaluator and an eval corrector not looking at the stats!

If no error exists in situation or stats I read the eval down to bright idea and look especially at the Why, ideal scene and handling to see if one would make the others.

If that's okay, I look at the targets of handling and the resources.

If those are okay, I look at data and outpoints. If these are all okay, I then verify the data. But if at any of these steps I find an error, I then reject at once for immediate correction. Often, by using only basic things to reject, the whole eval has to be redone as the basics are so far wrong.

If you try to correct the whole thing before rejecting or if you correct tiny little things instead of the big ones, the whole line slows. Eval correction should be a fast, helpful line, strictly on-policy, no opinion.

That way the job of correction becomes easier and easier.

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HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 11 AUGUST 1974

Remimeo

*Data Series 36*

**ENVISIONING THE IDEAL SCENE**

If one cannot envision the ideal scene, one is not likely to be able to *see* a situation or get one.

**A situation is the most major departure from the Ideal Scene.**

Thus:

**One must be able to envision an Ideal Scene to find a situation.**

A lot of "ideal scenes" you see are just glib. An afterthought.

Some people know the proper scene so well they at once recognize that a departure from it has occurred, which is fine. But such people do not realize, when they are teaching evaluation or correcting evals, that others may not know the proper scene well enough to get an idea of what *the* ideal scene should be. Thus, a wrong target occurs. The teacher or corrector keeps putting attention on the incorrectness of the situation given in the eval instead of noticing that the ideal scene is adrift.

An ideal scene is **future**.

When one is stuck on the time track it may seem pretty difficult to envision a *future*.

In politics this is called "reactionary" or "conservative." These mean any resistance to change even when it is an improvement. The bad old days seem to be the good old days to such people. Yet the old days will not come again. One has to make the new days good.

"Liberals," "socialists" and such make great propaganda out of this. They inveigh against (criticize) conservatives and say the future must be reckoned with. And they hold up some often incredible future scene and say the way to it is by "revolution" or destroying everything that was.

Both viewpoints could be severely criticized. The conservative tries to stick on the time track with no reality on the fact that today will be yesterday in 24 hours. The super-liberal skips tomorrow entirely and goes up the track 5 or 10 years to a perfect state which can never exist or is falsely represented as possible.

In between these two viewpoints we have the *attainable*.

And we come to an ideal scene that is possible and will occur if the Why is right and handling is correct and done.

Envisioning an attainable future requires some connection with reality.

There is no harm at all in dreaming wonderful dreams for the future. It's almost the bread of life.

But how about giving oneself a crashing failure by disconnecting from any reality?

Some laborers do this to themselves. Taking no steps to attain it, they daydream themselves as kings or some other grand identity. Well, all right. But that isn't an "ideal scene." That's a delusion engaged upon for self-gratification in a dream world.

One can not only dream a *possible* ideal scene but he *can* attain it.

So an ideal scene is **something that can be attained**.

It should be quite real.

Some people setting unreal quotas are really setting some impossible ideal scene. "Complete this work in 1 hour!" to someone working hard on a job that will take 4 days is delusory. It is setting, without saying so, the ideal scene of having a worker who is really a magician! Well, maybe if he were audited and hatted he would be. But that's sure some ideal scene! The here and now is a guy sweating it out and trying. And that's an ideal scene that is missed!

And so are many ideal scenes missed. The offices neat and orderly might not even be imagined by someone who has seen them in a mess for two years. He may think that's the way they're supposed to be! And be quite incapable of envisioning the offices in any other condition!

Thus, if one cannot see the offices should be clean, he does not see that they are dirty and messy as a *situation*. Thus when he is told the public won't come into the place, and even if he finds the place is full of old dirty junk, he can't evaluate it as a clean orderly place would not be envisioned by him. So he doesn't get "dirty place" as a valuable datum, doesn't get "a clean orderly place that is inviting to the public" as an ideal scene, doesn't get "office so dirty the public won't go near it" as a situation and so cannot find a Why to lack of public! And so as he didn't find Why it was so dirty and disorderly, it wouldn't handle. So there would be a failed eval.

Yet the teacher or evaluation corrector would not realize the person could not envision an ideal scene and so keep telling the person to find the situation whereas the ideal scene was what was out.

You can get some very beautiful ideal scenes **and** attain them-if you can evaluate!

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 12 AUGUST 1974

Remimeo

*Data Series 37*

**WHYS OPEN THE DOOR**

You can really understand a real Why if you realize this:

**A real Why opens the door to handling.**

If you write down a Why, ask this question of it: "Does this open the door to handling?"

If it does not, then it is a wrong Why.

Backtracking to find how it is wrong, one examines the ideal scene and the situation one already has.

The outpoints should be checked. The completeness of data should be checked. One may find he is in a wrong area of the scene.

Correct that, correct the ideal scene, correct the situation and look for more data.

With the outpoints of more data one can achieve the real Why that will open the door to handling.

Quite often an "evaluator" "knows" the Why before he begins. This is fatal. Why evaluate?

Some of the most workable Whys I've ever found surprised me! So usually I also ask, did I know this? Am I surprised? The chances are, if I "knew" it already (and the situation still exists) it is a wrong Why. And needs proper evaluation.

When you have a right Why, handling becomes simple. The more one has to beat his brains for a bright idea to handle, the more likely it is that he has a wrong Why.

So if you're not a bit surprised and if the handling doesn't leap out at you **the Why has not opened the door** and is probably wrong.

I have seen evaluators take weeks to do an evaluation. In such cases they went on and on reading as they did not know how to find a real Why. Actually they did not know what one was.

By going through the total current files of an activity looking for outpoints just by randomly glancing at data sheets from all sources, you can find the **area**. Outpoints lead you straight to it.

An ideal scene for that smaller **area** is fairly easy to envision.

The type of outpoint will generally give you how the departure is. One can then get the situation.

By looking over (in detail now) the data of that smaller area and counting the outpoints, one can find the Why.

The Why will be how come the situation is such a departure from the ideal scene and **will open the door to handling.**

If it doesn't, then review the whole thing, do the steps again. Don't just sit and sag!

Let's say we find outpoints of added inapplicable data in all reports. And they lead to Reception. The ideal scene of Reception is easy: attractive pleasant atmosphere, welcoming in the public.

We find more detailed reports that the place is full of junk and filthy and we get our situation, "public repelled by filthy messy Reception."

Now why?

So back to the real data and we find the janitor never cleans it. Or anything else. The easy out is just sack the janitor (and leave the post empty). But that won't handle so we have no Why.

So we dig and dig and suddenly we find that the staff refer to the janitor in lowly and disrespectful terms: "Janitor has no status." Well, the outpoints all say so. And it opens the door to a handling.

So we handle by transferring the janitor org board position from treasury where it went as he "looks after assets" to the Office of the President with the president's secretary as his direct senior.

We write up a program for clean offices.

Magic!

The offices get clean!

The public again comes in.

The ideal scene is attained.

(You may think this example is pretty unreal. But actually it once happened and worked!)

So a right Why opens the door to handling.

If it doesn't, look harder.

**There is always a reason for things.**

And if your ideal scene and situation are correct, you can find the real Why that opens the door.



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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 3 OCTOBER 1974

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*Data Series 38*

**PLUSPOINT LIST**

The following is a list of **pluspoints** which are used in evaluation.

Needless to say, pluspoints are very important in evaluation as they show where **logic** exists and where things are going right or likely to.

**Related facts known.** (All relevant facts known.)

**Events in correct sequence.** (Events in actual sequence.)

**Time noted.** (Time is properly noted.)

**Data proven factual.** (Data must be factual, which is to say, true and valid.)

**Correct relative importance.** (The important and unimportant are correctly sorted out.)

**Expected time period.** (Events occurring or done in the time one would reasonably expect them to be.)

**Adequate data.** (No sectors of omitted data that would influence the situation.)

**Applicable data.** (The data presented or available applies to the matter in hand and not something else.)

**Correct source.** (Not wrong source.)

**Correct target.** (Not going in some direction that would be wrong for the situation.)

**Data in same classification.** (Data from two or more different classes of material not introduced as the same class.)

**Identities are identical.** (Not similar or different.)

**Similarities are similar.** (Not identical or different.)

**Differences are different.** (Not made to be identical or similar.)

The use of the word "pluspoint" in an evaluation without saying what type of pluspoint it is, is a deficiency in recognizing the different pluspoints as above. It would be like saying each outpoint is simply an outpoint without saying what outpoint it was. In doing evaluations to find why things got better so they can be repeated, it is vital to use the actual pluspoints by name as above. They can then be counted and handled as in the case of outpoints.

Pluspoints are, after all, what make things go right.

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HCO POLICY LETTER OF 28 OCTOBER 1974

Remimeo

*Data Series 39*

**WHO-WHERE FINDING**

You may now and then see an eval that winds up with a *Who*. Very rarely you also find one that winds up in a *Where*. Sometimes you find an "evaluator" who only finds Whos or Wheres.

If this puzzles you when you see such "evals" or if you land in that situation yourself while evaluating, remember this:

**An "eval" that only has a who or a where as its why is incomplete.**

What has happened is this: The "evaluator" does an outpoint count only for Who or Where. He does not then really investigate or dig up the real data on that Who or Where but lets it go at that. He says-**Why**: Dept I not functioning. **Who**: Director of Personnel. **Ideal Scene**: A functioning Dept 1. **Handling**: Shoot the Dir Personnel.

Such evals do **not** raise statistics. They do *not* work. Because they are not complete!

In *any* eval you have to do an outpoint count to find where or who to investigate. This prior outpoint count does not appear, always, on the eval form. It's just where to look.

Having gotten the Who or Where you **now** do a full read out, lift the rocks, pry into the cracks and find the Why.

It can even get worse. Having seen something wrong, one puts down a situation. He does a preliminary outpoint count for a Where or Who and *then* discovers a more basic or even worse situation. In other words his situation can change!

Example: No personnel being hired leads one to Dept 1, Personnel. So one writes the situation: "No one being hired." Then one can easily dash off, "Why: Dept I inactive. Ideal scene: An active Dept I hiring personnel." And write up a handling: "Hire people."

Great, easy as pie. *But* somehow six months later there are *still* no personnel! The reason is simple: The "evaluator" never went beyond the Who-Where. He put down a Who-Where as his Why.

Real evaluation would go this way: First observed situation, "no personnel being hired." The Who-Where comes up as Dept 1. *Now* and only now do we have something to evaluate. So our *situation* has changed. It becomes, "Dept I inactive." And we investigate and lo and behold there is no one in that whole division! Again we could go off too early. It is tempting to say, "Why: No one in it!" And say, "Handling: Put somebody in it!"

But actually "no one in it" is just data! Certainly the execs who should be screaming for personnel know there is no one in Dept 1. After all, they get cobwebs on their faces every

time they pass the door! So it is just an outpoint, not a Why as it does not securely lead to solution. So we look further. We find seven previous orders to put on a Director of Personnel! The writers of these orders are not the Whos but who they were given to are elected. That's seven noncompliances by the executive in charge of organizing! And this turns out to be Joe Schmoe. Now we have a Who. So what's with this Joe Schmoe? So we go to anything connected with Schmoe and we locate Board of Directors minutes of meetings and herein he has been stating for 2 years repeatedly that "The organization only makes so much money anyway so if we hire anybody to deliver service we might go broke." As the organization has been going broke for those two years and the last Dir Personnel was fired two years ago we now also have our **date coincidence**. But this is still just an outpoint-contrary facts, as one has to deliver to stay solvent. So we look up Joe Schmoe even further and we find he is also the chief stockholder in a rival company! So here is our Why: "Organization being suppressed by the chief stockholder in the company's rival." "Who: Joe Schmoe. Ideal scene: Organization hiring personnel needed to deliver." Now for the handling. Well, Joe Schmoe could mess things up further if we just fired him. So we better know what we're doing. We have found our organization controls the tin Joe Schmoe's company needs for its cans. So we shut off the tin supply and when Schmoe's stock falls we buy it up, merge the companies and fire Joe. Or so a businessman would do. **That** handles it!

Shallow evals that stop with a Who-Where on the first inspection don't succeed. Outpoints are usually aberrated and the people there around them usually handle things unless they have depth of mystery.

You have to have a Who-Where to *begin* your investigation. Once you find your Who or your area, now the outpoints begin to count.

Very few situations in actual fact are caused by active Whos. Usually it is inactive Whos, confronted with situations they have not grasped and don't see any way through.

A classic case was a situation that did not resolve for over a year until *very* close **investigation discovered a statistic was wrongly worked out and which targeted** an area in the wrong direction. One could have shot "Whos" by the dozen without ever solving it!

So when you see a Who-Where as a Why, you know one thing: The eval is incomplete.

You can cure someone doing this chronically by making him first list the outpoints that show Who-Where to look. And then make him go on with the evaluation outpoints that lead to a Why, giving two counts of outpoints. The light will dawn.

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HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex  
HCO POLICY LETTER OF 12 MARCH 1975  
Issue II

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*Data Series 40*

**THE IDEAL ORG**

(First appeared as LRH ED 102 INT,  
20 May 70, referring to evaluation.)

The ideal org would be an activity where people came to achieve freedom and where they had confidence they would attain it.

It would have enough space in which to train, process and administrate without crowding.

It would be located where the public could identify and find it.

It would be busy looking, with staff in motion, not standing about.

It would be clean and attractive enough not to repel its public.

Its files and papers, baskets and lines would be in good order.

The org board would be up-to-date and where the public could see who and what was where and which the staff would use for routing and action.

A heavy outflow of letters and mailings would be pouring out.

Answers would be pouring in.

Auditors would be auditing in Div IV HGC and Qual would be rather empty.

Supervisors would be training students interestedly and 2-way comming all slows.

The HCO Area Sec would have hats for everyone. And checked out on everyone.

There would be a pool of people in training to take over new admin and tech posts.

The staff would be well-paid because they were productive.

The Public Divisions would be buzzing with effective action and new people and furnishing a torrent of new names to CF.

The pcs would be getting full grades to ability attained for each, not 8 minutes from 0 to IV, but more like 30 processes. And they would be leaving with high praises.

The students would be graduating all on fire to audit.

One could look at this ideal org and know that this was the place a new civilization was being established for this planet.

The thousand or more actions that made it up would dovetail smoothly one with another.

And the PR Area Control would be such that no one would dream of threatening it.

Such an ideal org would be built by taking what one has and step by step building and smoothing, grooving in and handling each of its functions, with each of its divisions doing more and more of its full job better and better.

The business is always there-the skill with which it is handled and the results on pcs and students is the single important line which makes it possible to build the rest.

The ideal org is the image one builds toward. It is the product of the causative actions of many. Anything which is short of an ideal org is an outpoint that can be put right. The end product is not just an ideal org but a new civilization already on its way.

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